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Most conceptual design techniques for aircraft implicitly assume that the air-
craft manufacturer operates in a monopoly. This is because these techniques do not
directly account for the possible actions of a competitor. By examining several mo-
tivating examples from the aviation industry, it was determined that in the presence
of a competitor the design of an aircraft can be impacted. Therefore, current de-
sign approaches were deemed lacking because they do not account for the fact that
aircraft markets are best characterized as a duopoly where two manufacturers are
competing for market share. It was also determined that most forms of competition
can be categorized as technology infusions or enterprise-based solutions. There was
a need identified to determine how to select an appropriate strategy in the presence
of competition. This problem is further complicated by the inherent uncertainty that
exists in designing an aircraft compounded with the lack of perfect knowledge of a
competitor.
The main objective of this dissertation was to construct a framework for facili-
tating the direct comparison between an aircraft design and a competitor’s design
during the early phases of conceptual design. This framework should parametri-
cally account for design considerations and possible competitive strategies in an in-
tegrated environment to not only analyze the physical performance of an aircraft,
but also the economic viability for a given market. This lead to the development of
the Competition-influenced Decision Support (CoDeS) Framework, which allows for
the interactive exploration of competitive strategies using exploratory or normative
forecasting. These strategies were assessed using a validated modeling and simula-
tion environment by implementing the established technique of k-factors to represent
xxvi
technology strategies and the developed technique of λ-factors to represent enterprise
strategies.
In order to gain a clear understanding about the interdependencies that exist
between an aircraft design, a competitor’s design, and competitive strategies (tech-
nology and enterprise), the effects of uncertainty were mitigated using a two-step
approach. First, the large variability from the effects of uncertainty where mitigated
by using scenario-based analysis. Secondly, a hybrid formulation using a modified
Taguchi’s signal-to-noise ratio approach combined with a multi-criteria decision mak-
ing technique. Two techniques were considered: an overall evaluation criterion and
the technique for ordered preferences by similarity to ideal solution to compare strate-
gies between two aircraft competing for market share.
Finally, the CoDeS Framework was implemented for three use cases in order to
demonstrate its capabilities. The first use case examined an exploratory forecasting
approach for analyzing a proposed enterprise strategy. The second use case exam-
ined normative forecasting of enterprise strategies in order to determine a minimum
threshold for a competitive strategy. Finally, the third use case examined a hypothet-
ical scenario of two aircraft manufacturers trying to enter the Asian market – in this
scenario, one manufacturer competes using technologies and the other competes using
a maintenance-based enterprise strategy. The completion of this research yielded a
parametric, integrated framework that can be used interactively in order to assess the




“Since the origin of the species, men have been making deci-
sions, and other men have been telling them how they either
make or should make decisions.”
Peter C. Fishburn [62]
The conceptual design of an aircraft is a difficult process. This difficulty arises for
multiple reasons, including but not limited to: multiple stakeholders, high interde-
pendencies between design variables, non-obvious system-level impacts from changes
in design variables, large amounts of uncertainty, and significant consequences for a
failed design. For these reasons, aircraft design should be thought of as something
that requires the rigors of a scientific process. Hazelrigg summarizes this notion by
stating:
[the] process of creating something physical requires allocation of nature’s
resources; therefore engineering design is, essentially, the effective alloca-
tion of resources. The allocation of resources is, by definition, decision
making. [73]
While experience and intuition may allow for better decisions [66], it may be more
useful to consider these to be two of the many possible tools available to a decision-
maker. Since the 1940s, there has been a significant push to improve decision making
from a variety of disciplines, including: mathematics, economics, social sciences, be-
havioral sciences, philosophy, and engineering. [66] By cross-fertilizing techniques
from these disciplines, a decision-maker has more tools available to support their
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decisions. For instance, a mental model may allow for a decision-maker to better
understand the interdependencies that exist in a system; however, by including an
engineering model, which is based on the underlying physics and mathematics of the
system, one may be able more accurately quantify sensitivities of the system.
As the system being designed becomes more complicated or when there is high risk
(i.e., consequences), there is a need for more and/or better tools to conduct analysis.
Both of these characteristics are present when designing aircraft, which means that
decision-makers desire tools that can allow them to gain more insight. This disserta-
tion sought to explore the impacts of competition during the conceptual design of an
aircraft. The remainder of this chapter provides necessary background information
and motivating examples in order to understand which aspects of competition are
most important to explore during the conceptual design of an aircraft.
1.1 Aircraft Design
When considering the design of an aircraft, multiple parameters may need to be
determined in order to meet the system’s criterion(a) for success. Ideally, these pa-
rameters should be chosen in order to meet or exceed the stakeholders’ requirements;
the design that most efficiently meets the system’s requirements may be considered
the best or optimal design. Very early on in the design process, a simplified model
of an aircraft may be considered to reduce the number of factors under considera-
tion. But even when considering a simplified system with only a few parameters and
one requirement, a decision-maker may have difficulty with, or may be incapable of,
identifying the optimal design. [73, 10] As the number of parameters and criteria
increases, which occurs further along the design process, decision making can become
exponentially difficult. [94] This nonlinear increase in difficulty can occur from a
variety of factors, including: inability to deductively reason at various stages [119],
non-obvious interactions between parameters and criteria [155], path-dependency of
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decision making within a group/design team [140, 73], high risk [94, 72] and/or high
uncertainty [62], etc. These factors are often indicative of a complex system. While a
variety of definitions exist, a complex system can be thought of as one that exhibits
one, some, or all of the previously mentioned factors, which are summarized below:
Interdependencies Changes in one subsystem or component can have cascading
effects through other subsystems.
Non-Obvious Behavior Changes in one parameter may propagate through the sys-
tem and result in unintended behavior.
High Risk Failed designs can lead to large consequences.
High Uncertainty There exists some forms of reducible and irreducible uncertainty.
It may be impossible to accurately extrapolate to a single point.
An aircraft is an example of a complex system. The concept of a complex system
is not introduced as a means for analyzing the design of an aircraft. Rather, it
further motivates the need for rigor for any process followed during the design of an
aircraft. The complexities that exist require that analysis be traceable, defensible,
and repeatable in order for a decision-maker to have confidence in their decisions.
Not only does the aircraft have numerous components and subsystems working
together to achieve more than the sum of their individual parts, but these components
and subsystems also are highly interdependent. For example, consider the initial
sizing of fuel required for an aircraft: to increase the range of a given aircraft, more fuel
is required, which means a larger wing is needed to provide more lift for the increased
weight, which in turn increases the weight of the wing structure thus requiring more
fuel, etc. [8, 137, 105] An aircraft’s components and subsystems can also exhibit
non-obvious behavior. For example, consider the design of a wing; a small increase in
the thickness-to-chord ratio can result in large structural weight savings. The reason
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for the significant weight saving is due to changes in the moment of inertia of the
wing, which increase the stiffness, thus requiring less structural weight to support
the loads. [58] However, it should be noted that this increase in thickness-to-chord
may also have other effects on other performance metrics, including lift-to-drag ratio,
aeroelastic performance, etc. Understanding and accounting for these non-obvious
yet modelable effects is critical for analyzing an aircraft’s performance. To fully
capture these effects, a non-heuristic model should be used to allow for changes in a
subsystem/component to propagate through the entire system. A clear understanding
of an aircraft’s performance is necessary to determine whether a proposed design is
capable of meeting stakeholders’ needs.
These stakeholders can impose many requirements, either directly or indirectly,
which may affect the aircraft throughout the stages in its life cycle. For example,
airports are mainly concerned with the operations of an aircraft, but a supplier would
be more concerned with the manufacturing of the aircraft. Failure to meet those
requirements may result in a failed design, which could prevent certification, decrease
number of aircraft purchased, limit operations, etc. The following list is representative
of some stakeholders and their concerns in the life-cycle of an aircraft.
Aircraft Manufacturer How do I create and deliver a technically feasible and eco-
nomically viable aircraft in an appropriate time frame?
Airports Will this aircraft cause a disruption in the current operations of this air-
port?
Airport Planners What are the necessary procedures associated with the operation
of this aircraft
Airline Companies (i.e., Customers) How will this aircraft impact the overall
performance of my fleet?
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Airline Employees How do we know the aircraft will be safe and reliable?
Component Manufactures What are the tolerances necessary in the manufactur-
ing process for this aircraft?
Consumers (i.e., Travelers) Will this aircraft yield ticket prices that are afford-
able?
Engine Manufacturer What are the propulsive requirements (e.g., thrust, noise,
emissions, fuel burn) for this aircraft?
Investors When will the aircraft provide an acceptable return on investment?
Maintenance Companies/Divisions What are the mean time to failures of the
various components?
Neighborhoods Around Airport How will this airplane affect my daily life?
Raw Material Extractors Will extracting the necessary materials for this aircraft
require a new facility?
Regulators Will this aircraft pass the certification standards?
Subsystem Manufactures What are the requirements of the various subsystems
for this aircraft?
Transporters How will the various subsystems be transported in an efficient and
cost-effective manner?
The generalized life cycle of any system can be divided into a series of major
categories, which often occur in series to one another. A notional depiction of these
categories can be seen in Figure 1 [59, 51]. After analyzing the market and determining
the need for the system (i.e., aircraft), the next step is the conceptual design of the
system. preliminary and detailed design phases follow the conceptual design phase.
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At this point, the design is finalized and manufacturing begins. After a system is
manufactured it is then deployed, which begins the operations and support phases of
a system’s life-cycle. While Figure 1 represents one approach to designing a system,
multiple authors have demonstrated the need to shift knowledge gained about a design


























Figure 1: Notional depiction of the serial process of design. [59, 51]
This need can be seen in the current aircraft design practice, which is undergoing
a paradigm shift as shown in Figure 2 [59]. This shift can be characterized as trying
to bring knowledge earlier in the design process. In Figure 2, Fabrycky illustrates
that approximately 66% of the costs are committed to the design of the aircraft by
the end of the conceptual design phase. [59] Besides Fabrycky, Dieter also shows a
similar trend, where approximately 75% of the costs are committed by the end of the
conceptual design phase, which is shown in Figure 3. [51] While both Figure 2 and 3
are notional trends, they illustrate the generally accepted belief that a large amount of
the costs of the design of an aircraft are committed before sufficient knowledge may be
gained to make informed decisions. This means that design changes should be made
as early as possible in the design phase before a substantial amount of funds are com-


























Figure 2: Paradigm shift to bring knowledge earlier in the design of aircraft. Modified
from Fabrycky. [59]
decisions early because less is known about the design’s performance and subsystems’
interdependencies during the conceptual design phase. To minimize the number of
design changes occurring after the conceptual design phase, the decision-maker must
increase knowledge of the design’s performance in the presence of uncertainty about
the future. These uncertainties include, but are not limited to: environmental, eco-
nomical, and competitive. A decision-maker could gain more knowledge earlier in the
conceptual design phase by implementing a process that addresses these three sources
of uncertainty.
These sources of uncertainty pertaining to design are both aleatory (i.e., irre-
ducible) and epistemic (i.e., reducible). This dissertation does not seek to reduce








































































Figure 3: Dieter’s approximation of the committed cost to the design of a complex
system. [51]
examined as if it were aleatory and only approaches to mitigate its effects were ex-
plored. The main concern with uncertainty is that it reduces the ability of a decision-
maker to predict the impacts (i.e., consequences) of their decisions, and can cause
large amounts of risk for an aircraft manufacturer because of these consequences.
[66, 62, 94] An aircraft manufacturer’s risks can be better understood by assuming
that they are profit-maximizing companies. This means that all decisions made by
an aircraft manufacturer are intended to maximize their profit. Therefore, the con-
sequences from uncertainty can be directly related to the amount of profit (or loss)
that is expected from any given design.
To further expand on the impacts that uncertainty can have on the design of
aircraft, several examples from industry are examined in the following sections. The
five examples presented can be divided into two separate categories: 1) cases of neg-
ative consequences due to market issues, and 2) cases of aircraft Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEMs) solutions to market/competition issues. By examining these
examples from industry, the requirements of a framework to analyze conceptual design
of an aircraft in the presence of a competitor were derived. From these requirements,
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Table 1: Layout of Motivating Examples in Following Sections
Negative Consequences Due to Market Issues
§ 1.2.1 Lockheed Martin L-1011
§ 1.2.2 Airbus A380
OEM Strategies to Market/Competitor Issues
§ 1.3.1 Boeing B787 v. Airbus A350
§ 1.3.2 Boeing 737MAX and Airbus A320NEO
§ 1.3.3 Boeing Enterprise Solutions
the objective of this research was formulated.
1.2 Negative Consequences Due to Market/Competitor Is-
sues
These first two examples examined involve the Lockheed Martin L-1011 and the
Airbus A380. These examples provide two main sources of insight. Firstly, they both
show the tremendous economic pressure that exists for these aircraft – neither of these
aircraft could be described as technical failures.
The L-1011 represented the last commercial transport aircraft built by Lockheed
Martin because it was a financial disaster – more information is given on this example
in § 1.2.1. One could infer from this behavior that the decision-makers at Lockheed
Martin determined the commercial aircraft market to be too risky. Today, Lockheed
Martin is one of the most profitable defense contractors in the world.[101]
The A380 could be described as a modern marvel in terms of engineering. Not
only can the aircraft carry a very large number of passengers, but the range of the
aircraft is almost unprecedented. In early 2016, an A380 flew 8,824 miles, nonstop
from Dubai to New Zealand. [138] Even with these strong technical benchmarks, the
A380 has struggled financially – more information on this is given in § 1.2.2.
This section will provide further background detail on both of these aircraft and
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an analysis of the problems that have limited/reduced their success. At the end of
each sub-section is a key observation that was used to directly motivate the objective
of this research.
1.2.1 Motivating Example: Lockheed Martin L-1011
Lockheed Martin is currently a well-known and well-established “global security and
aerospace company ... [that] is principally engaged in the research, design, develop-
ment, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems.”
[101] The history of Lockheed Martin can be traced back to 1912. Before the Lock-
heed Corporation and Martin Marietta merger in 1995, the Lockheed Corporation
manufactured commercial aircraft. One of the more notable aircraft was the L-1011
TriStar, which was produced in the 1970s and 1980s and can be seen in Figure 4.
According to Lockheed Martin, 250 L-1011 jets were produced. [101]
Figure 4: A prototype L-1011 TriStar during final assembly in 1970. [63]
This aircraft was notable for a variety of reasons. It was the first commercial
aircraft to be able to automatically fly from takeoff to landing, which made it one
of the most technologically advanced aircraft of its day. [101] The aircraft was also
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one of the most admired double-aisle aircraft from an aerodynamic perspective. [125]
While these all seem like characteristics of a successful aircraft, many would consider
the L-1011 to be a failed design because at the end of production, around 1981, the
Lockheed Corporation had lost approximately $2.5 billion USD. [125] L-1011 was the
last commercial aircraft produced by the Lockheed Corporation. [101]
This example lends itself to multiple observations, which may provide further
insight on aircraft design. Even though the L-1011 TriStar was a technologically
advanced aircraft that received numerous praises from industry insiders, the aircraft
was ultimately not economically viable. Lockheed Martin’s website highlights several
difficulties that existed in the design process, stating that “[divergent] needs from
competing airlines led to design challenges. Financial difficulties ravaged its engines
manufacturer. And a recession, fueled by the world’s first oil crisis, lessened the de-
mand for commercial airliners.” [101] This quote highlights the various uncertainties
that existed not only in the customers’ requirements, but also the economic environ-
ment. These uncertainties can become especially problematic because of the long life
cycle associated with many aircraft. The L-1011 was initially conceived in the 1960s,
but was manufactured for approximately ten years during the 1970s and 1980s. It is
necessary to note that some of these concerns have been addressed in the literature.
Summary of Key Observations:
Uncertainty This example highlights uncertainty associated with requirements and
economic climate in which the aircraft is not only designed but also operated.
Economic Viability Besides the performance of an aircraft, the financial aspects
need to be considered. The economic constraints on a design must be considered,
especially with modern aircraft that have long-range capabilities.
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Long Life-cycle Not only do aircraft take numerous years to design and manufac-
ture, but airlines will often operate the aircraft for a long period of time.
1.2.2 Motivating Example: Airbus A380
In terms of wide-body commercial aircraft, The Boeing Company (Boeing) and Air-
bus are currently the main, if not only, aircraft manufacturers. Currently the B747 is
Boeing’s largest aircraft and can hold over 400 passengers, depending on the config-
uration. The B747 was initially deployed in 1969, and has been a successful aircraft
for Boeing. [23] Airbus’s A380 can hold 500-800 passengers. [2] Figure 5 shows a
picture of an A380. The first A380 was delivered in 2007, but it is not completely
certain whether the aircraft will be profitable over its life cycle. This has to do with
issues concerning the initial deployment of the A380 and the long-term acceptance of
very large aircraft.
The A380 began its formal development in the early 1990s. While the double-
decker design was not unique, it did provide several challenges for Airbus. One of these
challenges can still be readily seen in the United States (US). Due to the immense
size of these aircraft, most US airports are not large enough to accommodate them.
In fact, “the Atlanta airport had to widen two runways and three taxiways by a total
of more than 855,000 square feet.” [121] Besides runway length, the jetports would
require a new design in order to board passengers in a timely manner. This may be an
issue for longterm profitability because the required additional investment required
by airports, which limits the market penetration of the A380. As of early 2016,
experts believe that the Airbus A380 may reach its breakeven point in the coming
years, based on the current number of orders. [173] Even though it has been seven
years since the A380’s first commercial flight, only eight airports in the US, which is
currently the largest market for commercial aircraft, can accommodate the aircraft.
Of those eight airports, five only offer one destination for the A380. [5]
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Figure 5: Prototype A380 about to land on its maiden flight. [54]
Another large concern with the A380 involved several delays in the initial delivery
of the aircraft. One announcement about a delay in delivery caused Airbus’s (formally
EADS) stock price to drop by 11.7% in a single day. [22] Another announcement
about a delay in delivery and reduction in initial delivers caused their stock price to
drop by 26.3% in a single day. [37] This high volatility of a company’s stock price
could have significant consequences for an aircraft manufacturer. While too big to fail
may be a current colloquialism with financial institutions and US auto makers, there
is no reason to believe that a significant drop in stock price could not potentially
bankrupt an aircraft manufacturer. These consequences are easily related to the L-
1011; there is a need to analyze possible future scenarios that could impact the design
of an aircraft. One way to handle this need is to use parametric scenarios where all
variables of interest, not just design variables, can easily be adjusted and their effects
calculated.
Summary of Key Observations:
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Market Penetration Different markets may have unique standards or requirements
in order to enter them. This may result in increased cost or a decrease in
acceptability. All airlines cannot be assumed to have the same needs or the
same preferences when considering new aircraft purchases.
Market Volatility Bad news could cause investors to quickly lose confidence and
possibly bankrupt the company. Designing a new aircraft could mean that the
aircraft manufacturer is figuratively betting the farm. These considerations can
be difficult to account for because of investors’ susceptibility to human emotion.
This highlights the need to examine financial information throughout the life-
cycle and not only the estimated profit at the end of the life-cycle.
1.3 OEM Strategies to Market/Competitor Issues
Two of the next three examples pertain to a specific situation involving a direct
competition between Boeing and Airbus. The first case examines the infusion of new
technologies associated with a new design concept. The second example examines
the use of a different type of strategy option that does not necessarily require a
new geometry. The final example looks at specific business practices that have been
implemented and are not related to any specific geometric design or technology.
Boeing and Airbus are currently the only manufacturers of large commercial air-
craft that are in deployment. While their competitive strategies are not identical,
they do often directly compete in some key areas. The Boeing 787 and Airbus A350
were designed to capture similar segments of the commercial aviation market. The in-
clusion of advanced structural technologies by Boeing caused Airbus to make changes
to their proposed design.
Due to the large risks and cost associated with designing a geometrically novel
aircraft, Boeing and Airbus have looked at other strategy options to make their
designs more competitive. One of these options is referred to as a New Engine Option
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(NEO). This approach basically replaces an engine from an existing aircraft with a
more advanced engine, while requiring minimal geometric changes to occur.
Finally, the last example will examine some of the business practices of OEMs,
specifically focusing on Boeing. The strategies presented in this section are especially
important because they are not directly related to any specific aircraft design. How-
ever, the impacts of these strategies can be very large for bot the OEM and their
customers.
This section will further examine these different strategy options in more detail
by focusing on background information and consequences of those strategies. By
analyzing key observations from these strategies, more detailed requirements for the
proposed framework can be determined.
1.3.1 Motivating Example: Boeing B787 and Airbus A350
As previously stated, large aircraft manufacturing can be characterized as a duopoly,
which means that there are two main competitors: Airbus and Boeing. However,
when considering the manufacturing of smaller aircraft, the market resembles more
of an oligopoly, which means there are several competitors (e.g., Airbus, Boeing,
Bombardier, Embraer, Comac). This is an important distinction because a com-
pany’s behavior is expected to be influenced by the type of competitive market in
which they are competing. To set the context, an example concerning the design of
Boeing’s B787 and Airbus’ A350 is presented; these aircraft can be seen in Figure 6.
These two aircraft are both trying to capture the 200+ passenger aircraft market,
which is currently a duopoly. After this example, economic theory related to duopoly
competition will be discussed. This theory will then be compared to the example
presented in this section to gain more insight into the expected behavior of aircraft
manufacturers in a duopoly.
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Boeing 787 Airbus A350 
Figure 6: Photographs of prototypes for the Boeing B787 [150] and Airbus A350
[53].
Airbus began designing the A350 in 2004. [120] Around the same time, Boeing
announced that its B787 aircraft would be made out of 50% composite materials.
[143] Boeing’s use of composites in its design could be thought of as a strategy of
infusing a new technology into the design of an aircraft. Even though aircraft manu-
facturers have been utilizing composites in their designs for decades, the B787 would
use more composites than any other commercial aircraft. By using a large amount
of composites, Boeing, either intentionally or unintentionally, fundamentally changed
the market. This caused the airlines to start desiring aircraft that took advantage
of the benefits of composites, specifically the fuel savings that come with reducing
weight. This idea is further supported by the fact that after being unable to gain an
adequate number of orders, Airbus changed the A350 design to include significantly
more composites. [120] The new A350 design is slated to be made of approximately
53% composite material. [3] As of February 2014, over 820 orders had been placed
for the A350, but no aircraft had been delivered. [3] One may assume that Airbus
will lose out on profits by not being the first to enter the composite aircraft market.
However, the adoption of the composites, or any technology, may not be that intu-
itive. For more insight, a review of economic theory regarding technology adoption
in a duopoly was conducted in § 2.1.4.
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Summary of Key Observations:
Strategy Option: New Design One way to gain a competitive advantage is to
develop a new design that utilizes one to several new technologies. However, this
should not be done without consideration toward a competitor and their possible
strategies involving technologies, which only further increases the uncertainty of
this problem. However, by considering a competitor and their possible design
alternatives, an OEM may be able to identify a design-strategy combination
that is more robust to competition.
1.3.2 Motivating Example: Boeing B737MAX and
Airbus A320NEO
As previously stated, aircraft OEMs do not only compete by bringing forth new
geometric design alternatives with infused technologies. Sometimes aircraft OEMs
are able to replace the engine of an existing design with a more efficient alternative.
This is not necessarily true for all aircraft designs and only applies to designs that are
currently in the market. Two recent examples of this strategy being used are with
the Boeing 737MAX [26, 25] and the Airbus A320NEO [4]. These two aircraft are
shown in Figure 7. These two aircraft are considered derivative aircraft as opposed
ot the previous example with the Boeing B787 and Airbus A350.
Boeing B737MAX Airbus A320NEO 
Figure 7: Photographs of Boeing 737MAX [25] and Airbus A320NEO [4]
This type of strategy option has several benefits and shortcomings associated with
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it. To help visualize these, Figure 8 shows notional CCF for both new commercial
aircraft and derivative aircraft.[110] Firstly, there are lower costs because there is less
RDT&E costs and drastically reduced certification costs. These lower costs translate
to a lower amount of risk for the aircraft manufacturer. However, one of the major
drawbacks of these derivative designs is that they tend to have lower potential profits
based on historical data collected by NASA Ames [110]. Another major benefit of








New Commercial Design 
Derivative Commercial Design 
Figure 8: Notional Manufacturer CCF for new design alternatives versus derivative
design alternatives – adapted from data from NASA Ames and presented by Mavris
[110]
Besides the NEO strategy, there are other ways OEMs can modify their aircraft
without having to examine a new geometric alternative. One of these options is the
use of winglets or similar devices such as end plates that attach to the tip of the wing.
The purpose of these devices is to decrease fuel consumption decreasing the amount
of lift-dependent drag. These devices were commonly deployed in the same manner
as a NEO – they would be integrated into an aircraft that exist in the market without
significant changes to the geometry. However, sometimes the use of these devices is
incorporated with other strategy options like the NEO. Both the Boeing B737MAX
and Airbus A320NEO utilize a form of these devices: the B737MAX has a split-tip
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winglet[26, 25] and the A320NEO has a “sharklet” (blended winglet). [4]
Summary of Key Observations:
Strategy Option: Derivative Design While some may consider competition be-
tween aircraft OEMs to consist of new geometrically-designed aircraft, that is
not always the case. It can be significantly less costly and less risky to infuse
new technology into an existing design.
1.3.3 Motivating Example: Boeing Enterprise Solutions
Technology infusion is not the only strategy that has been used by OEMs to make their
aircraft more competitive. Several OEMs have began looking at other strategy options
besides new or modified products. This is an important transition because it shows
that OEMs are seeking to earn revenue at different stages in an aircraft’s life-cycle.
Implementation of these strategies is commonly referred to as enterprise engineering,
which “can be defined as the art of understanding, defining, specifying, analyzing,
and implementing business process for the entire enterprise life cycle, so that the
enterprise can achieve its objectives, be cost-effective, and be more competitive.”[170]
To summarize, Enterprise Engineering can be thought of as transitioning from the
approach of solely designing a product to focusing on that product’s life cycle to see
if there are aspects that can make that product more competitive. An example of an
aircraft OEM that utilizes these techniques is Boeing, which has invested heavily into
various initiatives to increase the competitiveness of their products. Two key areas
specifically discussed in this subsection involve manufacturing and maintenance.
Manufacturing:
While keeping costs low has always been a priority for any manufacturer, there has
been many initiatives that have been embraced by aircraft OEMs in recent decades.
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One of the earliest techniques was pioneered by Taguchi [157, 158], but since his
seminal work many other initiatives have been implemented. Boeing has specifically
utilized techniques from Product Lifecycle Management[154], 6σ [139], Integrated
Product and Process Design & Lean Aircraft Initiative [167, 83], and more recently
Manufacturing Influenced Design [147, 156, 34, 98, 146]. All of these initiatives are
focused on reducing the costs of manufacturing by decreasing defects, decreasing
labor, reducing waste (i.e., effectively lowering raw material costs), and/or reducing
the time to manufacturer. By implementing these initiatives, Boeing has reduced
the costs associated with manufacturing some of the most technologically advanced
systems in the modern world. By keeping their manufacturing costs low, Boeing is
able to remain more competitive by offering their aircraft at a lower price to airlines.
For this reason, these manufacturing initiatives can clearly be classified as enterprise
engineering solutions.
Maintenance:
Maintenance has always been a concern for the aviation industry. Historically, main-
tenance would be performed by a third-party company or the airline’s maintenance
division. This has not been the case for aircraft engines, which have followed a
razor-razor blade model [162] for many decades. The razor-razor blade model can
simplistically be described as giving customers free razors, but charging for new razor
blades. Similarly, “jet engines for commercial aircraft are priced the same way – man-
ufacturers know that engines are long lived, and maintenance and parts is where Rolls
Royce, GE, Pratt & Whitney and others make their money” [162] In recent years,
there has been a shift in the business structure of aircraft airframe maintenance.
Following engine manufacturers, airframe manufacturers are trying to increase prof-
its by capturing the maintenance of the aircraft. “[Boeing’s maintenance program]
GoldCare has been expanded to include Next Generation B737 and the B747-400 ...
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Boeing is developing GoldCare offerings for the B777 and the B747-8.” [24] This
transition from a product-based firm to a service-based firm has been advocated by
literature [129] and can be considered an enterprise engineering solutions.
This initiative may be especially well-received by airlines, specifically those that
are seeking to remove their own maintenance units, to reduce overhead (in terms
of employees, facilities, and equipment) costs. Boeing advertises that strategy to
airlines with their GoldCare service, stating: “Boeing is uniquely positioned to bring
advantages to your operations so you can focus on what matters most to you–serving
your customers...Boeing can focus on keeping your airplanes where they belong; in
the air.” [24]
Summary of Key Observations:
Strategy Option: Enterprise The aircraft should not be thought of as just a de-
sign, but a product. One should examine enterprise strategies that can be used
to make an aircraft more competitive by focusing on various aspects of its life
cycle beyond the physical design.
1.4 Layout of Remaining Chapters
This chapter has provided the motivation for this dissertation work. The motivating
examples not only demonstrated a need for an approach to analyze competitive strate-
gies, but also provided specific examples of strategies that OEMs use when designing
aircraft. While these examples helped provide guidance to competitive strategies,
they did not account for all of the competitive strategies. The following chapter ex-
amines general economic theory related to competition in order to determine other
general forms of competition that may be applicable to aircraft manufacturers. Spe-
cific descriptions of these competitive strategies is provided in § 2.2. Based on these
insights, relevant approaches to analyzing competition were examined. Identification
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of a gap in the ability to analyze aircraft OEM competition lead to the formulation
of the Research Objective, which is stated in § 2.4.
Chapter 3 explores the technical formulation of a proposed framework necessary
to satisfy the Research Objective. This chapter describes the specific actions that are
taken during each step of the proposed framework. To address the specific needs of
this framework the requirements of an acceptable modeling and simulation (M&S)
environment were defined. Since subject matter experts (SMEs) may also be used in
conjunction with or instead of an M&S environment, considerations for using SMEs
was also presented in this chapter. Relevant research questions were also discussed in
regards to addressing the competition element of this dissertation research. Chapter 3
concludes by presenting relevant background information necessary to address these
research questions.
Chapter 4 describes the selection and modification of an acceptable M&S envi-
ronment described in Chapter 3. This chapter also describes three experiments that
addressed specific elements from the research questions. The results of these experi-
ments are used to further refine the proposed framework.
Chapter 5 examines three specific use cases to examine the capabilities of the
proposed framework. These use cases examine exploratory and normative forecasting
approaches that can be analyzed with the proposed framework. The third use case
examines a hypothetical scenario of two OEMs examining strategies to enter the Asian
market with a narrow-body, single-aisle aircraft design.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the contributions from this dissertation by exam-
ining the results of the experiments and outcomes from the use cases. This chapter




“As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are
not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer
to reality.”
Albert Einstein [57]
Chapter 1 provided motivating examples to properly frame this dissertation work.
This chapter seeks to provide the appropriate background information and formal
research objective, which is stated in § 2.4. Since the main subject of this dissertation
focuses on the competitive nature associated with designing an aircraft, the first
section of this chapter explores economic theory related to competition. This section
includes descriptions of monopolistic, duopolistic, and perfect competition. From that
information, a more detailed analysis of how aircraft OEMs compete was conducted
in § 2.2. By combining those two sources of information, relevant methodologies were
examined to see which ones may be best suited for analyzing competition amongst
aircraft OEMs. By synthesizing insights from these sections, the research objective
is formally stated and relevant questions that need to be addressed were posed.
2.1 Relevant Economic Theory
There are four basic types of competitive environments that are commonly studied
in the field of economics. These include: monopolistic competition, duopoly com-
petition, oligopoly competition, and perfect competition. When examining aircraft
manufacturers, the main competitive environments are duopoly and oligopoly. The
competitive markets that define aircraft manufacturers depend on the specific market
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segment served by those manufacturers. For example, small aircraft with less than
100 passenger capacity would be considered an oligopoly because Boeing, Airbus,
Embraer, Bombardier, and Comac currently have designs in this category. When
considering large aircraft with 150+ passenger capacity, there are currently only two
manufacturers: Airbus and Boeing. The specific competitive environment that an
aircraft manufacturer operates has a large influence on their behavior. To better
understand this, it is necessary to examine economic theory related to these vari-
ous forms of competitive environments. The following sections examine monopolistic,
duopolistic, and perfect competition in order to highlight the different behaviors char-
acteristic of each. While the following sections explore economic theory related to
several competitive environments, a quantitative example directly compares these
competitive environments in Appendix A.
2.1.1 Monopoly Competition
A monopoly exists when there is only one producer of a certain product. Monopolies
offer many benefits from the perspective of the producer, but not necessarily to the
customers. This is because monopolies are considered to be price setters. This is
shown in Figure 9. Since they are the only manufacturers of a product then they can
choose the price to sell it; however, they cannot ignore the basic fundamentals of the
law of demand, which loosely states that quantity demanded is inversely related to
the price of that product (i.e., a higher price means consumers will demand less of
that product). This trend is shown by the market demand line (DM) in Figure 9. This
figure also has lines of Marginal Revenue (MR), Marginal Cost (MC), and Average
Cost (AC). MR is defined by the amount of revenue achieved by selling the next unit
of a good, whereas MC is the cost associated with producing that next unit. AC is
defined as the total cost divided by the cumulative number of units produced. The













Figure 9: Notional graph of monopolistic competition where firms set the price of
their product.
A monopoly is a price setter because they first determine the quantity to manu-
facture (QM) by finding the quantity that causes MR=MC. By examining Figure 9,
the D line lies above the intersection of MR and MC, which means that the monopoly
can charge a higher price – this is denoted by PM . Since the AC curve also lies below
the D line at this point, the firm earns a profit.
Because monopolies utilize this strategy, they are able to use variable prices as
a competitive strategy. This reduction in price causes consumers to purchase the
lower-priced good, which can prevent other firms from entering the market if they
cannot offer the same goods at a lower price. In fact, the minimum price a monopoly
can charge without suffering a loss is often referred to as a reservation price for a
monopoly (PM,R). This point occurs when QM intersects the AC curve. The ability
to charge different prices as a competitive strategy is not unique to only a monopoly,
but directly shows how the type of competitive environment influences the way in
which firms can compete.
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2.1.2 Duopoly Competition
A duopoly is a special case of an oligopoly where there exist only two firms; this disser-
tation does not examine the economic theory related to oligopolies because duopoly
competition seemed more appropriate when first constructing a competitive frame-
work. The field of duopoly competition has been studied for well over a century, and
there are two leading theories. The first theory was presented in 1838 by Antoine
Cournot, with the basic argument that firms in a duopoly fix the quantity to pro-
duce and then determine the price from this quantity.[42] In 1883, Joseph Bertrand
suggested a different model of duopoly competition that said firms fix the price, then
determine the quantity to produce and sell at that price.[19, 20] It is important to
note that Bertrand’s theory lacked a firm mathematical underpinning until 1889,
when Francis Edgeworth closely examined decreasing marginal returns (MR). [55, 56]
Both Cournot’s model and Bertrand’s model of duopoly competition have similar
assumptions, with the main two being that both firms are identical and produce goods
that are perfect substitutes. Each of these models further reasons that firms do not
act independently of each other, but instead react to the other firm’s actions.∗ To
understand this behavior, Figure 10 shows how each firm reacts – R1 represents the
reaction of Firm 2 to the behavior (i.e., quantity produced) by Firm 1. R2 represents
similar behavior, of Firm 1 to the behavior of Firm 2. The intersection of these
two lines represent quantity that each firm should produce, which are given by Q1,C
and Q2,C for Firms 1 and 2, respectively. Since both firms are assumed identical,
which is why their reaction curves are symmetrical about a 45o line from the origin,
Q1,C=Q2,C .
Bertrand’s model of duopoly competition arose from the insight that competing
firms would try to undercut each other in terms of price so that consumers would buy
∗One should note the similarity between these models and Nash Equilibrium discussed in § 2.3.3








Figure 10: Cournot’s model of a duopoly: two firms that react to each other and set







Figure 11: Bertrand’s model of a duopoly: two firms that react to each other and
set a price of goods being sold to, then determine the quantity of production based
on market demand.
their product and not their competitors. Further assuming no collusion, this could be
extended all the way until both firms earn no profits because they are both selling their
products at the average cost required to produce them for that quantity. However,
the main takeaway is that both firms are reacting to the actions and strategies of the
other firm. This is shown in Figure 11. The firms’ reaction lines are not the same as
they appear in Figure 10 because they represent the price firms will charge. When
the curves intersect, the prices of P1,B and P2,B are set for each firm; since both firms
are assumed to be identical, P1,B=P2,B.
Regardless of the model being examined, both of these models have implications
when compared to the monopoly model presented in Figure 9. This is best illustrated
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by directly comparing the monopolistic competition model to the duopoly competition
model, which can be seen in Figure 12. One of the first things to notice in this model is
that the quantity produced in a duopoly (QD) is higher than the quantity produced in
a monopoly; however, it should be noted that this is the market quantity produced –
each firm would produce half of amount based on previous assumptions. Furthermore,
the price being charged in a duopoly (PD) is lower than PM . Each firm would now
earn a lower profit than either firm would earn in a monopoly because the profit
shown in the figure represents the total profit for both firms. It should also be noted
that the quantity produced occurs where the MR curve intersects the horizontal axis
– if firms produced a quantity greater than QD, their profits would decrease because












Figure 12: Notional comparison between monopolistic competition and duopoly com-
petition.
While the applicability of the Bertrand and Cournot models of duopoly com-
petition vary depending on the industry, neither is completely accurate to describe
aircraft manufacturers of large commercial aircraft. The main reason is that neither
Boeing nor Airbus could be assumed to be identical firms. However, research in re-
cent decades has shown the applicability of Bertrand/Cournot models even when the
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firms are differentiated.[148] Furthermore, insight into differentiated duopolies has
shown that market barriers can exist and be exploited by firms already established
in the market (i.e., incumbents).[52] These effects seem more applicable to the air-
craft manufacturing industry because of their use of competitive strategies involving
price differentiation and derivative designs, which were discussed in § 2.2 and § 1.3.2,
respectively.
2.1.3 Perfect Competition
While Perfect Competition does not exist amongst aircraft manufacturers, there are
some general insights that can be gained by examining the underlying economic the-
ory. Since firms in perfect competition are assumed to produce identical products,
the market sets the price using the fundamental laws of supply and demand. One of
the main insights from perfect competition is the idea that firms are not price setters,
but rather price takers. The specific characteristics of each firm determine whether
or not they will make a profit. This is illustrated in Figure 13. It is important to note
that in perfect competition it is assumed that D = MR = AR (Average Revenue) for
each firm and is determined by the intersection of the demand line (DM) and supply
line (SM) for the market. In this figure, three types of a notional firm are examined
in each row A, B, and C. In each row, the firm will produce the quantity where their
MR = MC (for simplicity, each type of firm was assumed to have the same MC curve,
although this would not be the case with real firms). In row A, this intersection
occurs at the same point as average cost (AC), which means that the firm makes no
profit. In row B, the AC curve is below that intersection, which means that the firm
will make a profit. In row C, the AC curve is above the intersection, which means
that the firm will suffer a loss. This highlights the need for firms to keep costs as low
as possible in order to achieve a positive profit.



































Figure 13: Notional figures of perfect competition where the market sets the price
and the individual firms take the price.
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time all firms will earn zero profit in perfect competition. This occurs because firms
suffering a loss will go out of business, or firms earning a profit will produce more
goods causing the supply line of the market to shift.[102] This shift will further drive
down the price of goods until a scenario similar to the one presented in row A of
Figure 13 occurs – where no firms earn a profit. A general heuristic that can be
derived from this analysis is that the firm that produces a desired product at the lowest
cost will survive, while other firms are forced to exit the market – this also suggests
rationale for how some industries can shift from a competitive environment similar
to perfect competition to one that is largely considered oligopolistic, duopolositic, or
monopolistic.
2.1.4 First-mover Advantage
This section seeks to provide economic theory related to the motivating example of
the Boeing B787 versus the Airbus A350 discussed in § 1.3.1. That example discussed
the adoption of a technology that preempted the competitor’s adoption of a similar
technology. Several authors have shown that a company’s adoption of a technology
would be influenced by the type of competitive market. Fudenberg and Tirole’s work
focused on whether a company should be the first adopter of a technology, which
is often referred to as a first-mover advantage†. [64] Fudenberg and Tirole showed
that a first-mover advantage may not be preferred in an duopoly. [64] This is best
illustrated by examining Figure 14 and Figure 15. [64]
†The first mover gets to enjoy high profits while their competitor(s) are still maturing the
technology.
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Figure 14: Joint adoption model showing notional payoffs for Leader (L), Follower
(F), and Mutual (M). [64]
Figure 15: Diffusion model showing notional payoffs for Leader (L), Follower (F),
and Mutual (M). [64]
In Figure 14, there is no first mover advantage; this is referred to as the joint
adoption model. In this figure, the leader makes more profit than the follower, but
would not earn more profit with simultaneous adoption. The opposite of this is true
in Figure 15, where an obvious first-mover advantage occurs in the diffusion model.
When looking at both of these figures, one should note that mutual adoption before
time T ∗2 results in both firms achieving lower payoffs by being on the mutual adoption
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curve. While these models offer valuable insight to be gained into the adoption of a
technology there exist some obvious concerns. One of these concerns is inability to
easily classify a technology as following one model or the other. Another issue arises
with regards to the example presented in this section, which described a perceived
first-mover advantage for Boeing.
The reason for the different outcome in this section’s example may be influenced by
several assumptions of these models, including perfect information and identical firms;
however, if a preemption in the adoption of a technology would result in large profits,
each firm would have incentive to preempt the other. These factors would result
in firms adopting simultaneously when the technology was initially matured. This
distinction suggest that the large aircraft manufacturer duopoly market follows more
of a diffusion model with technologies, which means that a first-mover advantage may
exist in this market. This may be the case when considering short-term profitability,
but in the long-term the second mover may be able to capitalize on information from
the first-mover.
Based on the economic theory about preemption in a duopoly and an oligopoly,
there may be more information to be gained from the industry example of the Boeing
B787 and Airbus A350 presented in § 1.3.1. A major risk associated with an aircraft
that is largely composite is that the certification standards were written for mostly
metallic aircraft. [60] This proved to be an issue for Boeing because the composite
wings could not initially pass the 150% deflection test. In order to meet certification
requirements, Boeing had to install titanium spars [127]. Boeing was able to pass the
wing deflection test in November, 2008 [127]; however, additional costs were incurred
and the full benefits of the composite technology were not realized. The insight
gained from Boeing moving first suggests that Airbus may be able to capitalize on
this information, which may reduce the A350’s certification and design costs. This
insight further casts doubt on whether a large aircraft manufacturer would prefer to
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be a first mover.
However, the fact that Boeing was the first to market with this technology allows
for them to earn income while Airbus is still developing/certifying their aircraft. The
long-term impact on total profit that these diverging ideas present about preemption
versus joint adoption will not be known for many years. An article published in
February of 2016 states, “the 787 is close to the point where it is no longer losing
money on each jet delivered, but its not quite there and certainly will not be making
significant profits for a long time.” [68] Furthermore, Boeing has recently announced
that it will be eliminating approximately 8,000 jobs (which represents approximately
5% of their total workforce and may reduce some business units by up to 10%) in
2016. [67]. It cannot be assumed that these layoffs are specifically related to the
B787, but another article offers the following insight:
“Teal Group analyst Richard Aboulafia said that to cover the recurring
cost of producing all its 787s and eke out an overall profit, Boeing will have
to build future 787-9s at an average cost of $91 million each – compared
with an estimated cost of $140 million each in the fourth quarter of 2015
... [a] 787 engineer said older employees were not surprised by the news
of job cuts, which he attributed at least partly to the money pit that is
the [B787] Dreamliner program.” [68]
Based on the economic theory and analysis of the industry example, the following
insight regarding preemption versus joint adoption was assumed:
Preemption v. Joint Adoption This decision may be sensitive to factors such as
quality and availability of information. It may be difficult to truly capture these
effects without very clear insight and specific details regarding both aircraft
OEMs.
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2.2 How OEMs Compete
The previous section explicitly described three distinct approaches regarding compe-
tition amongst aircraft OEMs. The strategy of infusing technologies into the design of
a new aircraft concept was described in § 1.3.1. The strategy of developing a deriva-
tive aircraft was explained in § 1.3.2. And § 1.3.3 discussed the departure from the
paradigm that an aircraft is solely a design and focused on the business aspects of the
aircraft throughout its life cycle. By examining all of these strategy options during
the conceptual design phase more information can be provided to a decision-maker.
The previous section also implicitly defined another form of competition amongst
aircraft OEMs. This form of competition involves the way in which decision-makers
interpret market data. While the aircraft described in § 1.3.1 and § 1.3.2 were exam-
ples of designs competing in the same market segment, not all of the aircraft presented
in Chapter 1 were focused on the same market segment. This differentiation in air-
craft designs for different market segments arises for multiple reasons. One of the
main factors is the needs of the customer – airlines have different business models,
and it is economically rational for OEMs to recognize those unique needs. Secondly,
having multiple aircraft that are each focused on different market segments is a good
way to mitigate business risks and has been suggested to be a robust approach for
designing aircraft. [39] Finally, aircraft differentiation can occur simply because sep-
arate decision-makers may not arrive at the same conclusion even though they are
both examining the same data. This final reason may best be illustrated with an
example described in a Forbes article with the following quote:
In todays marketplace, distinct differences in the way competitive prod-
ucts work have become increasingly rare. But functional product differ-
entiation is exactly what the rivalry between the Airbus A380 and the
Boeing 787 Dreamliner is all about: Two companies with fundamentally
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different products, based on diametrically opposite visions of the future,
engaged in a Hatfields versus McCoys battle with billions of dollars at
stake. [11]
The “diametrically opposite visions of the future” in that quote truly captures
the essence of this specific rationale into product differentiation. Technologies and
business strategies aside, Airbus and Boeing have created different visions (i.e., mod-
els) of the future, which means that neither company pursues the same type of basic
design for a new aircraft. It is reasonable to assume that both Airbus and Boeing
had access to the similar raw data regarding current market trends, but both firms
arrived at different conclusions. The underlying reasons for this result is too difficult
to discern, which makes this form of competitive analysis very difficult to model and
analyze a priori. However, the Forbes article points out, “both Airbus and Boeing
have a hedge in their back pocket. To compete directly with the A380 [Boeing is
developing the Boeing] 747-8 ... To counter the [Boeing] 787, Airbus is offering a
white elephant called the A350.” [11] While hedging is a common business practice,
in many industries, there can be a significant increase in costs, especially when the
product is as expensive to design and produce as an aircraft.
Another way that OEMs compete, which is common in most industries, is by
offering price discounts on aircraft. A recent Wall Street Journal article describes
this competitive action with the Airbus A380: “having given large price discounts to
the A380’s first customers and those that bought large numbers – which is typical
in the aviation industry – Airbus now has to try to sell A380s at high prices.” [173]
Based on general economic theory, offering a product at a lower price can increase
the demand for the product; however, this means that more of the product must be
sold to reach the breakeven point or return a profit. In fact, the price that is often
stated publicly for an aircraft is not the price that is paid by airlines:
Discounts seem to vary between roughly 20% and 60%, with an average
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around 45%. Savvy buyers don’t pay more than half the sticker price,
industry veterans say. But deal specifics differ greatly. Part of the reason
prices vary so much and are hard to pin down is that airplane contracts are
complex ... airlines also generally order lots of planes at once for delivery
over many years ... [and] psychology: Less-experienced plan buys like to
think they got a bargain ... more-seasoned plane buys also know that
bragging about discount specifics would anger Airbus, Boeing or other
producers and hurt the chances of striking a sweetheart deal again. [118]
A major insight that can be gained from this competitive strategy is the need to
analyze aircraft being sold a range of prices instead of a fixed price – this will allow a
decision-maker to more accurately assess the profitability of an aircraft during early
phases of design.
Based on these descriptions of how aircraft OEMs compete, the capabilities of
an appropriate framework to address the research objective can be more accurately
defined; this mapping is shown in Table 2. For example, the color of the carpet being
used in the aircraft would not be a top priority for a decision-maker during the con-
ceptual design phase. Alternatively, the choice about whether or not to fund research
into a given technology for infusion on an aircraft would be of more importance to
a decision-maker at this phase in the design process. Based on these characteristics,
various techniques/approaches that have been used to account for competition are
examined in the following section.
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Table 2: Summary and implications of how OEMs compete during the Conceptual
Design Phase
How OEMs Compete Implications for Proposed Framework
Infuse Technologies into New
Design
Must be able to examine physical impacts of tech-




Must be able to account for decreased costs associ-
ated with modifying an operational aircraft
Enterprise Solutions
Must be able to account for various business strate-
gies that occur in other phases of the aircraft’s life
cycle besides design
Different Passenger Class De-
signs
Must be able to analyze a variety of different types
of aircraft (i.e., should not just interpolate between
known designs of one passenger class) and account
for segmented market with different expectations
Hedging Designs
Must be able to account for head-to-head compar-
isons of designs in the same passenger class
Price Fluctuations
Must be able to account for variable prices charged
for the same design and/or strategy alternative
2.3 Applicable Design Methodologies/Approaches
Competition is basically defined as a contest between individuals, companies, or-
ganisms, etc. seeking to gain some benefit, whether it be food, mate, market share,
resources, etc. However, in the context of this dissertation, the term competition in-
volves the interactions between competing firms over market share based on the pro-
posed design and strategy for a given aircraft. While many ad-hoc approaches have
existed throughout the millennia to address various competitive situations, a more
formalized approach was desired. The idea about strategically allocating resources
is paramount to conceptual design – this sentiment was captured by Hazelrigg by
stating, “design is, essentially, the effective allocation of resources. The allocation of
resources is, by definition, decision making.”[73]. As stated in § 1.1, these decisions
should be made as early as possible in the conceptual design phase when it is easier
and less costly to make design changes.
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Although multiple formalized techniques exist for exploring competitive strategy
development/evaluation, they may not be well-suited for this design problem. To
this end, it was necessary to examine and critically evaluate the various techniques
in order to determine which is most appropriate. Several qualitative techniques were
examined, many of which are popular amongst a large number of companies today.
The concept of game theory, which has been used to analyze many similar duopoly
problems, was explored, but several key issues were raised that limit its applicability
to the proposed framework. Due to those reasons, which are discussed in more detail
in § 2.3.3, the work in this dissertation can be viewed as a necessary step to be able to
utilize the well established mathematical framework of game theory more concretely
in aircraft design.
Even though game theory cannot currently be used at an acceptable level for this
problem, that does not eliminate the need to examine how a competitor’s design and
strategies can influence design decisions. In order to gain insight into this competitive
nature of the problem, a general decision making method was adopted and expanded
to explicitly account for duopolistic competition.
2.3.1 SWOT Analysis
SWOT analysis is a common analysis technique that stands for Strengths, Weak-
nesses, Opportunities, and Threats. This technique was proposed by Humphrey in
1970 [76] as an effective means for companies to determine the appropriate business
strategies to pursue. This can be especially useful when analyzing the impacts of
a competitor because their actions/strategies can seen as threats. While there are
multiple ways to conduct SWOT analysis, the two most prevalent approaches involve
a single decision-maker or a group brainstorming. Regardless of the specific approach
chosen, the basic steps remain the same.
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These steps are divided into two main categories: internal and external assess-
ments. The internal assessments concern the strengths and weaknesses. A strength
could be thought of as something that gives the company a competitive edge, whether
it involves intellectual property, physical assets, proprietary designs, etc. A weak-
ness is best described as an area that is lacking in the company. Some examples of
weaknesses could include: lack of appropriate information technology infrastructure,
inefficient workforce, bad geographical location, etc. After assessing these internal
attributes, the external possibilities (opportunities and threat) are then examined.
An opportunity is an area that a company could easily expand to based on the
companies current resources and the state of the marketplace. Similarly, a threat
is something, whether entity, product, market trend, revolutionary technology, etc.,
that could harm business operations by a reduction in market share or loss in profit.
After enumerating these elements, some form of qualitative analysis is often used
to interpret the data. This means that this approach is highly subjective and can
suffer from many of the drawbacks associated with qualitative analysis. However, the
decision-maker would typically be considered a subject-matter expert (SME) when it
comes to evaluating the company. While the results of the SWOT analysis may be
useful at a high-level of analysis, they may lack the traceability to lower-level actions.
To illustrate this point, consider the following notional example:
Notional Example: Company A classifies a Company B’s development of a struc-
tural technology as a threat because it can reduce fuel burn by up to 5%. Company
A classifies their completed development of a structural technology that increases
utilization by at least 3% as a strength. Should Company A look to develop another
technology to compete with Company B? Or should Company A examine other as-
pects feeling confident that the threat is neutralized by their strength? Without a way
to further examine the threat and strength and directly compare their impacts on the
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aircraft, there is no way for Company A to defensibly know which is the appropriate
action to take.
2.3.2 Other Subjective Competitive Assessments
In addition to SWOT analysis, there exist several other subjective techniques that
mainly rely on qualitative assessments by a decision-maker or group brainstorming.
Each of these techniques can offer unique insights. Preferences for a technique are
dependent on the individual(s) and the situation being assessed. While obvious syn-
ergy exists when multiple subjective techniques are combined, it was not possible to
determine the extent that this is prevalent in industry.
Political, Economical, Social, and Technological (PEST) can be a useful tool for
assessing the competitiveness of a company in a constantly changing market. This
technique was proposed by Narayanan and Fahey in 1994. [123] The main benefit
of this technique is that it allows for analysis of four key factors that can drastically
alter a company’s external environment. The applicability of this technique to a
complex design problem seems to be limited; however, this technique may be useful
for helping develop future scenarios that may occur during a system’s life cycle. While
PEST is more focused on the environmental factors in which a company operates,
the GE/McKinsey Matrix focuses more on internal business units.
The GE/McKinsey Matrix was developed in the 1970s by McKinsey & Company’s
consultant work at General Electric (GE). [168, 135] This approach is most useful for
evaluating various business units (i.e., separate entities under control of a central
company), but similar analysis may be applicable to other situations. The basic
principle of the GE/McKinsey Matrix is a 3x3 matrix used to evaluate Business Unit
Strength vs. Market Attractiveness based on a qualitative scale of Low, Medium, and
High. Figure 16 shows a notional GE/McKinsey Matrix. In these matrices, the size
of the circles represents the market size, the pie chart represents the market share,
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Figure 16: A notional GE/McKinsey Matrix, which may be applicable to more than
just business unit evaluation. [168]
and the arrow points to the expected future position. This could be thought of as
an extension on Boston Consulting Group’s Growth Share Matrix, which was first
described by Bruce Henderson in 1970. [104] The Growth Share Matrix categorizes
ideas into one of four categories: star (amazing performance), cash-cow (long-term
earnings, but not high growth), dog (bad investment), or question mark (need more
time and/or information to decide).
While these techniques are useful to many business, they suffer from the same
shortcomings as the SWOT analysis. The qualitative nature of these techniques
means they may lack repeatability because of their subjective evaluations. How-
ever, these techniques may be useful in situations where quantitative physical/virtual
analysis cannot be conducted, and the only sources of information are SMEs.
2.3.3 Game Theory
Game theory was first introduced by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in
1944 [172] and pioneered the field of interactive (competitive) decision making. Game
theory has been defined by Hazelrigg as “any activity that involves more than one
individual, where the actions of each individual in the game affects others who are
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also in the game.” [73] At a basic level, game theoretic analysis requires four “items”:
1. The players
2. The strategy space
3. The sequence of decisions/actions
4. The payoff structure for all the possible actions in the strategy space
This ability to reduce a complex problem to four dimensions was noted in 2004
by Smit and Trigeorgis. [151] The ability to shrink the dimensionality of the prob-
lem greatly increases the desirability of using game theory, which was also noted by
Briceno [29]. By shrinking the dimensionality of the problem, it can become easier
to perform useful analysis based on the type of game being analyzed. Cooperative
and noncooperative games are the most common approaches to modeling interactive
behavior. [73] and are described as:
cooperative game “any game in which players can make binding commitments.”
[73]
noncooperative game “any game that is not a cooperative game, this is, a game
in which the players are not permitted to make binding commitments.” [73]
These games can also include games in which the players can break binding
agreements.
While a cooperative solution can easily be described as the solution that maxi-
mizes reward for all of the parties, the non-cooperative solution is more complicated.
The non-cooperative game is also the format required to analyze competition between
aircraft OEMs because collusion amongst them is illegal‡. The non-cooperative solu-
tion can be thought of as:
‡Aircraft OEMs cannot agree to adhere to a specific competitive strategy because that would
unfairly hurt the customers. Most countries have specific legislation preventing this behavior.
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“the strategy of [a] player [that] yields the highest obtainable [payout] for
its player against...strategies of the other players. A self-countering [set
of strategies amongst players] is called an equilibrium point.” [124]
This is commonly referred to as the Nash Equilibrium (NE). Mathematically, an
NE of pure strategies§ is defined if a set of actions (aN1 , a
N
2 ) that meet the conditions










2 ) ≥ U2(aNE1 , a2) for all a2
(1)
There exist several, well-defined approaches for determining the NE of a game,
including dominated strategies and best response analysis [174]. Both of these tech-
niques can guide one to finding a pure-strategy NE in a game (assuming that one
exists), and often the technique used depends on the preferences of the one analyzing
the game. The best response technique basically employs a dynamic programming
framework to solving the problem. This technique seems rather intuitive because
it requires identification of each player’s best response given the other player’s ac-
tions. While implementing this best response technique is rather easy for normal
form games with complete information, this type of game does not fully capture the
intricacies of a competitive aircraft design problem. When considering a competitor,
the uncertainty of the problem can increase exponentially because of the difficulty in
predicting the decisions they may make.
Shortcomings of Game Theory:
Several authors have criticized game theory for a variety of reasons. One of the major
§Pure strategies refers to selecting only one strategy option to be used throughout the game.
¶The notation U is used because economists traditionally deal with utility values
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elements of these criticisms is underlying human behavior; Hagen and Hammerstein
addressed this and other issues in a paper highlighting theoretical game theory’s
inability to match the results of several experiments. [70] A quote that summarizes
many of the issues with game theory comes from John Williams‖:
[Game theorists] are often viewed by the professional students of man as
precocious children who, not appreciating the true complexities of man
and his works, wander in wide-eyed innocence, expecting that their toy
weapons will slay live dragons just as well as they did inanimate ones.
[33]
That quote (and other critiques) highlights two of the key aspects that limit the
practicality of game theory when dealing with complex design problems. Firstly, game
theory assumes that all decision-makers are rational and seeking to maximize utility
(either with regards to another player’s actions or independent of other players).
That assumption has two major concerns: 1) it may be difficult, if not impossible, to
accurately describe a utility function (or all of its elements) for an individual and/or
firm [87], and 2) decision-maker’s preferences may change during the design process
and/or their preferences may not be accurately known. While assuming a firm is profit
maximizing does mitigate some of these concerns, it does not completely alleviate
them.
Furthermore, the problem of uncertainty has long been an issue for not only game
theory, but many other fields. While several specific forms of game theory (e.g., games
with incomplete information [71, 174], signaling games with asymmetric information
[153, 126]) have attempted to mitigate these concerns, they still cannot fully eliminate
‖John Williams wrote texts on game theory and “provided the initial impetus and intellectual
(and financial) support for most of the mathematical work underpinning the entire edifice of the
theory of games.” [33]
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all the issues that arise with uncertainty and are often limited to only exploring high-
level actions. Also, these techniques are not well suited for problems with multiple
sources of uncertainty – as the number of sources of uncertainty grow, there is an
exponential growth in the level of difficulty associated with modeling and accounting
for these sources.
Due to these limitations, this dissertation work did not seek to implement game
theory for the competition problem being addressed. Instead a framework was de-
veloped in order to gain more insight into the competition problem by allowing for
games to be played (i.e., various actions and strategies can be implemented to see how
they might impact the final result). This proposed framework was seen as a necessary
first step towards being able to implement game theoretic analysis. For this reason,
a generalized decision making approach needs to be adopted to further explore this
competition-influenced design problem.
2.3.4 Top-Down Design Decision Making
The top-down design decision support process is a general methodology to allow for
increased traceability in decisions. The general applicability of this approach allows
for it to be applied to a large variety of problems. Figure 17 shows the steps that
are used; these specific steps are taken from the Integrated Product and Process
Design methodology proposed by Mavris et al. [111] However, many other decision
making techniques follow similar steps. For example, Gass defines decision making as,
“recognizing that a problem exists, identifying possible causes, developing alternative
solutions, choosing among alternative courses of action”[66], which are very similar
to the steps shown in Figure 17.
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Establish the Need 
Define the Problem 
Establish Value Metrics 
Generate Feasible Alternatives 
Evaluate Alternatives 
Make a Decision 
Figure 17: Top-down Design Decision Support Process [111] that is generally appli-
cable to most decision making problems.
The generality of this top-down design decision support process lends itself well
to the competition problem being analyzed. The one element that is missing involves
the act of competition, which should be explicitly stated and not lumped into the
step of evaluating alternatives. By explicitly analyzing competition separately from
evaluating feasible alternatives, a decision-maker may be able to gain more insight into
which aspects should be further investigated to improve a design’s competitiveness.
2.4 Research Objective
Each of the examples from industry presented in § 1.2 and § 1.3 provided motivation
for the research objective of this dissertation. As a reminder, Table 3 provides an
overview of some key observations and where they were discussed.
The information presented in Table 3 also highlights some of the approaches that





Section 1.2.2 Market Penetration Market Volatility
Section 1.3.1 Strategy Option: New Design
Section 1.3.2 Strategy Option: Derivative Design
Section 1.3.3 Strategy Option: Enterprise
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aircraft OEMs use to compete; a more complete listing of these approaches is shown
in Table 2 of § 2.2. By compiling the information in those tables, one can begin to
understand the large range of possible competitive strategies that exist, especially
since multiple strategies may be used simultaneously. Even though there is no way to
analyze every possible permutation and combination of possible competitive strate-
gies, a framework could be developed that allows for various games to be played.
However, based on the motivating examples presented in § 1.2 and 1.3 coupled with
the economic theory presented in § 2.1, several key elements need to be addressed:
Flexibility The framework should allow for various strategies to be used. Further-
more, the framework should be adaptable to the preferences of the decision-
maker and allow for the specific approach to be adopted based on the specific
problem being analyzed.
Uncertainty Mitigation When designing a product with a long life cycle, like an
aircraft, the large amounts of uncertainty can drastically reduce the confidence
of one’s decisions. The proposed framework must provide a process to mitigate
the impacts of uncertainty.
Sensitivities Since decision-makers may not fully know their preferences and/or
their preferences may change over time, the framework should focus on the sensi-
tivities related to decisions, not just a final decision based on assumed/inputted
preferences.
Direct Comparison One of the major strengths of Game Theory is that it directly
accounts for the actions of the competitor. This direct comparison should be
used in the framework in order more robustly account for possible strategies of
a competitor.
As discussed in the previous sections, techniques that have traditionally been
used to analyze competition cannot be applied to this specific problem. However,
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modifications to the Top-Down Decision Support Process can be made to construct
a framework that would allow a decision-maker to analyze games of interest.
Research Objective: Develop a framework to aid in the conceptual
design of aircraft by parametrically accounting for uncertainty from the
economic market and competitive environment through an integrated and
interactive design approach. This approach should allow for analysis of
various strategies (e.g., technology and enterprise-based) that can be used
by the designer or the competitor. Furthermore, this framework should
allow for a direct comparison between proposed solution(s) and possible
competitors solution(s).
Chapter 3 focuses on the formulation of the proposed framework. This formula-
tion addresses the key elements that were previously stated. Flexibility is addressed
throughout the development of the framework by allowing various paths to be taken
depending on the problem being analyzed. Since it has been shown that the uncer-
tainty of the market and competition can affect the success of a design alternative,
there is a need to further explore the impacts of uncertainty. Assuming that the
uncertainty reduces the ability to make decisions with confidence, then there will be
a need to introduce a mitigating strategy. These impacts are further discussed in
§ 3.6, but they also propagate to the other key elements of sensitivities and direct
comparisons. Both of these are directly related to decision making. While a large
variety of decision making techniques exist in the literature, some are not applica-
ble to this design problem. This occurs for two reasons: 1) as previously stated, a
decision-maker’s preferences may be unknown or may change, and 2) there needs to
be a direct comparison between a proposed alternative and a competitor’s design that
leverages this decision making technique. To address the first point, it was necessary
to implement an approach that allows for a decision-maker to easily examine how
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changes in their preferences can affect the preferred decision. To address the second
point, a selected decision making technique should be applicable to both the proposed
design and the competitor’s design. Both of these elements are examined in further
detail in § 3.7.
The formulation of the proposed framework resulted in several concerns regard-
ing the implementation of the specific approaches for a given problem. One of the
concerns arose due to the specific impacts of uncertainty and a mitigating strategy is
examined in Chapter 4 – this experiment includes a sensitivity analysis on the sources
of uncertainty and examines the effectiveness of mitigating strategies. Furthermore,
the impacts of uncertainty and implementation of a mitigating approach could im-
pact the ability to apply various decision making techniques. To this end, Chapter 4
also examines an experiment to compare decision making approaches that are for-
mulated in § 4.3. Based on the results of these experiments, several use cases were





“Human decisions affecting the future ... cannot depend on
strict mathematical expectation, since the basis for calculat-
ing such calculations does not exist; ... it is our innate urge
to activity which makes the wheels go round, our rational
selves choosing ... but often falling back for our motive on
whim or sentiment or chance.”
John Maynard Keynes [89]
This chapter sought to explicitly define the proposed framework and elaborate on the
steps necessary for it to be effectively used. The general framework can be described
by adopting an approach similar to the Top-Down Decision Support Process presented
in § 2.3.4. However, the application of this process to the specific objective of this
dissertation required elaboration of the various tasks performed throughout each step.
Some of these tasks were answered from the literature, but when the literature did
not highlight a clear approach research questions were posed to determine which
technique was best suited.
3.1 Overview of Proposed Framework
While the Top-Down Decision Support Process, which is shown in Figure 17, is gen-
erally applicable to most problems of interest, there are some obvious modifications
that were needed to account for competition. The major deficiency of the Top-Down
Decision Support Process in analyzing competition is that there is not an explicit step
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for comparing a design to a competitor’s design. This modification creates the back-
bone of the proposed framework, which is referred to as the Competition-influenced
Decision Support (CoDeS) Framework and is shown in Figure 18.
Establish the Need 
Define the Problem 
Establish Value Metrics 
Determine Geometric Baseline 
Evaluate Strategy Alternatives 
Compare to Competitor’s Design 
Make a Decision 
Figure 18: General steps of the proposed Competition-influenced Decision Support
(CoDeS) Framework.
The generality of these steps results in the benefit of the CoDeS Framework being
flexible to handle a variety of competitive situations that may be of interest to a
decision-maker. The steps of the proposed framework are not specific to one type of
competitive strategy, but can be adapted to almost all of the types described in § 2.2.
By directly comparing a proposed design to a competitor’s design, one of the major
aims of this research was addressed; however, the steps of the CoDeS Framework as
shown in Figure 18 are not particularly useful. More information about the specific
processes that should be taken during each step are needed to allow for beneficial
analysis. In its current form, the CoDeS Framework suffers from being too flexible
because guidance is not offered on how to accomplish the various steps. To this end,
the following sections seek to more explicitly define the required steps of the proposed
framework.
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3.2 Step 1: Establish the Need
Establishing the Need is one of the most important and possibly time-consuming
steps for any decision making process, especially related to designing a product for
a customer. The reason this step is so crucial is because without a correctly and
properly defined need, the remaining steps may be executed and result in a final
product that is neither desired or purchased. The need identification is crucial because
it lets the producer know which product to design. From this step, requirements can
be properly defined, which were discussed in § 1.1. While these requirements can
come from a variety of stakeholders, this dissertation focuses on the concerns of the
customer (i.e., airlines) because of their importance during the conceptual design of
commercial aircraft. [36, 117, 128] This is summarized with the general sentiment, “in
the commercial sector, the voice of the customer is critical.”[117] To further this point
Anderson states, “The design process starts with a set of specifications (requirements)
for a new airplane ... there is a rather concrete goal toward which the designers are
aiming.” [8]
While this step is important and lays the foundation for all of the future steps,
it is not considered a thrust of this dissertation research. This is justified for two
reasons stated in § 2.4: 1) it is difficult to model competition between aircraft man-
ufacturers that are pursuing different needs in the market, and 2) most of the time,
aircraft manufacturers will hedge their interpretation of market needs by having de-
signs that directly compete in the same market [11]. For these reasons, the CoDeS
Framework was constructed assuming that all customers have the same need (i.e.,
aircraft manufacturers are competing in the same market).
By assuming that the need is the same for the competing aircraft designs, the de-
sign mission was also assumed to be identical. This means that aircraft manufacturers
are not competing by trying to gain extra range, endurance, or other performance-
specific metrics. Instead aircraft designs were evaluated using the same metrics of
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value in an “apples to apples” comparison. However, before discussing the selection
of value metrics the aspects of the specific problem need to be defined.
3.3 Step 2: Define the Problem
While Establishing the Need directly leads to a description of the requirements and
outlines the basis for undertaking the design problem of interest, it only serves as
a starting point of analysis. To fully understand the requirements of a design, one
needs to Define the Problem, which consist of several important elements. These
elements are necessary to conduct meaningful analysis in the following steps of the
CoDeS Framework and are shown in Figure 19. Each of these elements is discussed
in more detail in the following sections:
§ 3.3.1 Define the Competitive Environment
§ 3.3.2 Define the Geometric Variables and Their Ranges
§ 3.3.3 Define the Competitor’s Geometric Baseline and Variable Ranges
§ 3.3.4 Define the Economic Noise Variables and Their Ranges
§ 3.3.5 Define the Strategy Variables and Their Ranges
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Establish the Need 
Define the Problem 
•  Competitive Environment 
•  Geometric Variables & Ranges 
•  Competitor’s Geometry & Ranges 
•  Economic Noise Variables & Ranges 
•  Strategy Variables & Ranges 
Establish Value Metrics 
Determine Geometric Baseline 
Evaluate Strategy Alternatives 
Compare to Competitor’s Design 
Make a Decision 
Figure 19: The CoDeS Framework with specific elements of the Define the Problem
step.
3.3.1 Competitive Environment
§ 2.1 described different competitive environments and the implications of each. While
the CoDeS Framework allows for any type of competitive theory to be analyzed, the
remainder of this dissertation focused on duopoly competition. This was because
it was believed that most traditional aircraft design methods implicitly assume the
aircraft is operating in a monopoly – a duopoly would represent a logical step and in-
sights gained from a duopoly-model could be extended further to account for oligopoly
competition. Furthermore, the aircraft manufacturing industry is not indicative of
perfect competition. However, aircraft manufacturing can not be completely de-
scribed by Bertrand or Cournot duopoly competition theory either. However, Singh
and Vives showed that in a differentiated duopoly, it is a preferred strategy to fix the
quantity of the good produced and then determine the price to charge if the products
are substitutes.[148]
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3.3.2 Geometric Variables & Ranges
When considering a large, commercial aircraft there are thousands of possible vari-
ables that impact the geometry of the design. However, the importance of these
variables is dependent on the phase of design. This dissertation work sought to ad-
dress competition during the early part of the conceptual design phase. In order
to determine the necessary variables to be considered, it was necessary to consult
the literature. Anderson defines conceptual design as, “within a certain somewhat
fuzzy latitude, the overall shape, size, weight, and performance of the new design
[is] determined.”[8]. Raymer suggest that conceptual design should answer “the ba-
sic questions of configuration arrangement, size and weight, and performance.”[137]
With these considerations in mind, it was necessary to determine the key geometric
variables that should be considered.
In order to determine geometric variables, an architecture for the design needs to
be determined. During the early conceptual design phase, the architecture basically
describes the overall physical configuration of the aircraft. One way of visualizing
the various possibilities of different architectures is through a Morphological Matrix,
which can be seen in Figure 20, where the yellow boxes represent the selection of a
notional architecture. In this figure, each row corresponds to a different physical char-
acteristic and the columns represent different options. This particular Morphological
Matrix has 1,007,769,600,000 unique combinations of architectures. If it were possible
to analyze one combination every second, it would take over 31,934 years to explore
all of the combinations. Further complicating the issues is that there is no reason to
assume that the geometric variables are the same between different architectures.
Once an architecture is decided for the aircraft being analyzed, then the geometric
design variables of interest can be determined. For conventional aircraft configura-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































similar to the notional architecture highlighted in Figure 20. Assuming this archi-
tecture was selected, some of the key geometric variables during the early phases of
conceptual design would include:
Wing Area The wing is the main source of lift for an aircraft and the amount of
lift produced is directly related to the size of the wing.
Thrust-to-Weight Ratio This ratio considers the thrust of the engines and the
amount of weight that must be lifted.
Aspect Ratio, Wing The Aspect Ratio relates the area of the wing to the span
of the wing. This parameter is important in determining the efficiency of the
wing.
Thickness-to-Chord Ratio, Wing This parameter accounts for the rigidity and
weight of the wing.
Sweep, Wing This parameter is important for drag considerations, especially con-
sidering the operating speed of most commercial aircraft during their cruise
segments.
Control Surfaces At these early phases of design, it is only necessary to examine
the general characteristics of the vertical and horizontal tail, which are similar
to those of the wing.
After identification of the key geometric variables, the ranges for each of these
variables need to be determined. These ranges can be influenced by: manufactur-
ing considerations, safety considerations, airport operations, etc. After the ranges
are defined for each geometric variable, analysis can begin on performance and eco-
nomic considerations from combinations of these geometric variables. The process for
conducting this analysis is further discussed in § 3.5.
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3.3.3 Competitor Geometric Baseline & Ranges
There is a need to determine the details of the competitor’s aircraft, whether that
design is in the market or still being developed. There are many legal means that
a company can employ to gain this insight into their competition. These techniques
include: reverse engineering, interviews with customers, interviews with suppliers,
examining paperwork filed with regulatory agencies, examining patents filed, etc.
The appropriate technique depends on the specifics of the scenario. For instance, one
could not reverse engineer a design that has yet to be manufactured.
If the competitor is using the same basic architecture for their design, then the
same geometric variables should be used to define their design. By using the same
variables to describe these two aircraft, it is more intuitive to make a direct compar-
ison between them. However, it is important to note that there is more than just the
geometry of the vehicle that will affect its economic success. An example of one of
these factors is the overall cost required to produce that design, which may be depen-
dent on information regarding the competitor that may not be known. Regardless,
estimations of these factors, even if described by a range of possible values, would
provide valuable insight.
3.3.4 Economic Noise Variables & Ranges
There are a large number of economic noise variables that could impact the design
of an aircraft; however, it is important to only examine key variables that can easily
be mapped to an aircraft designs. For instance, the valuation of the Euro relative to
the Dollar has impacts on which aircraft are purchased, but this variable might over-
complicate the analysis and not provide significant insights into the problem. Instead
of currency rates, it might be easier to vary the number of aircraft purchased in order
to see how quantity demanded and manufactured impact the profitability of a design.
While the CoDeS Framework has the flexibility for a decision-maker selecting noise
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variables that are deemed important, the remainder of this section suggest a few key
variables.
As a manufacturer, there are a couple key variables that can greatly impact the
profitability of a design. As previously stated, the number of aircraft sold and produced
can have significant impacts for two reasons: 1) it significantly influences average
costs, and 2) learning curve effects. Average costs have been discussed in § 2.1 and
since aircraft manufacturers exercise some control over the price of an aircraft it is
important to keep these costs as low as possible. Learning curve effects refers to
the fact that it often becomes less expensive to manufacturer a large number of an
item than it is to manufacturer a small quantity. This is often modeled using an
exponential relationship as described by Equation 2; in this equation, γ represents
the cost to produce the xth unit, a is cost to produce the first unit, x is the cumulative
number of units produced, and b is a learning curve parameter used to account for
the reduction in costs as production quantity increases. Of these parameters, b is
often the most difficult to estimate a priori – often this parameter is estimated from
historical data, but obvious errors can occur when trying to extrapolate historical
data to apply to new aircraft.
γ = ax−b (2)
There are two main reasons that the learning curve often causes a decrease in
the average cost as production increases. Firstly, a large amount of cost exist in the
production facilities and equipment needed to manufacturer, which includes tooling.
Secondly, as the number of units increases, the workforce gains more experience and
can then produce them more rapidly, which directly translates to lower costs. The
later effect dominates the learning curve in aircraft manufacturing because it is highly
labor-intensive and production rates are low. [18] In 1936, it was estimated by Wright
that aircraft manufacturing costs decreased by 20% for every doubling of quantity.
[178, 18] This reduction would correspond to b = 0.8 using Equation 2. But in
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1963, Alchian conducted analysis on twenty-two aircraft from World War II, and
noted that the exact value varies based on the aircraft.[7] Regardless, the estimate
of approximately 20% reduction does have wide-spread acceptance when no other
information is known. [18].
While the previous discussion of economic variables has focused exclusively on
factors that can influence the aircraft manufacturer, there is a need to also account
for the customer. As shown with industry examples in Chapter 1, the airlines have
to purchase the aircraft in order for it to be a successful design. For this reason, it
makes sense for an aircraft manufacturer to account for factors that affect airlines
when evaluating design alternatives. One of these factors is fuel costs, which have
been very prevalent in the news in recent years. One report stated that Delta earned
a record $4.5 Billion in profits for 2015 even though operating revenue decreased by
2%. [164] These large profits were due to the significant drop in fuel prices in the last
several years. Other factors that influence an airlines decision to purchase aircraft
include the price and the number of people that desire to use air travel. The number
of passengers expected to travel by aircraft in the next twenty years is expected to
grow by an average of 4.1% annually according data released by the International
Air Transport Association.[81] Based on these forecasts, it may be more beneficial to
examine how efficiently airlines are able to fill their aircraft since it seems that the
number of passengers will be increasing for the foreseeable future. This efficiency is
dependent on many different sources, but can often be summarized by the metric of
Load Factor (LF), which is used to quantify the percentage of seats occupied on a
flight.
One last factor to consider that affects both airlines and aircraft manufacturers
is inflation rate. Inflation is basically a reduction in the purchasing power of money.
There are many ways to estimate inflation and a large number of economist use the
Consumer Price Index as general measure of inflation for consumers throughout all
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industries. However, inflation does not have to be uniform throughout industries. In
fact, the Bureau of Labor Statistics releases regular reports on the Producer Price
Index (PPI), which tracks inflation in various industries. [30] This data can be used
to more accurately track how inflation affects aircraft manufacturers, and can be used
as an estimate the inflation rate experienced by airlines.
The following list summarizes some of the suggest key economic noise variables
for both aircraft manufacturers and airlines.
• Manufacturing Learning Curve
• Production Facility and Equipment Costs
• Number of Aircraft Produced/Purchased
• Price of Aircraft
• Price of Fuel
• Load Factor
• Inflation Rate
3.3.5 Strategy Variables & Ranges
The specific strategy variables and their ranges depends on which strategies are ana-
lyzed. A list of major strategies that OEMs use during the conceptual design phase
is presented in Table 2 of § 2.2. The process of determining specific variables and
their ranges for a given strategy is largely dependent on understanding the specific
parameters affected by a strategy. This understanding can often be gained through
a literature review of that specific strategy.
Consider a manufacturing strategy, like the ones discussed in § 1.3.3: Product
Lifecycle Management[154], 6σ [139], Integrated Product and Process Design & Lean
Aircraft Initiative [167, 83], and Manufacturing Influenced Design [147, 156, 34, 98,
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146]. These manufacturing initiatives are not focused on reducing the cost to produce
the first unit, but are often focused on affecting manufacturing costs of the following
units. While there are a large number of specific variables that could be impacted
by these different manufacturing initiatives, there may not be a need to model all of
these details during the early phases of conceptual design. Instead, one could alter
the learning curve parameter, b in Equation 2, to capture the benefits/costs of these
initiatives.
This is similar to an approach adopted by Kirby for technologies. [91] This ap-
proach is further discussed in § 3.5.1. If no equations exist, then one could use SMEs to
help estimate the impacts on top-level metrics. The use of SMEs is further discussed
in § 3.5.2. Regardless of the strategies that are used, a decision-maker evaluates them
based on their impacts on the selected value metrics of interest.
3.4 Step 3: Establish Value Metrics
The choice of value metrics depends on the preferences of the stakeholder and this
can affect the result of the analysis. Since a variety of value metric may be chosen,
flexibility was built into the CoDeS Framework. However, for this dissertation work,
two main value metrics were used. One metric was meant to capture the competi-
tive interactions between aircraft manufacturers and the other metric was meant to
capture the desirability of an airline to purchase a particular aircraft. These metrics
were normalized profit and normalized average required yield per revenue passenger
mile ($/RPM).
Profit:
Profit makes sense as a value metric because an aircraft manufacturer is a profit
maximizing firm. To maximize their profit, an aircraft manufacturer would not only
want to minimize their costs, but also sell as many aircraft as possible at as high of a
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price as possible. While profit is a good metric for examining an aircraft, it does not
provide information about risk, return on investment, or the amount of time required
to recoup that investment.
To provide more insight into the economic performance of an aircraft, one might
consider the manufacturer’s cumulative cash flow (CCF) defined by Equation 3, which
shows how yearly incomes (It) and yearly costs (Ct) propagate throughout an aircraft’s
life cycle. Within these curves, there is a wealth of information that could be useful
to a decision-maker. A notional example of a manufacturer’s CCF curve is shown in
Figure 21. The first segment of this curve, from Research, Development, Testing, and
Evaluation (RDT&E) Begins to production begins represents the initial investment
and conceptual exploration of a possible design. All design (conceptual, preliminary,
and detailed) occurs during this first segment of the CCF curve. At the point pro-
duction begins, all of the design considerations should be finalized and manufacturing
occurs. The start of this activity causes a change in slope of the following line segment
until maximum sunk cost, which marks the point where incomes from aircraft sales are
greater than the costs associated with producing those aircraft; therefore, the slope
of the CCF curve changes from negative to positive. Notionally, this line segment
continues until the end of the manufacturing life cycle for that particular design of
aircraft. When that line segment crosses the horizontal axis (which indicates when
CCF is equal to zero), the design is said to have reached its breakeven point – at this
time the manufacturer has recouped their investment in the aircraft. All net earnings































Figure 21: Notional Manufacturer’s Cumulative Cash Flow curve, highlighting points
of interest.
There are many interesting points on a manufacturer’s cumulative cash flow curve,
and several metrics can be further analyzed to provide additional insight into an air-
craft design’s economic performance. For example, the Return on Investment (ROI)
for a design can be calculated by using the formula in Equation 4 and data taken
from the manufacturer’s CCF curve. Although the notional figure assumed that all
of the line segments were linear, this may not be the case. Not only is the slope of
the line affected by the number of aircraft sold in a given year, there are external
factors that can influence these curves such as the factors described in § 3.3.4. The
combination of these factors introduce economic uncertainty into the design of an
aircraft, which can be visualized in the CCF curve. Instead of being approximated
as a single curve, it may be more accurate to visualize the boundaries of the CCF
curve caused by economic uncertainty, which can been in Figure 22. This figure not
only highlights potential upper and lower ranges of the manufacturer’s CCF, but it
also explicitly shows a potential distribution on the breakeven year. Distributions
like those could also be created for ranges of profit and ranges of maximum sunk cost,
which could provide more insight into potential risks of design alternatives given an
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Figure 22: Notional Manufacturer’s CCF ranges with uncertainty. A notional dis-
tribution of the possible breakeven year has been highlighted.
While the manufacturer’s CCF curve does provide large amounts of information
about a design, the single metric of profit may be more useful in comparing designs
at this early stage of conceptual design. However, by keeping track of the CCF values
throughout the years, the final profit can be calculated. Furthermore, by keeping
track of the CCF yearly values, a decision-maker has more tools available to make
a decision. Suppose two strategies had the same expected profit, but one strategy
had a breakeven year that was expected to occur 1-2 years before the other – the
decision-maker would probably choose to go with the strategy that had the earlier
breakeven year, especially considering the demands of investors, which was discussed
in § 1.2.2.
$/RPM:
As stated earlier, this metric serves as a surrogate to represent the desirability of
airlines to purchase a given design alternative. Like aircraft OEMs, airlines seek to
maximize their profit as well. This is accomplished by purchasing aircraft at a low
price and keeping operating costs low, which usually occurs from having efficient
aircraft. To fully understand how $/RPM captures these interest of an airline, it
is necessary to examine the various factors that constitute $/RPM. Firstly, it is a
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function of total operating costs (TOC), number of seats on the aircraft (NS), LF,
and the length of trips flown throughout its life cycle (LTot,LC). Before defining the
exact equation for $/RPM, it is necessary to identify the factors that comprise TOC,
which are broken into two categories of Direct Operating Costs (DOC) and Indirect
Operating Costs (IOC). DOC are costs that are required to operate the aircraft,
and IOC are cost related to running the aircraft. According to the Federal Aviation
Administration, DOC account for approximately 52% of the total operating costs for
major passenger air carriers. [61] To better illustrate this distinction, the common



















– General & Administrative Fees
Since these operating costs will occur throughout the life cycle of the aircraft,
their values will change based on the inflation rate.∗ In order to account for this
variation in the quantity of cash needed throughout the years, a net present value
(NPV) formulation of the TOC should be used; this formulation is applied by using
Equation 5. In this equation, Pi represents the amount of cash in year i and f rep-
resents the inflation rate. To quickly illustrate how NPV works, consider an example
where $100 was received each year for three years with a constant 5% inflation rate.
At the end of three years, there would be a quantity of $300, but it would only have





Using a NPV formulation, the various operating costs throughout the years can
be converted to a common year’s dollar value. Furthermore, this formulation allows
for the $/RPM metric to be less sensitive to inflation. But the value of $/RPM would
still change if estimation of the costs increase or decrease. The formula for calculating





One of the key benefits of using $/RPM as a surrogate metric for desirability to
purchase an aircraft is that it is intrinsically linked to Profit for an OEM because
one of the elements of DOC is financing, which relates to the acquisition price of
the aircraft. The significance of this linkage between value metrics, becomes more
apparent by explaining the rationale for normalizing them.
∗Since inflation reduces the purchasing power of money, a larger quantity of money will be needed
in future years to achieve the same level of service/benefit.
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Normalizing the Metrics:
This need arises for two main reasons: 1) it provides more context for the gains/losses
of a possible strategy compared to the strategy of doing nothing, and 2) it allows for
a more direct comparison to the competition. The first reason has to do with the
cognitive processing of humans – by showing both metrics on the same scale and in
terms of percentage change from a baseline, it is easier to intuit the net improve-
ment/detriment of a given strategy. Furthermore, it is also easier to evaluate possible
strategies relative to a competitor. For example, consider the direct comparison be-
tween aircraft in Figure 23 where i represents the initial location of the aircraft and
f represents the final location given market behavior and/or strategy option. If the
red square represents a competitor’s aircraft and the green circle represents the pro-
posed design alternative, it is easy to see that the competitor has a lower normalized
$/RPM value, which may cause more aircraft to purchase their aircraft than initially
estimated. This behavior is shown in Plot A of Figure 23. If more of the competi-
tor’s aircraft was purchased then the red square would shift to the right (i.e., obtain
a higher normalized profit) and the green circle would shift to the left (i.e., obtain
a lower normalized profit). Since the profit values have been normalized, it is easy
to directly relate the changes in normalized profit to market share if the a direct
relationship between $/RPM and quantity demanded by airlines was known. Plot B
shows a different result because the green circle implemented a price cutting strategy
that caused a reduction in the normalized $/RPM value and a reduction in the nor-
malized profit ; however, the reduction in normalized $/RPM value could cause more
airlines to purchase that design of aircraft which would increase the normalized profit.
Again, if a relationship between $/RPM and quantity demanded was known, then
the percentage change in market share could be quantified. It is important to note

































Figure 23: Notional plot showing the benefits of using normalized value metrics.
Plot A shows how market share could be reduced due to a higher normalized $/RPM,
and Plot B shows how a price-cutting strategy could help increase market share.
economics. General theory states that the quantity demanded of a good/product has
an inverse relationship between price and quantity – as the price of a good increases,
the quantity demanded decreases.
While the exact relationship between $/RPM and quantity of aircraft demanded
by airlines is not publicly available, one would expect that aircraft OEMs would have
estimations of this relationship based on their past experience with customers (i.e.,
airlines). Since this information could not be used in this dissertation, normalized
profit served as a surrogate metric to approximate changes in market share.
Even though this dissertation work used profit and $/RPM as the value metrics,
the CoDeS Framework is not limited to these metrics. While this flexibility does exist,
there are benefits that come to using these economic-based metrics. The main benefit
is that it allows for the engineers/designers and the decision-maker(s) to “speak the
same language” when evaluating designs – the need for clear communication within
and between engineering teams and decision-makers has been cited as being a critical
element for effective designs. [74, 12, 41] For this to occur, appropriate relationships
between design, economic noise, and strategy variables need to be mapped to the
value metrics of interest using a defensible approach.
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3.5 Step 4: Determine Geometric Baseline
Geometric Baselines need to be established for both a proposed design alternative
and a competitor’s design. This need exist for several reasons. Firstly, it is necessary
to separate the geometry considerations from the strategy considerations in order to
fully understand the impacts of each – this is similar to the approach adopted by
Kirby where she separated geometric optimization from technology implementation
in her Technology Identification, Evaluation, and Selection (TIES) methodology. [91]
It is important to note that Kirby did adopt an iterative approach where the geometry
was re-optimized after a technology was selected in order to realize the full benefits
of the technology. Secondly, it is important to have a baseline vehicle design in order
to easily make comparisons; this was discussed in the previous section (§ 3.4) when it
was suggested that the value metrics should be normalized. While these two reasons
highlight the importance of having baseline designs, they do not address how they
should be constructed or evaluated.
When thinking about constructing models of geometric baselines of a proposed
design and a competitor’s design, one can easily imagine two distinct approaches.
One of these approaches is to create models of the designs in parallel to each other
(i.e., create both geometric baseline models simultaneously) and the other is to create
these models in series (e.g., create a model of the competitor’s geometric baseline and
then create a model of the proposed geometric baseline). The former approach may
be preferred if both aircraft OEMs are seeking to enter the market simultaneously
and there is little information known about the competitor’s design. This approach
may also be ideal if the aircraft OEM has enough resources for two design teams
to independently model each design. The latter approach may be preferred if the
competitor’s design is already in the market; if this were the case, then there would
be a large amount of information that could be gathered about the competitor’s design
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Figure 24: The Geometric Baseline for the proposed design and competitor’s design
can be established either in series or in parallel.
also be preferred if there are limited resources to model both designs simultaneously.
The approach adopted in this dissertation was to model the competitor’s design and
the proposed design in series. These two approaches are shown being incorporated in
the CoDeS Framework in Figure 24. It is important to note that the ability to adopt
either approach increases the flexibility of the CoDeS Framework.
While it may not be difficult to determine which approach should be used in
creating models of the geometric baselines, there may be considerable difficulty in
ensuring that the models provide reliable and relevant information to the decision-
maker. In order to have confidence in the results, an ad-hoc approach should not be
used in establishing the geometric baseline for aircraft. Furthermore, this approach
should be defensible, repeatable, traceable, and also applicable to strategy evaluation
in order to maintain consistency in the analysis. For mapping design variables to
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performance characteristics, the ideal solution would be using a validated physics-
based analysis tool. This would allow for changes in various design variables to
propagate through the system using a proven mathematical framework. For capturing
how these performance characteristics and manufacturing considerations would map
to economic value metrics, an ideal solution would be using an activity-based costing
tool. However, the use of these tools may not always be possible.
The inability to use these tools could occur for several reasons. Two of the possible
reasons for this include the proprietary nature of these tools or because alternatives
are being analyzed where the physics or cost-basis are not fully understood. While the
lack of proprietary tools may limit analysis in this dissertation, it would not affect an
OEM’s ability to apply the CoDeS Framework to their design. However, when trying
to analyze situations where the physics or cost-bases are not fully understood, it may
be better to use SMEs. It is not advisable to use a database that interpolates between
existing designs in order to estimate performance. The conceptual design of an aircraft
may analyze alternatives that have never been flight-tested or manufactured, which
would result in erroneous results when interpolating.
The following subsections focus on three approaches for the conceptual design
of aircraft. § 3.5.1 elaborates on the requirements of an appropriate modeling and
simulation (M&S) environment. § 3.5.2 describes when it may be necessary to use
SMEs and how SMEs could be solicited to evaluate potential designs. And § 3.5.3
discusses how these two approaches may be used jointly in order to fully evaluate a
potential design alternative.
3.5.1 Considerations for a Modeling and Simulation Environment
One of the underlying factors influencing the selection process was the availability
of the M&S environment. It would be näıve to believe that OEMs do not have
proprietary tools that they use for conceptual design of their aircraft; however, the
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proprietary nature of these tools meant that they were inaccessible for this disserta-
tion. Other factors influencing the selection of an appropriate tool are more directly
related to the research that was conducted. This section is divided into three parts:
Part 1 provides an overview of the capability requirements of an M&S environment
that is able to meet the needs of this dissertation research, Part 2 explains how to
establish a Geometric Baseline using in M&S environment described in Part 1, and
Part 3 elaborates on implications for the CoDeS Framework.
Overive of Desired M&S Environment Capabilities:
While performance characteristics were not considered to be value metrics in this
dissertation, their effects on the value metrics selected should be accurately quantified.
To this end, there was a need to discuss how design variables are used to determine
performance characteristics in the design of aircraft. This will be discussed from a
first-principles, physics-based analysis focusing on evaluations that would be typical
during the conceptual design phase. This is usually accomplished through a process
referred to as sizing and synthesis (S&S). Synthesis refers to the idea of bringing
together multiple disciplines (e.g., aerodynamics, propulsion, structures, stability &
control) in order to determine the characteristics of an aircraft (i.e., sizing) that meet
the stakeholders’ requirements. The basic premise of S&S is to simulate the mission,
whether on a computer or paper, ensuring that at each point throughout the mission
the aircraft meets stakeholders’ requirements (e.g., has enough fuel, produces enough
lift, maintains appropriate thrust).
A typical commercial aircraft mission consists of eight segments: 1) pre-takeoff
(e.g., board, refuel, taxi), 2) takeoff, 3) climb, 4) cruise, 5) descend, 6) approach, 7)
land, and 8) post-landing (e.g., taxi, deboard, unload cargo). There exist additional
reserve requirements (e.g., climb, loiter, descend) that are used as a margin for safety
– if the initial fuel estimates are too low, aircraft gets delayed in landing, or has to
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reroute due to a situation at the destination airport. While multiple other mission
segments could occur, these nine (eight including the additional reserve phase) can
be considered typical of a notional mission. As stated above, S&S literally examines
whether an aircraft has the performance characteristics necessary to complete each
segment of its mission and has enough fuel in order to safely complete the mission.
An appropriate M&S environment must be able to account for these various mission
segments and the key characteristics that affect the aircraft performance during each.
Multiple authors, including Anderson[8], Mattingly[105], and Raymer[137] have sug-
gested approaches for performing S&S. The following provides a brief overview of
the general approach suggested by these authors; a more detailed explanation can be
found in [105].
The phases of pre-takeoff and post-landing can be approximated using historical
data since this dissertation does not examine any strategies involving airport oper-
ations. The other phases though can be modeled using equations. The equations
presented by Mattingly focus on using two high-level scaling parameters: thrust-to-
weight ratio (T/W) and wing loading (W/Swing). These equations all take the general
form of T/W = f(W/Swing). In order to use these equations, specific details need to
be known about the aircraft, such as: aircraft drag polar, engine characteristics, and
component weights.
The aircraft drag polar is a mathematical representation of the amount of drag
an aircraft experiences based on given characteristics. While the specific equation
used can take a variety of forms, a common expression is described by Equation 7.
In this equation, CD represents the drag coefficient, CD,0 represents the amount of
profile drag that occurs from the shape of the body, K1 & K2 represent coefficients
that describe the amount of lift-induced drag that occurs, and CL represents the
lift coefficient. CL and CD are directly proportional to the amount of lift (L) and
drag (D) experienced by the aircraft. Formulas for L and D are shown in Equations 8
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and 9, respectively; in these equations, q∞ represents the dynamic pressure. The other
parameters, CD,0, K1, and K2 are dependent on the specific geometry of the aircraft.
A common heuristic used in commercial aircraft design states that the higher the
lift-to-drag ratio, the less fuel will be burned during a mission. This directly relates
to the cost to operate the aircraft (as seen in DOC described in § 3.4).
CD = CD,0 +K1C
2
L +K2CL (7)
L = q∞SwingCL (8)
D = q∞SwingCD (9)
Engine characteristics that are needed to perform S&S analysis include the amount
of fuel burned for different thrust levels and how that fuel burn varies as a function of
altitude. This information is necessary because S&S ensures the aircraft is producing
enough thrust to overcome the drag experienced during the various mission segments.
From determining the amount of thrust required, the engine characteristics can be
used to determine the amount of fuel burned. This information can then be directly
related to the costs of operating the aircraft.
Finally, the component weights need to be taken into account. This is because the
amount of lift required, is directly proportional to the weight of the aircraft at that
phase in the mission. While fuel will be burned throughout the mission, which causes
the weight to decrease, a commercial aircraft should not have any other changes in
weight† associated with completing its mission. While historical estimates could be
used to approximate the weights of various components, it may limit the capability
of examining how changes in those components affect the total weight. For this
reason, it would be better to use an M&S environment that is capable of converting
†Some missions for military aircraft include a payload drop.
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geometric descriptions of components, which is comprised of a given material, to an
accurate weight for that component. An example of this could be for the wing of
an aircraft, where a geometric description and choice of materials are inputted to
approximate the weight of the wing. This level of fidelity would allow for an accurate
assessment of the amount of fuel required to complete the aircraft’s mission – since it is
heavily dependent on the total weight of the aircraft – the amount of fuel is directly
proportional to the costs of operating the aircraft. Furthermore, if manufacturing
complexities associated with constructing the desired component were inputted, then
the M&S environment should be able to estimate the manufacturing costs incurred
by the OEM.
Figure 25 aids in illustrating how the drag polar, engine characteristics, and com-
ponent descriptions are used in S&S by illustrating Mission Analysis and Constraint
Analysis. In Constraint Analysis, the characteristics of the aircraft are used to de-
velop the various constraints for each mission segment using the T/W = f(W/Swing)
formulation for each segment. The interactions of these constraints can lead to a
feasible area, which is colored green in Figure 25. All the points in that feasible
area represent designs that are able to complete the mission segments based on the
inputted aircraft characteristics (drag polar, engine characteristics, and component
weights); however, any changes in those characteristics will cause some and/or all of
the curves to shift which could increase or reduce the size of the feasible space. In
Mission Analysis, the aircraft simulates completing each mission segment to ensure
that it has enough fuel to complete the mission – as stated previously, the amount of
fuel burned depends on the aircraft characteristics. Figure 25 also shows the iterative
nature of S&S. Since Mission Analysis depends on the results of Constraint Analysis,
and visa-versa, both analyses need to be iterated until a converged solution occurs.
If a converged solution does not occur, then either the aircraft characteristics or the























Figure 25: S&S analysis of a mission consist of iterating between constraint analysis,
which yields the feasible design space, and mission analysis, which yields the weights
at various mission segments to ensure adequate fuel.
The discussion on performance characteristics has focused on their relationship to
operating costs of the airline, but they are also related to the profit of the aircraft
OEM indirectly and directly. They are indirectly related for the same reasons that
$/RPM is used as a value metric, which was discussed in § 3.4 – the more desirable
an aircraft is to an airline means that aircraft OEMs may be able to charge a higher
price and/or sell more units. These performance characteristics are directly related
to profit because they affect the cost of production.
The cost to produce aircraft is directly dependent on three high-level factors:
RDT&E Costs (CR,Tot), Manufacturing Costs (CM,Tot), and Sustainment Costs (CS,Tot).
CR,Tot encompass all of the costs to design and develop the vehicle and components.
These costs include: labor, initial tooling, experimentation (ground-based and air-
based), certification, raw materials required for the initial prototypes, and technology
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development. CM,Tot account for the costs associated with producing all of the op-
erational vehicles. These costs include: labor, tooling, raw materials, component
purchasing (e.g., buying an engine from an engine manufacturer), and possible trans-
portation costs. CS,Tot account for all other production costs that are not CM,Tot. This
includes: spares, facilities, initial training, ground support equipment, and technical
data.
These cost elements could be modeled as only total costs accrued over the aircraft’s
production life cycle. However, this would limit the flexibility in analyzing data. As
stated in § 3.4, a large amount of information can be gained from the manufacturer’s
CCF similar to the one seen in Figure 21. For this reason, it would be preferable to
have an M&S environment that computes yearly values, which can then be summed
to quantify total costs for the aircraft – this approach also assumes that incomes
from selling aircraft would be calculated on yearly basis. The costs associated with
RDT&E would occur over several years before production on the aircraft begins, but
for simplicity one could model these costs as occurring over the entire life cycle of N
years as denoted by Equation 10, but RDT&E costs would be equal to zero for each
year after production begins. The costs for manufacturing can also be modeled as
occurring each year during the aircraft’s life cycle, as shown in Equation 11, but with
a value of zero for each year before production begins. This same approach can be
adopted for the costs of sustainment, which is captured in Equation 12. Ideally, an
M&S environment would allow these costs to vary yearly depending on influencing
factors (e.g., difficulty in technology maturation, production schedules, modifications
to existing facilities) instead of having a fixed value from historical data that is equally














Some interdependencies between costs and performance characteristics are obvi-
ous based on the previous discussion. One of these is the component weights, which
depend on the raw materials being used for production. Another is the engine char-
acteristics because one would expect a better performing engine to costs more than a
lower performing engine. However, several of the interdependencies are more subtle to
detect. For example, improving the drag polar might require use of a new technology
(CR,Tot), more complicated tooling (CM,Tot), and new facilities (CS,Tot). This means
that the impact on the OEMs profit is not just dependent on the technology, but also
the change in manufacturing activity caused by that technology. These subtle effects
may be simplified to the point of being adequately captured as learning curve effects
(given by Equation 2 in § 3.3.4), but this depends on the level of granularity desired.
By accurately capturing more of these interdependencies, the M&S environment can
be used to explore more strategy options. An activity-based costing approach would
be ideal to capture these interdependencies, if and only if it was also directly linked
to the physics-based analysis described previously.
These requirements on an acceptable M&S Environment are summarized as:
• Available for use (i.e., non-proprietary)
• Capable of analyzing strategies discussed in Section 2.2
• Propagate low-level physical design and business changes to high-level metrics
• Use physics-based analysis whenever possible
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Figure 26: Notional figure of a desired M&S environment that links physics-based
performance calculations to activity-based cost calculations for an aircraft.
• Analyze costs throughout the life cycle of the design – including costs related to
the OEM during RDT&E, Manufacturing, and Sustainment and costs related
to operations (DOC and IOC)
Ideally, an M&S environment would allow for a direct linkage between the per-
formance characteristics and the economics related to the aircraft. As previously
stated, this would allow for capturing of the interdependencies that exists between
performance and costs. To this end, a notional block diagram shows this linkage
in Figure 26. Using an M&S environment as described would provide confidence in
accurately selecting a geometric baseline.
Selecting a Geometric Baseline:
As previously stated, if a design exist in the market, then reverse engineering can be
used to determine the geometric baseline of that aircraft – this geometric baseline can
then be analyzed using an M&S environment in order to create a mapping between the
design variables and the value metrics. However, if the design does not exist and only
a range of values for different geometric design variables has been established, then
an optimization technique should used to identified a preferred geometric baseline.
Based on the value metrics identified in § 3.4, a multi-objective optimization technique
should be used. Several techniques were identified in the literature that could be well
suited for this design problem, depending on the specific details. These techniques
are: Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS), gradient-based algorithms, and evolutionary
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algorithms. Each of these techniques are well-suited for different types of problems
– to maintain flexibility in the CoDeS Framework any of these approaches could be
used. To aid in the selection of an appropriate technique, a brief description of each
approach is provided.
MCS is a brute-force approach to solving problems that is best suited when an
M&S environment can be evaluated many times in a small amount of time. This
approach does not rely on information from previously evaluated alternatives, but
instead evaluates randomly sampled combinations of design variables. For MCS to
be effective a large number of evaluations must occur, which is typically greater than
or on the magnitude of 104 alternatives – even if an M&S took only one second to
execute, it would still take over 2.75 hours to analyze just 10,000 alternatives using
an MCS approach. Regardless, this technique can be useful in visualizing the design
space. Filtering techniques can also be applied to these results in order to identify
a preferred geometric baseline. This technique is best suited for problems where
the M&S environment has a low runtime and when it is not possible to apply other
optimization techniques.
Gradient-based algorithms seek to minimize the number of alternatives analyzed
by exploiting information regarding previous evaluations. These algorithms are more
suitable for M&S environments that take longer to analyze a design alternative; how-
ever, to utilize these algorithms, the design variable inputs (and outputs) need to be
continuous. While these algorithms can be used in the presence of constraints, the
design space must be convex in order to ensure that global optimum is found. Fur-
thermore, some gradient-based algorithms require the calculation or approximation
of second derivatives, which can be time consuming or may not be possible for a given
M&S environment. If it was assumed that a gradient-based algorithm could be used
for a given M&S environment, then sequential quadratic programming (SQP) may
be the preferred algorithm to use for these design problems. Details for applying this
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approach are discussed in several sources [21, 169] that provide a strong theoretical
underpinning and worked out examples. SQP has been shown to quickly converge
on optimums with a minimal number of function calls, which can be beneficial if the
M&S environment is expensive to execute. The speed of convergence is dependent on
the initial point evaluated, which may be randomly selected. As with other gradient-
based algorithms, SQP cannot be easily applied if design variables or outputs are
discretized or if discontinuities exist in the design space.
Evolutionary algorithms are well suited for handling problems with discrete in-
puts and/or outputs or that have a non-convex design space. These algorithms first
initialize a random population of points that evaluate different alternatives and then
attempt to find more optimal points based on these previous evaluations. An example
of a popular evolutionary algorithm is the Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm
II (NSGA-II)[47]. A basic overview of this algorithm is that it evaluates an initial
population of points to determine which points are the most optimal (based on their
ability to optimize the value metrics) and then uses those most optimal points to pro-
duce a new population of points – this process is repeated until a given convergence
criteria is met. While NSGA-II is well-suited for certain problems, it often requires
a large number of evaluations using an M&S environment, which can make it time
consuming to execute. Furthermore, the results of NSGA-II are dependent on the
specific conditions (e.g., size of population, convergence criteria) used in setting up
the algorithm.
The specific type of problem being analyzed will influence which technique is pre-
ferred. One heuristic that can be used involves whether or not the input variables to
the M&S environment are discrete or continuous – if discrete, then NSGA-II or MCS
should be used, otherwise SQP would be preferred. Another heuristic involves the
time required to execute the M&S environment – if the M&S environment is expensive
to execute, then MCS should not be used. However, as previously stated, the CoDeS
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Figure 27: Flowchart of the Determine Geometric Baseline step when using an M&S
environment.
Framework has the flexibility to use any of these approaches. The specific details of
the problem should guide the selection of an appropriate optimization technique.
Impacts on CoDeS Framework:
The use of an M&S environment would be applicable to both the parallel and se-
rial approaches (as shown in Figure 24) to the CoDeS step of Determine Geometric
Baseline. This process could be done for either the competitor’s geometric baseline
or the proposed geometric baseline. Figure 27 illustrates this process and shows how
either of three optimization techniques discussed above could be used. However, the
use of an M&S environment is not the only approach that could be used to establish
a geometric baseline – the next section discusses how SMEs could also be used in this
step.
3.5.2 Considerations for Subject-Matter Experts
As previously stated, some aircraft designs cannot be analyzed using an M&S environ-
ment because the underlying physics or cost-basis may not be completely understood.
When a situation like this occurs, aircraft manufacturers can use SMEs in order to
84
help assess a proposed design alternative. While the notion of an expert may be hard
to completely define, the US Department of Defense offers the following definition of
a SME:
“[A SME is] an individual who, by virtue of position, education, train-
ing, or experience, is expected to have greater-than-normal expertise or
insight relative to a particular technical or operational discipline, system,
or process.” [166]
Identification of an appropriate SME was outside the scope of this dissertation,
but has been discussed in the literature by several authors, including: Engler [58]
and Pace & Sheehan [130]. But when using SMEs there are two major concerns
that need to be addressed: 1) how to solicit data, and 2) how to use that data.
Both of these concerns are related to establishing a geometric baseline; however, the
same approach may also be applied to the next step of the CoDeS Framework, which
evaluates strategy alternatives. Since SMEs were not solicited in this dissertation,
this section provides a description of how to gather and use SME data so the CoDeS
Framework could have more flexibility to analyze potential designs
How to Solicit Data:
A well-known approach to soliciting data from SMEs is the Delphi Method, which
was first proposed by Dalkey and Helmer in 1963 from work they did at RAND
Corporation. [46] A schematic of this method can be seen in Figure 28. The general
philosophy of the Delphi technique is that, “two heads are better than one, or ... n
heads are better than one.” [45] One of the key purposes of the Delphi Method is, “to
determine or develop a range of possible program alternatives.” [48] This technique
has been used by numerous authors throughout the years in order to develop consensus
amongst groups (e.g., SMEs, stakeholders, decision-makers) in fields ranging from
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human resources to parks and recreation.[75, 163, 159, 165, 180] This method has been
further developed by several authors throughout the years. [58, 43, 136] In general,
these methods leverage planning workshops where individuals gather to reach some
form of consensus about the proposed topic. In the context of this dissertation, this
would involve getting SMEs together in order to reach a consensus about a Geometric
Baseline. One of the key differences between using SMEs and an M&S environment is
that an M&S environment could theoretically analyze millions of different alternatives
by making small changes in variables, but SMEs would be limited in the number of
alternatives they could affectively evaluate. Ideally, the number of alternatives should
be as small as possible.
The Delphi Method (or similar) could be applied to an aircraft design problem
by asking SMEs to rank alternative designs using a ratio scale based on a variety of
metrics of interest. While these metrics of interest are based on the discretion of the
decision-maker, SMEs would be most beneficial if the metrics were not able to be
quantified using an M&S environment. To illustrate what this data may look like,
consider the notional example below:
Notional Example: consider the metrics of manufacturability (i.e., how difficult a
design would be to manufacturer) and desirability (i.e., whether airlines would
think the design is worth purchasing). Suppose ten SMEs were asked to rate six
designs, using these metrics, on a scale from one to ten, and the Delphi Method
was used to help reach consensus. To clarify, a rating of 1 for manufacturability
would mean that the design can be easily manufactured with current facilities,
but a 10 would mean that significant advances/upgrades would be needed. As
for desirability, a rating of 1 would mean that airlines would probably not be
interested in the design, but a rating of 10 would mean that every airline would
try to purchase that design. After several iterations, a final consensus is reached

























Figure 28: Delphi Method, which can be used to aid in soliciting information from
subject-matter experts. [159]
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Table 4: Example results of SMEs’ evaluations of six design alternatives using the








Now that the data has been acquired, a technique needs to be identified that can
process the data.
Selecting a Geometric Baseline:
A desired technique should not be limited to a maximum number of metrics that
can be evaluated. This technique should be able to handle data where no clear
mapping exists between metrics. Furthermore, the technique should have a strong
mathematical underpinning and have been thoroughly vetted in the literature. By
examining the fields of operations research and economics, a technique called Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was identified and was cross-fertilized into the CoDeS
Framework.
Classically, DEA has been used as a way of evaluating “productivity or efficiency
when multiple outputs and multiple inputs need to be taken into account.” [40] This
analysis is commonly conducted by using linear programming techniques; however,
modifications can be made for different problems, which increases the versatility of
DEA. The use of DEA has increased throughout the years and has been applied to
diverse topics of study, including education systems [17], natural resource extraction
[160], technology development [16, 149], manufacturing [149, 181, 182], deregulation
of the airline industry in the 1980s [15], and a wide range of other applications, even
including baseball player efficiency [113]. These different applications use a variety
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of modifications and models, which are dependent on the specific application. In the
context of the design problem examined in this dissertation, DEA could be used to
identify preferred solutions from SME evaluations. In order to use DEA, the data
would need to be in the form of a ratio scale with each metric having the same
possible range of values – if this is not the case, then the data must be transformed
or normalized.
One of the first DEA approaches developed was the Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes
(CCR) model, which was proposed in 1978.[35] Like most forms of DEA models, this
model does not require prescribed weightings on the metrics being analyzed; instead
it allows for the data available to determine the optimal weightings. The CCR model
is shown in Equation 13 and is generalized for o = 1, 2, . . . , n design alternatives‡,
each with m inputs and s outputs. By solving for θ∗, one can determine whether
a DMU is efficient based on the following criteria: θ∗ = 1 and there exists at least




θ = µ1y1o + · · ·+ µsyso
subject to ν1x1o + · · ·+ νmxmo = 1
µ1y1j + · · ·+ µsysj ≤ ν1x1j + · · ·+ νmxmj, j = 1, . . . , n
ν1, ν2, . . . , νm ≥ 0
µ1, µ2, . . . , µs ≥ 0
µ : output “weights”
ν : input “weights”
(13)
To demonstrate how DEA would be applied, the CCR model shown in Equation 13
was applied to the notional example of SMEs’ assessments shown in Table 4. This was
done by assuming that manufacturability was an input to the design alternatives and
‡Typical terminology for DEA analyzes Decision Making Units (DMUs), but in the context of
this dissertation, this terminology is changed to design alternatives.
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Table 5: Example DEA results of SMEs’ assessments of data presented in Table 4.
Alternative ν∗ µ∗ θ∗
A 0.5 0.6 0.6
B 0.25 0.3 0.9
C 0.167 0.2 1
D 0.2 0.24 0.48
E 0.167 0.2 0.6
F 0.125 0.15 0.75
desirability was an output. The analysis of Alternative A is shown in Equation 14.
This same approach would be applied to all design alternatives; the final results of
this analysis are shown in Table 5. From these results it can be seen that Alternative
C is the preferred solution for the metrics given in the notional example.
A: max θ = 1µ
subject to 2ν = 1
(A) µ ≤ 2ν
(B) 3µ ≤ 4ν
(C) 5µ ≤ 6ν
(D) 2µ ≤ 5ν
(E) 3µ ≤ 6ν
(F) 5µ ≤ 8ν
∴ ν∗ = 0.5, µ∗ = 0.6, θ∗ = 0.6
(14)
The CCR model can determine a production frontier, which is based on the inputs
and outputs of the various DMUs and does not depend on a preassigned objective
function. In principle, this is similar to the concept of a Pareto frontier. However,
a major benefit of DEA analysis is the ability to identify inefficient DMUs that may
appear to be on the Pareto/Efficiency§frontier. This is often accomplished by trans-
forming the linear program model to a dual problem, which uses a real variable θ
§The terms Pareto frontier and Efficiency frontier are used interchangeably here to highlight
their similarity, but should not be interpreted to suggest that these concepts are the same.
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and non-negative vector λ = (λ1, . . . , λn)
T and is shown in Equation 15 – the bold
symbols in this equation represent vectors. Equation 15 is just a slightly modified




subject to θxo −Xλ ≥ 0
Y λ ≥ yo
λ ≥ 0
(15)
By solving for θ∗ in Equation 15, an extension of the dual problem, which is shown
in Equation 16, can then be solved in order to determine any input excesses, s−, and
output shortfalls, s+, which are referred to as slacks. Using the notional example
presented in Table 4 for context, an input excess would mean that the manufactura-
bility of a design would need to decrease to be considered efficient; an output shortfall
would mean that the desirability of a design would need to increase to be considered
efficient. Models with these slacks can either be input-oriented, which means they
show how much an input needs to decrease to become efficient, or output-oriented,
which means they show how much an output needs to increase to become efficient.
It is important to note that whether input-oriented or output-oriented, Equation 15
is first solved in order to determine θ∗. From that point, a second model is solved
to determine the slacks – Equation 16 shows an input-oriented form of this equation.
The only difference between the input-oriented and output-oriented forms of these
equations is the constraints of s− and s+. For the input-oriented form, they are
defined as shown in Equation 16, but for the output-oriented form, s+ = Y λ− θ∗yo
and s− = xo − Xλ. To help provide more context, the notional problem described
in Table 4 was solved using input-oriented and output-oriented models for slacks; the
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Table 6: Example DEA results, including slacks to show input excesses or output
shortfalls, of SMEs’ assessments of data presented in Table 4.
Alternative θ∗ Input-oriented (s−) Output-oriented (s+)
A 0.6 0.8 0.667
B 0.9 0.4 0.333
C 1 0 0
D 0.48 2.6 2.167
E 0.6 2.4 2.0
F 0.75 2.0 1.667
results are shown in Table 6.
max
λ,s−,s+
w = es− + es+
subject to es− = θ∗xo −Xλ
es+ = Y λ− yo
λ ≥ 0, s− ≥ 0, s+ ≥ 0,
where e = (1, . . . , 1)
(16)
It should be noted that θ∗ remains the same between Table 5 and Table 6 be-
cause the CCR model is still used in the first phase of the analysis. The second
phase of analysis used Equation 16 to calculate the slacks. An optimal solution was
identified when all slacks were equal to zero. An alternative that satisfies both the
CCR-efficiency stated above and has all slacks equal to zero is referred to as Pareto-
Koopmans efficient, which is loosely defined as, “[being] fully efficient if and only if it
is not possible to improve any input or output without worsening some other input or
output.” [40] Therefore, Alternative C is the only one considered Pareto-Koopman
efficient.
While the notional example only dealt with one input and one output, this may not
be the case for real aircraft design problems. Most likely, SMEs would be required to
give assessments for several different metrics. As this number of metrics increases, it is
more cumbersome to perform the necessary DEA calculations. Several commercially-
available DEA programs exist that have been validated. Alternatively, there is a
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free, validated, open-source DEA solver available, OSDEA [171], that runs on JAVA
and can be used to analyze large number of alternatives or metrics (i.e., inputs and
outputs). This program was used to generate the results presented in Tables 5 and 6,
and took less than three seconds to complete the calculations.
Other DEA models exists and are suited for a variety of problems. In order
to determine the type of DEA model that should be used depends on the type of
problem being analyzed. As an example, consider the notional example presented
in this section. All of the DEA results assumed a constant returns-to-scale, but if a
variable returns-to-scale model was used to analyze the data, then Alternatives A, B,
and C would be considered efficient. A thorough discussion is provided by Banker et
al. [14], which examines the values of λ for all alternatives that have θ∗ = 1. Since
the λ values for Alternatives A, B, and C are all sum to unity for the variable returns-
to-scale model, one can assume that constant returns-to-scale is appropriate for the
given data. However, this represents only one different type of DEA model – as the
number of metrics increases and the type of metrics change, there may be a need to
investigate other DEA model types, but that cannot be known prior to selecting the
metrics that will be used in evaluation.
Impacts on CoDeS Framework:
The use of SMEs would be applicable to both the parallel and serial approaches
(as shown in Figure 24) to the CoDeS step of Determine Geometric Baseline. This
process could be done for either the competitor’s geometric baseline or the proposed
geometric baseline. Figure 29 builds from Figure 27 to highlight how either an M&S
environment or SME assessments could be used in identifying a geometric baseline.
While these two approaches could occur exclusive of the each other, it is more likely
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Figure 29: Flowchart of the Determine Geometric Baseline step when using an M&S
environment or SME assessments.
3.5.3 Combination
There are obvious pros and cons to both SME assessments and analysis from an
M&S environment. While an M&S environment might allow for more traceability and
finer granularity in separation between design alternatives, SMEs can draw on their
depth of knowledge to estimate values that cannot be captured using equations. This
allows for SMEs to offer insight onto technologies still being developed or approximate
values that may never be quantifiable a priori (e.g., desirability of proposed design).
Obvious synergies exist if both SME and an M&S environment were used to evaluate
alternatives. While there are a variety of ways that this could occur, this section
describes one of the approaches that seems most intuitive.
As stated in § 3.3.2, multiple architectures exist that could describe an aircraft
– Figure 20 shows possible architectures and highlights one with yellow boxes. It
was also stated in this section that it would take too long to analyze every type
of architecture. However, suppose that several possible architectures were selected
as potential candidates. One method for determining an optimal candidate would
be to build a model for each different architecture and analyze it based on value
metrics, which may be difficult to quantify. This could be especially problematic
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if that architecture represents a revolutionary design or if the value metrics being
used are hard to quantify. This could result in spending a large amount of time and
resources constructing models of different architectures, when only one (or a few) is
going to be further analyzed in the conceptual design phase.
Instead, it may be better to use SMEs to evaluate different architectures using
the approach described in § 3.5.2. After an ideal architecture is selected, then more
detailed models can be constructed in order to conduct further analysis. In this
approach, the SMEs could also use metrics that are difficult to quantify, such as the
manufacturability and desirability as previously described. But other metrics may
also be used to make the analysis more robust, including: complexity, competitiveness,
ease of certification, etc.
This style of combining SMEs and an M&S environment is captured in Figure 30
with the dotted line. Following the notional steps previously described, the analysis
would begin with SMEs’ assessments that lead to using DEA in order to determine
a preferred architecture. From that point, the dotted-line would then be followed
to the M&S portion of the flow chart, where a model of that architecture would be
constructed and different combinations of geometric variables then analyzed. This
process would culminate in a geometric baseline that can be further analyzed.
For the purposes of this dissertation, SMEs were not used. However, it was deemed
necessary to highlight the ability to use SMEs within the CoDeS Framework because
of the likelihood that they would be used by an aircraft OEM. The remainder of
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Figure 30: Flowchart of the Determine Geometric Baseline step when using an M&S
environment, SME assessments, or the combination of both.
3.6 Step 5: Evaluate Strategy Alternatives
The fifth step of the CoDeS Framework is to Evaluate Strategy Alternatives. While
this evaluation could be done using SMEs, using the same process of soliciting and
analyzing their assessments as discussed in § 3.5.2, it was assumed that an M&S
environment was used for this analysis. The specific strategies that need to be in-
vestigated would be identified in step two, which was Define the Problem. These
strategies fall into two broad categories: technologies and enterprise solutions, which
are not necessarily mutually exclusive (i.e., an aircraft could both infuse technology
strategies and implement enterprise strategies). The main concern with both of these
strategies is utilizing an approach that can be easily implemented for a wide-range of
options.
Ideally, an approach should be adopted that allows for both exploratory and nor-
mative forecasting to be applied. Exploratory forecasting occurs by evaluating the
impacts of identified strategies on the aircraft’s value metrics. Normative forecast-
ing examines what should be done in order to achieve given change in the aircraft’s
value metrics – for this approach specific strategies are not examined. Instead, the
amount of an improvement in a parameter is quantified and then a strategy(ies) is
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sought that leads to that improvement. The benefits of these two types of analysis
provide flexibility for the CoDeS Framework. § 3.6.1 examines the approach adopted
for analyzing technologies and § 3.6.2 describes how a similar approach was adopted
for analyzing enterprise strategies.
3.6.1 Technologies
The M&S environment must be capable of analyzing the various forms of technology-
based strategies described in § 2.2. While the tool does not necessarily need to have
exact processes that mimic the technology, there must be a way to capture the impacts
of various technology strategies by manipulating certain model inputs. Mavris et al.
proposed an approach that uses technology k-factors in order to manipulate model
inputs to mimic the impacts of a technology. [108] This approach is advantageous
because it took advantage of preexisting correction factors that were used in the M&S
environment being used to analyze technologies. These correction factors are often
used in M&S environments to aid in model calibration, but Mavris et al. adapted
these correction factors to model technologies. These k-factors can be applied to
design variable or system/subsystem-level metrics in order to demonstrate the impacts
of technologies. This approach is beneficial because it does not necessarily require
and exact description of the technology, which may still be in development, but can
utilize forecasts of that technology’s impacts. To demonstrate how these k-factors
can be used for technologies, consider the following notional example:
Notional Example: Suppose a technology, T1, reduces the profile drag (DProf )
of an aircraft by X%. This effect can be simulated using the k-factor approach shown
in Equation 17 by setting kT1 = X%. This equation shows that the system-level
benefit of this technology is applied to the baseline (BL) value for the metric that the
technology impacts. Alternatively, a normative forecasting approach could be applied





















“What will it take me to do 
today to get to where I 
want to be in the future?” 
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be in the future?” 
Figure 31: Relationship between TIF (normative forecasting) and TIES (exploratory
forecasting), adapted from Kirby [91].
for the k-factor.
DProf,T1 = kT1DProf,BL (17)
The use of k-factors, originally proposed by Mavris et al.[108] for assessing eco-
nomic viability of commercial aircraft was further refined by Kirby and Mavris [90],
applied to performance assessments of military vehicles by Mavris et al. [109], applied
to civil tiltrotor by Mavris et al. [106]. All of these techniques mainly focused on the
use of these technology k-factors for normative forecasting. This process was referred
to as Technology Impact Forecasting (TIF). In 2000, Kirby and Mavris formalized
this k-factor approach for exploratory forecasting in the TIES methodology. [93]; fur-
thermore, in her PhD thesis, Kirby demonstrated how, “TIF is a fallout of applying
TIES.” [91] The relationship between TIF and TIES is shown in Figure 31, which
was adapted from Kirby [91].
The TIES methodology can be used to evaluate many different technologies in
order to select an optimal technology or set of technologies to infuse into an aircraft.
For this analysis to occur, the compatibilities between technologies must be taken
into account. If technologies are compatible, then it may be necessary to also account
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Table 7: Adding impacts of compatible notional technologies, adapted from Kirby
[91].
k-factors T1 T2 T3 T1&T2 T1&T3
kO&SCost +4% - -10% +4% -6%
kRDT&ECost -1% - -2% -1% -3%
kD - -3% - -3% -
kFuelBurn -2% -2% +3% -4% +1%
for any interactions that may exist. Kirby utilizes an additive approach [91], which
was assumed to provide appropriate fidelity during early phases of conceptual design.
To illustrate this, consider the data shown in Table 7, which shows three notional
technologies and their impacts on four different system-level metrics. To illustrate
the additive nature of these k-factors, it was assumed that T2 and T3 were not
compatible, but T1 & T2 and T1 & T3 were compatible.
One of the major elements that needs to be addressed with using technology k-
factors is determining their values. Kirby suggest literature reviews and interviews
with SMEs, which could be conducted using the approach described in § 3.5.2. The
values for these technology k-factors could be either deterministic (i.e., described
by a single value) or probabilistic (i.e., described by a probability density function
(PDF)). Uses of both probabilistic and deterministic k-factors occur in Chapter 5,
which examines three use cases of the CoDeS Framework.
3.6.2 Enterprise
Besides technology-based strategies, § 2.2 highlighted enterprise strategies as a way
in which aircraft OEMs compete. Two specific enterprise strategies, manufacturing
initiatives and maintenance programs, were described in § 1.3.3, which examined how
Boeing was using enterprise strategies. Besides these enterprise strategies, the CoDeS
Framework should utilize an approach that is capable of modeling a wide variety of
enterprise strategies. To this end, an approach similar to the technology k-factors























“What will it take me to do 
today to get to where I want 
to be in the future?” 
“With the specific [enterprise 
strategies] that I have today, 
where will I be in the future?” 
Figure 32: Comparison of enterprise-based normative and exploratory forecasting
approaches – Ent-IF and Ent-IES, respectively.
implemented simultaneously, impacts from enterprise strategies were modeled using
λ-factors. For example, consider the following notional example:
Notional Example: Suppose a notional enterprise strategy, E1, was investigated
that was expected to impact the manufacturer’s learning curve by X%. This could
be captured using Equation 18, which uses a λ-factor to modify the learning curve
parameter presented in Equation 2 of § 3.3.4, if the value of λE1 = X%.
YE1 = ax
−λE1b (18)
By applying λ-factors in the same manner as k-factors, then both normative and
exploratory forecasting techniques can be utilized. Instead of TIF and TIES, these
techniques were referred to as enterprise impact forecasting (Ent-IF) and enterprise
identification, evaluation, and selection (ENT-IES The relationship between these
two approaches is illustrated in Figure 32, which was adapted from Figure 31.
It was also assumed that enterprise strategies effects would be additive. Further-
more, it was assumed that impacts from implementing both enterprise and technology
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strategies were additive, if they were compatible. While both strategies could be as-
sessed simultaneously using the CoDeS Framework, it may allow for more insight if
these strategies were assessed in series. This would allow for clear insight into the
specific benefits of each strategy without confounding of the results. By implement-
ing this approach, exploratory and normative forecasting approaches can be used
simultaneously for technologies or enterprise strategies. For example, if a decision-
maker was trying to analyze specific technologies using TIES, but realized that the
desired benefits were not achieved, then they could perform an Ent-IF analysis to
see the requirements of an enterprise-based strategy to supplement the benefits of
technologies.
The similarity between using λ-factors and k-factors is not only in their applica-
tion, but also their quantification. While some enterprise strategies may have been
previously used by an OEM for a different aircraft, there is a chance that OEMs
may not be able to rely on historical data for quantifying the impacts of enterprise
strategies. If this is the case, then SMEs can be consulted to provide insight using
an approach similar to the one described in § 3.5.2. However, one of the difficulties
in using λ-factors is determining which variables they should be applied to.
Consider, the notional example and Equation 18 discussed previously. Since the
enterprise strategy being examined was related to manufacturing, it would make sense
to apply the λ-factor to the learning curve parameter b. However, if an enterprise
strategy was examined that utilized virtual experimentation to reduce the first unit
costs of a new design, then it would be more appropriate to apply the λ-factor to a in
Equation 18. The exact terms that will be effected by λ-factors not only depends on
the specific enterprise strategy, but also the specific M&S environment being utilized
for analysis. By ensuring that appropriate λ-factors are used in the M&S environment,
then the decision-maker can have more confidence in the results.
Whether evaluating technology strategies, enterprise strategies, or both, the basic
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How are strategy variables mapped to value metrics? 
Equations/M&S Environment Subject-Matter Experts 
Solicit k-factors & 
λ-factors Input k-factors & λ-factors 
Quantify Impact on 
Value Metrics 




Figure 33: Specific actions to be taken in the Evaluate Strategy Alternatives step of
the CoDeS Framework.
process of this step in the CoDeS Framework is shown in Figure 33. In this figure, a
dotted line from the Solicit k-factors & λ-factors to the Input k-factors & λ-factors
box is shown to highlight that SMEs may be needed to quantify these values even if
an M&S environment is used for the analysis.
3.7 Step 6: Compare to Competitor’s Design
One of the major benefits of the CoDeS Framework is the direct comparison between
proposed design alternatives and a competitor’s design. This comparison, using the
same value metrics, allows for the decision-maker to make a more informed decision
because they are taking into account the competitive environment in which their
aircraft will exist. However, because of the nature of this design problem, it can be
difficult to gain clear insight into the problem. This is due to the inherent uncertainty
associated with this problem. The following section describes these difficulties in
further detail. Then § 3.7.2 through § 3.7.5 explore different techniques that can be
used to mitigate the difficulties described in § 3.7.1.
3.7.1 Difficulties
There are multiple sources of uncertainty that cause difficulties to occur in comparing
a proposed design to a competitor’s design:
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Strategy Uncertainty Since there are multiple strategies that can be implemented,
which may have a range of impacts, it can be difficult to determine a preferred
solution.
Economic Uncertainty As discussed in § 3.3.4, some variables are not under the
control nor influence of an aircraft OEM, but they still can have a large impact
on the success of a proposed design.
Competitor Uncertainty The actions of a competitor can significantly impact a
design because if airlines prefer their design, then this competition will gain a
larger portion of the market.
These sources of uncertainty make it difficult to have confidence in any decisions
that are made. Part of the reason for this difficulty is that the OEM may not be able
to control or influence the sources of uncertainty. To illustrate this point, consider
the step of Determine a Geometric Baseline through the lens of uncertainty. Since
the various design variables could take a variety of values, one could consider that to
be geometric uncertainty ; however, all of these values are under control of the aircraft
OEM. Even though multiple metrics may be considered multi-objective optimization
techniques, as stated in § 3.5, could be used to determine an optimal design whether
using an M&S environment or SMEs. The result of this multi-objective optimization
would be a determination of what values to set the geometry variables in order to
achieve a preferred outcome. While this approach works for optimizing geometry, it
cannot be applied to situations where the decision-maker has no control/influence over
the variables that affect the design – while an aircraft OEM may have a preferred value
for the inflation rate, they cannot set inflation rate to any value. When analyzing
variables that cannot be controlled optimization cannot occur, at least in the approach
that it was used in § 3.5. Notional figures illustrating this difficulty can be seen in
Figure 34.
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 A) B) 
Result from Controllable Factors 
Result from Uncontrollable Factors 
Figure 34: Notional figure showing different impacts of uncertainty: A) The effects
from controllable factors is much larger than the effects from uncontrollable factors,
B) The effects from uncontrollable factors is much larger than the effects from con-
trollable factors.
In Figure 34, plot A shows the case where the effects from controllable factors is
much greater than the effects from uncontrollable factors for both value metrics. This
is similar to the previously described case of geometry uncertainty. In that context,
plot A’s controllable factors could represent the design variable settings and the un-
controllable factors could represent the uncertainty in manufacturing tolerances. In a
situation like plot A, it is easy to determine optimal values for the geometry variables.
In Figure 34, plot B represents the opposite case where the impacts of uncontrollable
factors is much larger for both metrics. In this situation, it is difficult to pick optimal
values because the effects of uncontrollable factors dominate to the point that any
decision’s impact is lost in the noise of the uncontrollable factors. Since the effects
of uncertainty cannot be known a priori, there is a need to examine how to make
decisions in either situation.
Research Question 1: How to ensure a decision-maker has confidence in their
decisions in the presence of uncertainty from economic factors and the competitive
market?
With regards to Research Question 1, it is not difficult to answer if the effects
of uncertainty resemble plot A of Figure 34 – § 3.5 introduced several techniques
that could be used to choose preferred settings for controllable factors. But if a
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situation similar to that of plot B in Figure 34 occurs when analyzing a proposed
design compared to a competitor’s design, then a mitigating technique needs to be
implemented. However, in order to answer this question, the impacts of the various
sources of uncertainty need to be analyzed and if necessary mitigated.
Research Question 2: How can the impacts of uncertainty be determined with
regards to controllable and uncontrollable factors?
In order to answer Research Question 2, there is a need to explore the impacts of
uncertainty on the design space. To this end, a sensitivity analysis would provide the
most insight into the influences of each factor, whether controllable or uncontrollable.
This is the main thrust of Experiment 1, which is described in detail in § 4.2. This
experiment is used to characterize the design space in terms of single-factor sensi-
tivities and multiple-factor sensitivities. Experiment 1 also examines the sensitivity
of the approach used for describing the uncertainty of various factors (i.e., shapes
of probability density functions to represent uncertainty). However, the motivating
examples presented in Chapter 2 demonstrated that uncertainty from economic fac-
tors and the competitive market did have large impacts on the success of a design –
this lead to the assumption that mitigating steps would need to be taken in order to
answer Research Question 1.
Research Question 3: What technique is most appropriate to mitigate the
impacts of uncertainty?
Scenario-based analysis creates a finite number of logically reasoned possible fu-
ture events. The history of scenario-based analysis can be traced back to ancient
philosophers and their use of treatise to examine various scenarios. [28] The mod-
ern use of scenario analysis has military origins; Herman Kahn used scenario-based
analysis at the RAND Corporation involving thermonuclear war during the 1950s.
[85, 86, 141] A widely quoted definition of a scenario was described by Kahn and
Weiner in 1967 as a “hypothetical sequences of events constructed for the purpose of
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focusing attention on casual processes and decision-points.” [86] Using this definition,
scenarios can serve as a way to examine the performance of a system under specified
conditions, which can effectively quantify the effects of an uncertain future. In a 1968
publication from the RAND Corporation, Quade provides the following advice for
system analysis:
“The essence of the questions with which systems analysis is concerned is
uncertainty, not only about economic, technical, and operational param-
eters – which can be serious but are to a large extent under our control
and somehow appear limited – but also about future environments or
contingencies ... an analytic scenario might be useful.” [134]
By adopting scenario-based analysis to mitigate the effects of uncertainty, the
concerns of Research Question 3 was addressed. This claim was further investigated
in Experiment 1, which is described in § 4.2.4. The use of scenarios should create
a situation similar to plot A of Figure 34 – this is predicated on the assumption
that scenarios would be intelligently defined and based on established forecasting
techniques. While it was outside the scope of this dissertation to explore specific
scenario forecasting techniques, the parametric capabilities of the CoDeS Framework
means that any scenario can be rapidly analyzed. The use of scenarios mitigates
the effects of uncertainty by reducing the effective design space. Figure 35 shows a
notional representation of three scenarios that are much smaller than the total design
space with uncertainty. The amount of reduction in the design space is not only
predicated on the values/ranges of variables used to define the scenario, but also on
the sensitivities of the impacts from those variables and their interactions, which is
addressed with Research Question 2. These scenarios can be defined in Step 2 of the
CoDeS Framework when defining the ranges on the economic noise variables. This
modification is shown in Figure 36, which highlights the general steps of the CoDeS
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Figure 35: Notional figure showing three scenarios (S1, S2, and S3) reducing the
effects of uncertainty.
Framework. By addressing Research Questions 2 and 3, techniques can be explored
to fully address Research Question 1.
While scenarios can help mitigate the impacts of uncertainty, they may not com-
pletely reduce all of the elements of uncertainty. For this reason, it was assumed that
the results would still be probabilistically defined, which limits the ability to clearly
evaluate strategy alternatives and/or compare design alternatives to a competitor’s
design. This becomes even more difficult when multiple value metrics are considered.
The field of multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) has many well-established tech-
niques that can be used for analyzing alternatives, but most of these techniques work
best when they are applied to point-solutions, not a probability space. To illustrate
this difficulty, Figure 37 highlights three notional situations that may occur with
these multi-criteria, probabilistic solution space for two alternatives. The direction of
improvement (DoI) is indicated in Figure 37 by the arrow in the bottom right corner
of each graph, which means that Value Metric 1 should be maximized while Value
Metric 2 is minimized.
The graph in row A shows that the red ellipse dominates the blue ellipse for each
of the value metrics; however, there is no guarantee that only situations resembling
graph A would be analyzed in the CoDeS Framework. The graphs in row B show
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Establish the Need 
Define the Problem 
•  Competitive Environment 
•  Geometric Variables & Ranges 
•  Competitor’s Geometry & Ranges 
•  Economic Noise Variables & Ranges / 
      Scenarios of Interest 
•  Strategy Variables & Ranges 
Establish Value Metrics 
Determine Geometric Baseline 
Evaluate Strategy Alternatives 
Compare to Competitor’s Design 
Make a Decision 
Figure 36: General steps of the CoDeS Framework with a modification to Define the
Problem that incorporates defining scenarios of interest.
the case where either the red or blue ellipse appears dominate for one value metric,
but not the other value metric. The graph shown in row C highlights a case where
there is significant overlap between the red and blue ellipses, but the blue ellipse has
larger variability in Value Metric 2. Furthermore, this increased variability extends
in the direction of worsening for Value Metric 2. There is significant difficulty in
having confidence in a decision made involving the situations depicted in rows B or
C. Each of these notional situations was further analyzed in order to help hone in on
a technique that can be applied, regardless of which situation that occurs.
In row B, there are two major concerns in each of the figures: 1) there exist regions
of overlap and regions where one alternative is clearly dominate in one value metric
while being simultaneously worse in the other value metrics, and 2) the preferences
or elasticities¶ of Value Metric 1 and Value Metric 2 are unknown and not taken
¶In this context, elasticities refers to the acceptable differences that can occur in one value metric






Figure 37: Notional figures of probabilistically comparing two alternatives denoted
by the red and blue ellipses – the direction of improvement is indicated to identify
the preferred alternative.
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into account. The second concern can be addressed by soliciting relative weightings
for each value metric. The first concern could be taken into account by identifying
a meaningful statistic to describe each ellipse. An example of a candidate statistic
is the centroid of the ellipse. The centroid can be thought of as a single value that
represents the average of each value metric simultaneously – the use of the average
can be beneficial because it provides a decision-maker with insight into an expected
outcome.
In row C, the concern of relative weightings of value metrics is present, but the
concerns involving regions of overlap is not the same as discussed regarding the graphs
in row B. In row C, it is obvious that the variance in the blue ellipse is larger for Value
Metric 2 and not in the preferred direction. If a single statistic, like the centroid, was
used to evaluate these ellipses then the results may be misleading because they do not
take into account the greater variance of the blue ellipse. But if only the magnitude of
the variance is taken into account for the blue ellipse, then the information regarding
the skew of the distribution not being in the preferred direction may be lost.
Based on these insights, an appropriate technique to fully address Research Ques-
tion 1 should have several key characteristics:
• Account for elasticities/preferences between different value metrics
• Account for the direction of improvement for each value metric
• Account for the average of a distribution and the variance simultaneously
3.7.2 Overall Evaluation Criteria
Many MCDM techniques allow for a decision-maker to input their preferences by
using weightings for the various metrics. For example, consider a well-known MCDM
technique called the overall evaluation criterion (OEC), which is shown in Equa-
tion 19. This technique seeks to collapse multiple criteria or objectives (Oi), which
110
are normalized by baseline values (OBLi ), into a single metric that can easily be used
to compare options. Each of the criteria/objectives has an individual weighting (wi),
which can be specified by a decision-maker in order to show relate their relative
preference of that objective compared to other objectives. However, several authors
have suggested that decision-makers may not know their exact preferences a priori.
[177, 175, 82, 152] To mitigate this, the weightings can be varied in order to provide
more insight into the elasticities of various objectives. Figure 38 depicts a notional
representation of the OEC values for two alternatives (Alt1 and Alt2) as the relative
weightings (w1 and w2) vary – in this figure, a value of (1,0) means that all of the
importance is placed on Objective 1 and no importance is placed on Objective 2, a
value of (0.5, 0.5) means that both objectives are equally-weighted, and a value of
(0,1) means that all importance is placed on Objective 2 and no importance is placed
on Objective 1. From this figure, it can be seen that the OEC score of Alt1 is not as
sensitive to changes in the weighting values and dominates the OEC value for Alt2
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(19)
Besides these variables weightings, the OEC formulation also allows for a decision-
maker to specify the direction of improvement for each objective, which is shown by
the possible values of k in Equation 19. While the OEC formulation does address two
of the three characteristics of a preferred selection method, it is not well-suited for
handling a range of values for alternatives. Several authors have suggested that OEC
formulations may not fully capture the intricacies associated with decision making
involving complex systems like an aircraft. [13, 93, 91, 179, 79] Instead, the Tech-












(0,1) (1,0) (0.5,0.5) 
Figure 38: Notional figure showing impacts of variable weightings for two alternatives
(Alt1 and Alt2) on their relative OEC values.
useful.
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3.7.3 Technique for Ordered Preferences by Similarity to Ideal
Solution
TOPSIS was first described on page 120 of Kwangsun Yoon’s 1980 doctoral disser-
tation from Kansas State University. [179] This work was further elaborated on by
Hwang and Yoon in 1981 [79]. A benefit of TOPSIS is that it first identifies both
positive- and negative-ideal solutions from the given objectives. The technique then
identifies which alternative is closest to the positive-ideal solution and furthest from
the negative-ideal solution calculating their Euclidean distances. This general process
is demonstrated with the notional representation in Figure 39. In this figure, four
alternatives (Alt1, Alt2, Alt3, and Alt4) are compared to each other using TOPSIS
with the goal of maximizing both Metric 1 and Metric 2. The positive-ideal point is
constructed using Alt4’s value for Metric 2 and Alt2’s value for Metric 1; the negative-
ideal is determined from Alt4’s value for Metric 1 and Alt1’s value for Metric 2. The
Euclidean distances from each alternative to the positive- and negative-ideal are then
shown by the black arrows. For specific details on implementing TOPSIS, the reader
should examine [79, 179], but the process of TOPSIS is summarized in the following
five steps:
1. Construct the normalized decision matrix
2. Construct the weighted normalized decision matrix
3. Determine ideal and negative-ideal solutions
4. Calculate the separation measure
5. Rank the preference order
As shown in step 2 of TOPSIS, the weightings for each metric/objective is included
in the decision making process, which is similar to the OEC formulation. The TOPSIS















Figure 39: Notional TOPSIS figure comparing four alternatives (Alt1, Alt2, Alt3,
and Alt4) using TOPSIS.
approach for the OEC formulation. Another similarity between TOPSIS and OEC
is that both techniques are best suited for situations where an alternative is defined
using one value for each metric and not a distribution of values. This means that
neither TOPSIS nor OEC can fully address the key characteristics of a preferred
selection technique, which were detailed at the end of § 3.7.1.
3.7.4 Taguchi’s Signal to Noise Ratio
To account for the distribution of ranges, other techniques outside of MCDM were
examined. The field of quality engineering offers relevant insight. This field was ar-
guably started by Taguchi [157, 158] and is often applied to manufacturing processes.
In general, Taguchi divides a process into factors that are under control of the de-
signer and factors that are uncontrollable. By separating these factors into formally
defined experiments and recording the results, Taguchi was able to determine the op-
timal settings for factors that are controllable while taking into account the effects of
uncontrollable factors. This was accomplished by repeating experiments to produce
a range of values for the results and then intelligently collapsing that range of values
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into a single metric; this metric would not only account for the average values, but
also the variability in the values. The metric that was used is the signal to noise ratio
(S/N). Furthermore, Taguchi’s method allows for the specification of the direction
of improvement. For the situation where a smaller value is preferred, Equation 20
should be used – in this equation yi represents the values of each metric for the N
different results. If a nominal target (T) is preferred, then Equation 21 should be used
to calculate S/N. If larger values for a metric is preferred, then Equation 22 should
be used. Regardless of which equation is used, S/N is always sought to be maximized























Since Taguchi’s entire optimization process was not considered relevant for this
dissertation work, a formal overview was not included; however, interested readers
can consult [157, 158] for detailed descriptions of the entire process. As previously
described, Taguchi’s S/N approach seems well suited for comparing alternatives in the
CoDeS Framework. The only key characteristic not addressed is the ability to handle
multiple metrics and apply variable weightings to each of those metrics. The inability
to apply Taguchi to multi-criteria problems has been recognized in the literature and
several authors have made suggestions to adapt Taguchi’s S/N formulation for these
problems. More detail into these techniques is provided in the following section.
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3.7.5 Hybrid Approach
The application of Taguchi’s S/N to problems with multiple responses have been
receiving more attention in recent years [161, 99], but an ideal solution has yet to
be finalized. As discussed in the previous sections, neither Taguchi’s S/N, OEC, or
TOPSIS are capable of addressing all of the elements required to make a decision.
However, there may exist a way of combining these MCDM techniques with Taguchi’s
S/N formulation may result in an approach that can be applied in the CoDeS Frame-
work. To this end, a literature review was conducted to determine whether any similar
approaches exist.
Multiple authors have combined Taguchi’s S/N formulation using a weighted-sum
[77, 145, 9, 100, 161]. The weighted-sum approach is similar to an OEC formulation.
However, the application of this approach is not the same amongst these authors.
The main point of contention seems to occur about whether the OEC formulation
should be applied to the data prior to the logarithm or after the logarithm. Shiau [145]
advocates applying the weightings after the logarithm, but Tong et al. states that this
would provide confusion to the meanings of the weightings in the context of Taguchi’s
quality loss [161]. However, since this dissertation does not focus on manufacturing,
the meaning of Taguchi’s quality loss is not as applicable. For this reason, an approach
that should be considered is an OEC using Taguchi’s S/N formulation, which is
shown in Equation 23. Since larger values are always preferred in Taguchi’s S/N
formulation (as described by Equations 20 to 22), no k values need to be specified








While the OEC could be applied to the S/N formulations, several authors ad-
vocate a different approach in which the OEC formulation occurs before the loga-
rithm. [9, 161, 100] Tong refers to this approach as the multi-response signal to noise
(MRSN) ratio. [161] To demonstrate this approach, the S/N formulations given by
116
Equations 20 to 22 should be rewritten in the form of Equation 24. The three-step
description for calculating MRSN, given by Equations 25, 26, and 27, was adopted




















, Larger is Better
(24)
Step 1: Normalize the quality loss for each alternative for each response, given by
Equation 25. In this equation, QL represents the normalized quality loss, i represents
the number of responses, and j represents the number of alternatives.
QLij =
Lij
max(Li1, L12, . . . , Lij)
(25)
Step 2: Compute the total normalized quality loss (TNQL) for each alternative,





Step 3: Determine the MRSN for each alternative using Equation 27.
MRSNj = −10log10(TNQLj) (27)
Finally, a combination between TOPIS and Taguchi’s S/N ratio can be performed.
This approach has been advocated in the literature as being superior to other results
because of its implementation of the TOPSIS methodology as opposed to the OEC.
[96]. This approach first calculates the S/N values for each metric and then uses those
values as the inputs to the TOPSIS methodology, as described in § 3.7.3.
From this section, three different approaches have been identified as possible so-
lutions for combining the benefits of MCDM and Taguchi’s S/N formulation in order
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to adequately assess the differences between alternatives. For each of these three
approaches, the weighting values (w) can be varied in order to see the sensitivi-
ties/elasticities of each alternative as described in § 3.7.2 and shown in Figure 38.
3.7.6 Considerations for CoDeS Framework
As described in the previous section, three different approaches were identified to
be used to make comparisons between alternatives in the CoDeS Framework. These
three alternatives are:
1. OEC with S/N Formulation
2. MRSN
3. TOPSIS with S/N Formulation
However, before examining these three approaches, their applicability to the CoDeS
Framework should be more thoroughly examined. Regardless of the approach, the
basic process for this step of the CoDeS Framework is the same – strategy alterna-
tives evaluated in Step 5 are compared directly to the competitor’s design and their
possible strategies. The basis for this comparison is using the value metrics that were
defined in Step 3. Since two value metrics (profit and $/RPM – discussed in § 3.4)
were selected for this dissertation work, their use in these proposed approaches should
be further described in detail. Figure 40 shows a notional representation of how these
value metrics were translated to S/N values. These two value metrics do not have
the same direction of improvement – $/RPM should be minimized and profit should
be maximized, which means that different formulations for S/N were used. These









Figure 40: Notional depiction of converting ellipses to S/N values.














When examining the formulation for S/N(Profit), an important aspect must be
taken into consideration: values for OEM’s profit could be negative. This is important
because Taguchi explicitly states, “The [larger is better] characteristic should be
nonnegative, and its most desirable value is infinity.” [158] In order to maintain the
usefulness of S/N, this contradiction was addressed. The most obvious way to address
this concern is by performing a transformation, which can take two forms: 1) Shift
all of the profit values by a constant, or 2) Introduce a target value for profit and
use the target is better formulation of S/N. Both of these approaches are based on
information found in the literature. The first case of shifting the data uses a well-
known and often used mathematical principle – for instance, in Linear Programming
when numbers cannot be negative, a large positive constant is introduced to shift all
of the data to non-negative values [169]. The latter option has been used with Taguchi
approaches when there is a finite target due to practical limitations because infinity
is not a possible option, as is the case if the maximum is 100%. [144]. Partially for
this reason, Sharma and Cudney introduced a finite target and changed the quality
119
characteristic to target is better instead of larger is better. [144].
Since profit is not theoretically limited, there is not an obvious reason to choose
one of the proposed transformations. For this reason, both transformations were
examined in Experiment 2, which is described in § 4.3.1. Since both transformation
techniques have strong mathematical underpinnings, it was not expected that the
results from either would be different; however, since each technique affects different
aspects of the S/N formulation, the guidelines for using them may not be the same.
By addressing this concern associated with possible nonpositive values for profit, the
three approaches to compare alternatives were further explored.
These three approaches were examined in Experiment 3, which is described in
§ 4.3.2. However, since there is no way to run a confirmation experiment or compare
to previously established data, the experiment can only be used to determine if the
three different approaches give the same or different results when comparing alterna-
tives and competition. Regardless of the specific approach adopted, the outcome is
expected to be the same – a preferred alternative. Therefore, the CoDeS Framework
could handle any of these three approaches, and it is expected that selection would
depend on the preferences of the decision-maker.
3.8 Step 7: Make a Decision
The final step of the CoDeS Framwork is to Make a Decision. Regardless, of the
preferred evaluation technique, this step has two possible outcomes, which depend on
the results of comparing a proposed design to a competitor’s design.
Terminate: If a proposed design and strategy combination beats the competitor’s
design, then that design and strategy should be implemented and analysis with
the CoDeS Framework terminated.
Iterate: If the competitor’s design beats the proposed design and strategy alterna-
tive, then more strategies should be considered by iterating steps 5-7.
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As previously stated in § 3.6, separating the evaluation between technology strate-
gies and enterprise strategies may provide the most insight into the competition
problem. Based on this recommendation, the CoDeS Framework should first ana-
lyze possible technology strategies to see if they result in a “winning design option”.
If the competitor’s design is still preferred against the analyzed technologies, then
enterprise strategies can be explored in during the iteration. However, the CoDeS
framework was constructed with the principle of flexibility, which means that it can
be used to evaluate only enterprise strategy alternatives, technology strategy alter-
natives, or both (simultaneously or separately). The entire CoDeS Framework, with




























































































































































































































   
































































































































































































































































































































































































3.9 Summary of Chapter
This chapter has not only highlighted the specific actions required during each step
of the CoDeS Framework, but also posed several research questions that will be
addressed by experiments covered in the following chapter. Before examining these
experiments, it was deemed necessary to highlight some of the key insights presented
in this chapter; Figure 41 should be referenced to help provide context.
In order to utilize the CoDeS Framework, the need must be established – for this
dissertation work it was assumed that the need, and therefore the requirements of an
aircraft, were the same. The next step is define the parameters of the problem under
analysis. This consist of five steps: 1) Define the Competitive Environment, 2) Define
Geometric Variables and their Ranges, 3) Define the Competitor’s Geometric Baseline
and their Ranges, 4) Define the Economic Noise Variables and their Ranges & Define
Scenarios of Interest, and 5) Define Strategy Variables and their Ranges. The third
step in the CoDeS Framework was to establish value metrics, which were assumed to
be $/RPM and OEM’s profit for this dissertation work – both of these metrics were
normalized in order to provide greater insight into the differences between strategy
options and the competitor, which was discussed in § 3.4. By using the value metrics
and the ranges of geometric variables, a geometric baseline is established in the fourth
step of the CoDeS Framework using one of the techniques discussed in § 3.5. During
that step, the competitor’s geometric baseline is also established, either in series or in
parallel; if the competitor already has an aircraft deployed in the market, then reverse
engineering techniques can be implemented. § 3.6 discussed methods for evaluating
strategies. Technologies are evaluated using the established k-factor method, and
enterprise strategies are evaluated using a similar λ-factor approach. The sixth step
constitutes the significant difference between the CoDeS Framework and other design
techniques because the competitor’s design and/or strategies and proposed design
and/or strategies are evaluated head-to-head. In § 3.7, multiple hybrid approaches
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were discussed to combine the benefits of Taguchi’s S/N formulation with established
MCDM techniques. Using the information from Step 6, the final Step of the CoDeS
Framework can be completed, which is to make a decision. The outcome of this final
step is either to iterate the CoDeS Framework to evaluate different strategies or to
terminate and pick the preferred strategy(ies).
Besides introducing and elaborating on the various steps of the CoDeS Framework,
this chapter also introduced the research questions. These research questions also
lead to necessary experiments that were conducted in order to gain further insight
and refine the CoDeS Framework. In order to conduct these three experiments, an
appropriate M&S environment was selected. The selection of this M&S environment




“At the time...[aeronautics] was neither an industry nor even
a science; both were yet to come. It was an art and I might
say a passion. Indeed, at that time it was a miracle.”
Igor Sikorsky [50]
Chapter 1 introduced motivating examples that provided the rationale for this disser-
tation work. Chapter 2 provided background information regarding competition in
order to help determine the context of the proposed CoDeS Framework. The previ-
ous chapter provided insight into the technical formulation of the CoDeS Framework.
This chapter elaborates on experiments necessary to address research question posed
in Chapter 3. Besides these research questions, an implementation consideration was
addressed.
In order to perform the experiments in this section, an appropriate M&S environ-
ment was selected. This M&S environment was used in Experiment 1, which sought
to characterize the impacts of uncertainty from the economic noise variables. Ex-
periment 2 leveraged a canonical example in order to provide deeper insight into the
impacts of nonpositive values being used with Taguchi’s S/N formulation. Experi-
ment 3 uses the results from Experiment 1 in order to evaluate the three different




§ 3.5.1 covered extensively the requirements of suitable M&S environment for the
CoDeS Framework. This section highlighted the need for physics-based performance
analysis that was directly linked to activity-based costing. Figure 26 captured this
idea of the M&S environment using a flow chart. Further considerations for an M&S
environment were discussed in § 3.6, where the concept of k-factors and λ-factors was
introduced to model the impacts of technology strategies and enterprise strategies,
respectively.
While an M&S environment could be constructed that would address the con-
cerns raised in the previous sections, the results may be suspect. This is due to
the immense difficulty of validating an M&S environment, especially one that links
together physics-based analysis and activity-based costing. Instead, a previously val-
idated M&S environment would not only reduce the burden, but also provide more
confidence in the results. The following sections identify an M&S environment and
then examine an implementation consideration that was addressed in order to fully
incorporate the M&S environment into the CoDeS Framework.
4.1.1 Selection
While an M&S environment that has been developed and thoroughly vetted by an
aircraft OEM would allow for the most insight to be gained, especially into the spe-
cific economic details related to that OEM, these tools are proprietary and were
not available for this dissertation work. Fortunately, NASA has helped create two
non-proprietary tools that can be linked together and meet the requirements of an ac-
ceptable M&S environment. These tools are FLight OPtimization System (FLOPS)
[115] and Aircraft Life Cycle Cost Analysis (ALCCA) [1]. The FLOPS and ALCCA
M&S environment comprises a stand-alone tool that addresses the requirements dis-
cussed in § 3.5.1. This section first describes the individual elements of FLOPS and
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ALCCA and then discusses some limitations that need to be addressed.
FLOPS is a physics-based sizing and synthesis (S&S) tool that allows for many
different inputs to be altered. Firstly, the design mission is inputted – this includes
the basic phases of commercial flight as described in Figure 25, and other phases can
also be inputted if desired. While some of these phases are based on historical data
(e.g., pre-takeoff and post-landing), other phases are based on first-principles analysis.
This is accomplished by allowing for flexibility with several key factors. Firstly, a
large variety of geometric design variables can be manipulated to specify a variety
of configurations and architectures, including the geometric parameters specified in
§ 3.3.2. Secondly, specific information regarding the drag polar for the aircraft being
analyzed can be inputted, which means that analysis is not limited to preexisting
airfoils or body configurations. Thirdly, FLOPS can analyze any engine because it
allows for the specification of an engine deck. An engine deck contains information
about how thrust and fuel flow vary as functions of Mach number and altitude;
several commercial programs, like Numerical Propulsion Simulation System [38] can
be used to generate engine decks for different engines. Finally, FLOPS allows for
specific information regarding component weights by accounting for geometry and
materials used. Based on this information, FLOPS is able to perform S&S analysis
in order to determine whether the characteristics of the aircraft inputted are able to
meet the inputted mission requirements. Besides outputting information related to
performance characteristics, FLOPS results are directly fed into ALCCA to provide
detailed costing information.
ALCCA provides costing information related to both the aircraft OEM and the
airlines. Data related to the airlines are specifically tied to the performance metrics
calculated in FLOPS, which includes the calculation of $/RPM. In order to accurately
calculate this metric, information related to the specific airline (e.g., average load
factor and indirect operating costs (IOCs)) must also be inputted. With regards to
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the aircraft OEM, the cost associated with RDT&E, Manufacturing, and Sustainment
are calculated yearly for the production life cycle of the aircraft – these costs are
dependent on inputted factors including RDT&E complexities, number of aircraft
produced, manufacturing rate, plant upgrades, and manufacturing learning curve.
While ALCCA is not a true activity-based costing tool, it does allow for modifications
to be implemented to the cost estimating relationships in order to simulate effects of
different activities. To elaborate, ALCCA does not simulate the various elements of an
aircraft being manufactured on different assembly lines in a factory, but allows for the
user to input complexity factors that are used to model the effects of manufacturing
difficulty associated with different aircraft. Furthermore, these complexity factors can
be treated as technology k-factors or enterprise λ-factors.
Not only do FLOPS and ALCCA address all of the requirements of an acceptable
M&S environment discussed in § 3.5.1, but it also allows for technology k-factors and
enterprise λ-factors to be implemented for a variety of metrics – this is due to the
existence of correction factors in the codes. This flexibility to not only model existing
aircraft, but also impacts of future technologies on aircraft caused Mavris, Kirby,
and others to utilize this M&S environment for analyzing the impacts of aircraft
technologies. [108, 109, 106, 90, 93, 91]
While FLOPS and ALCCA provide many advantages to analyzing a proposed
aircraft design, there are some drawbacks to using this M&S environment. Due to
the large number of variables that can be varied within FLOPS and ALCCA, it can
be difficult to develop accurate models of aircraft. To overcome this, FLOPS and
ALCCA will default some variables if no specified user input is provided. In this
dissertation, a previously developed model similar to a Boeing B737 [92] was used
as a baseline model for both proposed designs and competitor’s designs – various
parameters of this model could be altered to represent different OEMs. The use of a
baseline model allows for more confidence in the results since many of the correction
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parameters have already been adjusted to validate the physical performance of the
aircraft.
This model had some key characteristics that should be discussed further. While
the aircraft model was constructed to represent a Boeing B737, it had a range of
acceptable inputs for geometric design variables of interest – these variables and
ranges are shown in Table 8. The basic drag polar that was used as an input for
the M&S environment is shown in Figure 42. This drag polar is for an inputted
cruise altitude of 41,000 ft and cruise Mach number of 0.785. It is important to note
that the exact drag experienced during flight may change depending on a variety of
factors, and this drag polar in Figure 42 should be taken as somewhat of an average
value. Besides the geometric data, an engine deck is inputted into the model that
was generated using NPSS. Each of the two engines is modeled as having an installed
thrust of 27,293.2 pounds of force (lbf ) at sea-level conditions. While the engine deck
has information regarding how thrust and fuel consumption vary with Mach number
and altitude, Figure 43 shows how thrust and thrust specific fuel consumption vary
at the cruise altitude and cruise Mach number; each point in this figure represents a
different throttle setting for the engine. While information regarding the geometry,
drag polar, and engine deck do not comprise all of the details of the model, they
provide basic description of the model that is sufficient for conceptual design.
A concern with FLOPS and ALCCA is that these codes were initially designed
for point design evaluation, which means that an input file that describes one aircraft
geometry is analyzed with each execution of the M&S environment. This is further
complicated because any slight change in design variables requires a new input file
to be generated. While the current version of FLOPS does have parametric and
optimization models, they are limited in the number of parameters that are varied.
While these updates may be appropriate for some applications, they do not provide
enough flexibility for the CoDeS Framework. To this end, the following sections
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Table 8: Ranges for key design variables that are used in the early phases of concep-
tual aircraft design for the FLOPS model of the aircraft used in this dissertation.
Geometric Variable Min. Value Max. Value
Wing Area (ft2) 1200 1500
Thrust to Weight Ratio 0.25 0.3
Aspect Ratio – Wing 7 10
Taper Ratio – Wing 0.18 0.34
Thickness to Chord – Wing Root 0.14 0.2
Thickness to Chord – Wing Tip 0.085 0.15
Wing Sweep Angle (o) 20 35
Aspect Ratio – Horizontal Tail 3 7
Taper Ratio – Horizontal Tail 0.155 0.345
Thickness to Chord – Horizontal Tail 0.07 0.15
Aspect Ratio – Vertical Tail 1.2 3.6
Taper Ratio – Vertical Tail 0.2 0.4



































Figure 43: Thrust vs Thrust-Specific Fuel Consumption (TSFC) at cruise altitude
and cruise Mach number – each point represents a different throttle setting.
describes some modifications that can be made to the M&S environment in order to
address this concern.
4.1.2 Modifications
In order to increase the parametric nature of FLOPS and ALCCA, the codes were
incorporated into a software integration environment, ModelCenter [132]. This in-
tegration environment was used to automate the execution of FLOPS and ALCCA
with regards to different input values. By doing this, two distinct advantages were
gained: 1) FLOPS and ALCCA can be parametrically varied with more flexibility
by being able to select any inputs and outputs, and 2) uncertainties can be easily
analyzed by inputing a range of values for given variables.
By incorporating a software integration environment, input values can be quickly
altered and their effects rapidly quantified. This is because ModelCenter allows for
inputs to be a varied directly in its graphical user interface. ModelCenter will then
pass these new input values into the FLOPS and ALCCA M&S environment in order
to obtain the new output values, which are also visualized in through ModelCenter.
Besides this ability to quickly see changes in inputs, ModelCenter also allows for a
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Figure 44: Incorporation of a software integration environment in order to allow for
ranges on input variables to be evaluated using the M&S environment.
experiments that varies input values in an intelligent manner in order to gain some
insight about the design space. This is accomplished by inputting a range of input
values in order to generate a range of output files using the M&S environment. A
visual representation of this is shown in Figure 44, which is a modification of Figure 26.
While the integration environment rapidly analyzed changes in the aircraft model,
the time required for analysis could be further decreased. This can be accomplish
by the creation of surrogate models, which greatly increase the speed of analyzing
alternative designs. This was necessary because analysis of 400 alternatives using
FLOPS and ALCCA took approximately 4 minutes on a single machine with a 3.4
GHz processor and 8.0 GB of RAM. By creating surrogate models, thousands of
alternatives can be analyzed in a matter of seconds, while still retaining the physics-
based and activity-based capabilities of FLOPS and ALCCA. That is because these
surrogate models are generated from data that was created using these analysis codes.
Multiple authors have demonstrated how various surrogate modeling techniques can
be used to more rapidly explore the design space of these design problems. [107, 112,
93, 91, 114, 142, 29, 44, 97, 78]
While a variety of surrogate modeling techniques exist, some may be better suited
132
…




Figure 45: Notional diagram of a single-layer artificial neural net.
for an aircraft design problem. To help better capture the non-linearities and higher-
order interactions that exist in aircraft design problems, some authors have leveraged
the Response Surface Methodology (RSM). [122, 107, 112, 93, 91, 114, 142, 29, 44]
The general equation for a second-order response surface is shown in Equation 29.
In this equation, β represents the linear coefficients of regression, x represents the
design variables, ε represents the residuals term, R represents the response, and n
is the total number of design variables. Other authors have focused on another
surrogate modeling technique referred to as Artificial Neural Nets (ANN), which was
inspired by neural networks that exist in the brain. The algorithmic and mathematical
framework for ANN was described in 1943 by McCulloch and Pitts [116], but took
several decades for computational resources to increase for this technique to become
usable. In general, ANN makes use of hidden layers and activation functions in order
to more accurately capture non-linear behavior. [44, 97, 122, 32, 78] A generalized
schematic of a single-layer ANN is shown in Figure 45.













βijxixj + ε (29)
Regardless of the surrogate modeling technique chosen, data are needed to create,
verify, and validate the surrogate model. Multiple, mathematically based techniques
exist in order to verify and validate surrogate models. While a common technique is
to estimate the coefficient of determination (R2) or adjusted-R2, the results may be
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misleading. A more accurate approach is to examine the actual by predicted and resid-
ual by predicted plots; multiple guidelines exist for evaluating these plots. [91, 122]
Another approach involves examining the Model Fit Error (MFE), which constitutes
a distribution of the error between the model’s predicted points and the data points.
These techniques can verify a model because they check the predictions of the model
versus the data points used to create the model. Model Representation Error (MRE)
uses data points that were not the same used to create the model. MRE is a technique
for validating the model and is insightful because it captures a models accuracy of
capturing the effects of data not used in model generation.
In the context of the CoDeS Framework, surrogate models were used to capture the
impacts of the value metrics with regards to changes in various inputs. During Step
4 of establishing a geometric baseline, second-order RSEs were sufficient at capturing
the changes in value metrics with regards to different geometric inputs. The ranges
for these geometric inputs used are shown in Table 8 of the previous section. While
RSEs were appropriate to capture the effects of changes in geometry, they were not
sufficient at capturing the effects of economic noise and strategy variables.
An ANN approach was adopted in order to account for highly nonlinear behavior
that occurs with changes in economic noise and strategy variables. To fit these ANN
surrogate models, a software package called Basic Regression Analysis for Integrated
Neural Networks (BRAINN) [84] was used. The use of BRAINN was preferred because
the variable structure associated with ANN can have significant impacts on their
accuracy and usability of the surrogate model. As opposed to RSEs, where the
equation increases in size with new terms being added or increasing the order of
magnitude (e.g., second-order to third-order), an ANN equation increases in size
with each additional node and can drastically increase in size by adding additional
hidden layers. Since it is hard, if not impossible, to know the preferred ANN structure
a priori, BRAINN allows for different, single-layered ANN structures to be generated
134
and compared in order to determine the optimal number of nodes in the hidden layer.
[84] After an optimal ANN structure is determined by BRAINN, the surrogate model
should still be analyzed using the goodness of fit criteria previously described in order
to ensure that it accurately represents the FLOPS and ALCCA M&S environment.
As described in this section, the FLOPS and ALCCA M&S environment can be
incorporated into a software integration environment to enable parametric analysis,
which increases the speed of analyzing alternatives. However, this modification was
still not sufficient at rapidly exploring the design space. For this reason, surrogate
models were introduced in order to greatly increase the speed of analyzing design and
strategy options. While this increased capability was beneficial to the CoDeS Frame-
work, there are potential drawbacks to using surrogate models that are discussed in
the following section.
4.1.3 Surrogate Models
As described in § 3.4, the metric for OEM’s profit was quantified by analyzing the
various sources of incomes and expenses throughout the years of development and
production – this allows for the creation of the manufacturer’s cumulative cash flow
(CCF) curve, which provides more insight to the decision-maker. When this is com-
bined with the previous discussion on surrogate models, a potential problem arose.
The problem occurs due to the residual term that exists for every surrogate model.
When surrogate models for the income and costs are summed throughout the air-
craft’s production life cycle, the residuals would also be added and that may cause
large errors in the estimation of total profit.
Implementation Consideration: Is the accuracy of yearly cash flow
surrogate models acceptable to use as a value metric? Does this result
depend on the type of surrogate model (RSE or ANN) used?
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As stated by Equation 3, profit is a function of the incomes and costs throughout
the years. The incomes are a function of the price of an aircraft and the quantity sold.
The costs is composed of three elements: RDT&E Costs (CR), Manufacturing Costs
(CM), and Sustainment Costs (CS), which vary throughout the years of production
and are determined based on the specific inputs to the M&S environment. Consider
a surrogate model for year i of RDT&E costs, denoted by ĈR,i in Equation 30 –
CR,i is the actual value, and εR,i is the residual term. This could also be applied to
the manufacturing and sustainment costs, which are shown in Equations 31 and 32,
respectively.
ĈR,i = CR,i + εR,i (30)
ĈM,i = CM,i + εM,i (31)
ĈS,i = CS,i + εS,i (32)
If the price and quantity are assumed to be inputs of the M&S environment, then
the cash flow for a given year i can be written as shown in Equation 33, depending
on whether or not surrogate models are used. Therefore, when the total profit is
calculated, by summing all of the yearly cash flow values, the residuals could create
a significant discrepancy.
CFi = f(CR,i, CM,i, CS,i, Pi, Qi)
⇒ ĈF i = f(ĈR,i, ĈM,i, ĈS,i, εR,i, εM,i, εS,i, Pi, Qi)
(33)
Consider two different ways of creating a surrogate model for OEM profit (Π).
The first approach creates a surrogate model directly from the total profit, which is
seen in Equation 34 and as a residual term, εTot,A1. The second approach sums the
individual surrogate models for CR,i, CM,i, and CS,i and can be seen in Equation 35
– this approach has a different definition for the residual term, which is based on the
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Table 9: Percent ranges for εTot for OEM’s Profit surrogate models using both an










(εR,i + εM,1 + εS,i)
summation of all the other surrogate models’ residual terms. While it is intuitive to
think that εTot,A1 ≤ εTot,A2, these results were analyzed in order to determine whether




CFi = PQTot− (CR,Tot + CM,Tot + CS,Tot) + εTot,A1 = ΠTot + εTot,A1 (34)




ĈR,i + ĈM,i + ĈS,i
)
Π̂Tot = PQTot −
N∑
i=1
(CR,i + CM,i + CS,i) +
N∑
i=1




(εR,i + εM,1 + εS,i)
(35)
To address the Implementation Consideration, surrogate models were created us-
ing both Equation 34 and 35. These surrogate models were created using an RSE
approach and an ANN approach. The residuals of the validation points were examined
in order to quantify the difference between the two approaches for εTot. The distri-
butions from the two approaches of quantifying the residuals are shown in Figures 46
and 47. Both of these figures demonstrate a similarity between the distributions of
the residuals, regardless of the surrogate modeling approach used. Furthermore, the
ranges of the distribution are rather small, being withing ± 5% of 0. The quantifica-
tion of these ranges are stated in Table 9.
While Approach 1 does provide a smaller residual term, the residual terms asso-






























Figure 46: Distribution of εTot for the two approaches of create surrogate models

























Figure 47: Distribution of εTot for the two approaches of create surrogate models
using an ANN approach for OEM’s profit.
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Therefore, the increased flexibility of using yearly cash flow values causes Approach
2 to be the preferred approach, regardless of whether RSE or ANN surrogate models
are used.
Since surrogate models can be implemented to rapidly increase the speed of analy-
sis for the CoDeS Framework, the process of the CoDeS Framework should be updated
to include their use. This is shown in Figure 48; the dotted lines around the surrogate
model boxes indicate that their use is not required to complete the Generate Geo-
metric Baseline or Evaluate Strategy Alternatives steps, but can be used to increase




























































































































































































































   































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.2 Characterizing Uncertainty (Experiment 1)
Since surrogate models have been shown to be accurate enough to use with the value
metrics of interest, Experiment 1 utilized these surrogates as the M&S environment.
It should be noted that since these surrogates were derived from the FLOPS and AL-
CCA M&S environment, they still captured the effects from the geometric variables,
economic noise variables, and strategy variables on the value metrics.
Experiment 1 has three major aims:
1. Determine sensitivities of the value metrics to specific variables and their inter-
actions
2. Determine sensitivities of the value metrics to different probability density func-
tions that represent the uncertainty of these variables
3. Quantify the impacts of scenario-based analysis at mitigating the effects of
uncertainty
The following sections will not only describe in detail how this experiment was
conducted, but also highlight key results. For this experiment, a baseline geometry
was selected from the range of design variables. This baseline geometry was selected
using the approach that was described in § 3.5.1. Both NSGA-II and SQP techniques
were used and both produced similar results for the optimized baseline. The values
for the geometry variables of interest are described in Table 10.
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Table 10: Description of the geometric baseline that was used in Experiment 1.
Geometric Variable Baseline Value
Wing Area (ft2) 1200
Thrust to Weight Ratio 0.25
Aspect Ratio – Wing 10
Taper Ratio – Wing 0.34
Thickness to Chord – Wing Root 0.2
Thickness to Chord – Wing Tip 0.15
Wing Sweep Angle (o) 35
Aspect Ratio – Horizontal Tail 3
Taper Ratio – Horizontal Tail 0.155
Thickness to Chord – Horizontal Tail 0.07
Aspect Ratio – Vertical Tail 1.2
Taper Ratio – Vertical Tail 0.4
Thickness to Chord – Vertical Tail 0.09
4.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis: Single Variables
This sensitivity analysis is focused on determining the impacts that different single
economic noise variables have on the value metrics; § 4.2.2 discusses a sensitivity anal-
ysis concerning the interactions of these variables. This was motivated by Research
Question 2, which is restated below:
Research Question 2: How can the impacts of uncertainty be deter-
mined with regards to controllable and uncontrollable factors?
While several techniques exist in the literature, including Taguchi’s inner and
outer arrays [157, 158], some of them may not be applicable to this design problem.
Taguchi’s approach cannot be implemented because there are too many different
values (i.e., levels) that different factors can take – all of the variables being analyzed
in this experiment are assumed to be continuous. Instead, a one-at-a-time sensitivity
analysis was performed in order to examine the impacts of various variables and the
impacts from their interactions. As a reminder, the economic noise variables being
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considered were: manufacturing learning curve, production facility costs, inflation
rate, number of aircraft produced, price of the aircraft, average load factor, and fuel
price; these variables were discussed in detail in § 3.3.4.
Before determining the sensitivities of individual variables, there was a need to
first examine the general effects that the economic noise variables have on the value
metrics. This was done by first assuming that no information was known about
these variables so each range of uncertainty was modeled as a uniform probability
distribution. These probability distributions were then parametrically varied in the
M&S environment by increments of ± 1%, ± 5%, ± 10%, and ± 15%, around the
assumed baseline values. This was done in order to quantify the impacts of increasing
uncertainty of the economic noise variables on the value metrics. Each of these
increments was analyzed using 5,000 cases, which took less than three seconds to
complete using the surrogate models – this is a significant improvement from the four
minutes required to analyze 400 cases using FLOPS and ALCCA directly.
The manufacturer’s CCF curves for each of these cases was generated using box
plots in order to capture the variability in the cash flow values from each year. These
CCF plots for ± 1%, ± 5%, and ± 10% are described in detail; the CCF results for
± 15% were not shown because of the large variability seen in the results for ± 10%.
Figure 49 shows the CCF results for ± 1% with three specific aspects highlighted by
letters A, B, and C. Point A show that with this level of uncertainty, the breakeven
year may occur during year eleven, has a high likelihood of occurring during year
twelve and has definitely occurred by year 13. Point B illustrates the range of to-
tal expected OEM profit at the end of the twenty year production – this box plot
highlights the low expectation that the proposed design would achieve the base level
of profit that occurs with the Geometric Baseline in the presence of no uncertainty.
Point C highlights the maximum possible sunk costs, which is equal to approximately







Figure 49: Manufacturer’s CCF curve, with ± 1% uncertainty for all of the economic
noise variables.
Figure 50 shows the manufacturer’s CCF curve for ± 5% economic uncertainty.
In this figure point A shows that the expected breakeven year could occur any where
between year 10 and year 16, with the mean occurring in between years 11 and 12. It
is important to note that the increase in uncertainty means that there are some cases
where the aircraft may perform better than the Geometric Baseline due to favorable
market conditions. To further illustrate those effects, point B highlights the range
of expected total profit, with approximately 25% of the cases earning higher profit
than the Geometric Baseline. Point C shows that the maximum total sunk cost is
approximately -160% of the Geometric Baseline, which is not drastically different
from the case of ± 1% uncertainty shown in Figure 49. It is also noteworthy that the
maximum sunk cost occurs during year 6 for both ± 1% and ± 5% uncertainty.
The final result shown is of ± 10% uncertainty, which can be seen in Figure 51.
This figure highlights how uncertainty quickly grows to the point that is almost







Figure 50: Manufacturer’s CCF curve, with ± 5% uncertainty for all of the economic
noise variables.
years in the future, having confidence within ± 10% of a estimate may be optimistic∗.
In Figure 51, point A highlights how the breakeven year may occur in year 9, but also
may not occur by the end of the twenty year production. Point B shows that the range
of values for possible profit, which has about 30% of the data above the Geometric
Baseline, but also has approximately 10% of the data earning a negative profit. Point
C also shows that maximum possible sunk cos has increased to approximately -175%
of the Geometric Baseline. Point C also shows that the this maximum sunk cost may
occur in year 10, which would be four years after the first delivery of a completed
aircraft.
While valuable information can be gained from examination of the OEM’s CCF
curves, there is no information related to the other value metric of $/RPM contained
in those curves. The elliptical distributions of both value metrics are shown in Fig-
ure 52 – these ellipses cover 95% of the data points for each uncertainty range. One of
the first things to notice in this figures is that the normalized profit metric has a much
∗Between 2006 and 2016, the yearly inflation rate in the US has fluctuated between 0.1% and







Figure 51: Manufacturer’s CCF curve, with± 10% uncertainty for all of the economic
noise variables.
larger range of possible values than normalized $/RPM for all the cases examined.
This makes sense because the normalized profit accounts for the production (and sale)
of all aircraft, but $/RPM is evaluated on a per aircraft basis. Another important
characteristic exhibited by these ellipses is that they are more skewed towards lower
profit values than higher profit values, which is especially obvious in the case of ±
1%. This occurs for several reasons:
• The manufacturing learning curve exhibits nonlinear behavior, which means
that symmetrical shifts may result in different increase/decrease in average cost.
This effect is shown in notional representation of changes in the learning curve
paramter b (specified by Equation 2 of § 3.3.4) Figure 53 where it can be seen
that A is obviously larger than C.
• There may also be nonlinear behavior exhibited by other economic noise vari-
ables or their interactions. This needs to be further examined by performing
a sensitivity analysis on these variables. This section examines the sensitivi-
ties of single variables, while the following section explores sensitivities between
economic noise variable interactions.
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Figure 52: Distributions for both value metrics when analyzing ± 1%, ± 5%, ± 10%,
and ± 15% uniform uncertainty of the economic noise variables.
Instead of performing the sensitivity analysis of the economic noise variables by
varying them by ± 1%, ± 5%, ± 10%, and ± 15% around a baseline value, the
uncertainty range of ± 10% was selected as an appropriate value. This sensitivity
analysis was performed using only uniform distributions since further insight into
other probability distributions occurs in the following section (§ 4.2.3). The first
cases analyzed varied only one factor at a time and defaulted the other factors to
their baseline values.
The first variable analyzed was the average inflation rate – the results of this sensi-
tivity analysis can be seen in Figure 54. In this figure, the ellipse represents coverage
of 99% of the data points that occur when varying all of the noise factors simulta-
neously by ± 10%. Examining the line of points, which represents the sensitivity of
varying only average inflation rate, it can be seen that there was a larger impact on
the profit metric. The reason this impact was larger on the profit metric compared
to the $/RPM metric is that the price of aircraft was not adjusted to account for
varying changes in inflation rate. Besides the difference in impacts on value metrics,
it was observed that the sensitivity analysis was slightly skewed towards lower values
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b + 10% 
b - 10% 
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Figure 53: Notional figure of manufacturing learning curve that highlights nonlinear
effects, which is shown by A > C.
Figure 54: Sensitivity analysis of varying only average inflation rate.
of profit; the data points have a range of approximately 0.58 to 1.35.
Next, the manufacturer’s learning curve was analyzed in order to determine the
sensitivity of value metrics. It was expected that the variability should only occur
for the normalized profit metric – this was because price was held constant so in-
creases/decreases in manufacturing costs were not passed on to the airlines. However,
when examining Figure 55, there was a slight variating in the $/RPM value for differ-
ent value of the OEM’s learning curve. Upon further investigation, it was discovered
that the result in the figure overstates the variability – the actual range of variability
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Figure 55: Sensitivity analysis of varying only OEM’s learning curve.
in the normalized $/RPM metric was within ± 1%. This almost negligible variation
in normalized $/RPM was attributed to the residuals associated with the surrogate
models. In terms of the normalized profit metric the trend was as expected because
it was skewed towards lower values with a range of approximately 0.45 to 1.30. The
reason for this skewness was attributed to the nonlinearity shown in Figure 53.
The sensitivity of the value metrics to average load factor was examined and the
results are shown in Figure 56. This variable was not expected to have any impact on
the normalized profit metric because the average load factor is only used in computing
$/RPM, as shown in Equation 6 of § 3.4. Since the average load factor is directly
stated in the denominator of this equation, it makes sense that it would have a large
impact. This result is more interesting when compared to the sensitivity that $/RPM
exhibits from fuel costs, which is shown in Figure 57.
The results from the sensitivity analysis of fuel costs were not as expected because
the variability was rather small. This was due to the expectation that fuel costs
play a major role in determining the profitability of airlines; however, this initial
expectation was flawed for a major reason. The normalized $/RPM metric shows
the total operating costs of one aircraft, not a fleet of aircraft. When an airline is
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Figure 56: Sensitivity analysis of varying only average load factor.
Figure 57: Sensitivity analysis of varying only average fuel costs.
concerned with the fuel costs for hundreds of aircraft, then their profitability is greatly
affected by small fluctuations in this economic noise variable.
The sensitivity analysis for the price of the aircraft yielded results that were more
aligned with expectations. Figure 58 shows the results of this sensitivity analysis.
Changes in the price has not only a large impact on the $/RPM metric, but also
the profit metric. The curve also has a positive slope, which means that as price



























Figure 59: Sensitivity analysis of varying only the Number of the aircraft produced.
Figure 59 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis on the number of aircraft
purchased. Intuition would suggest that only the OEM’s profit should be affected.
However, the figure does show a slight variation in the $/RPM metric. Upon further
inspection, it was determined that this result was most likely due to residuals asso-
ciated with the surrogate models used since the variability for this value metric was
less than ± 0.5%.
The final sensitivity analysis conducted examined how the production facility














Figure 60: Sensitivity analysis of varying only the facility costs to manufacturer the
aircraft.
noise variables, the production facility costs were varied from zero to $1 billion USD.
The results from this variation are shown in Figure 60. While this figure shows
that the variability was limited to the OEM profit metric, which was expected, the
total variation was much lower than expected considering the maximum value of the
input was large. This was further examined by conducting a detailed cost breakdown,
which is shown in Figure 61. This cost breakdown was conducted using the Geometric
Baseline and the only factor not set to its baseline value was the production facility
costs, which were set to $1 billion USD. As can be seen from Figure 61, the production
facility costs only account for approximately 1% of the manufacturing costs, which
account for approximately 71% of the total costs. Further mitigating the impacts of
the production facility costs is that the M&S environment used (ALCCA) spreads
this cost over the twenty-year production life cycle of the aircraft.
One of the key takeaways that becomes apparent by examining Figures 54, 55, 56,
57, 58, 59, and 60 is that no single economic noise variable can fully account for the
variability in either of the value metrics. This is a key observation because it suggests
that the interactions between metrics is the main contributor to reduced ability to











Figure 61: Detailed cost breakdown to help explain minimal impacts of facility costs.
means that scenarios should be defined using multiple metrics – for example, consider
the following two, notional scenarios:
Notional Scenario 1: Fuel price increases by 5%
Notional Scenario 2: Fuel price increases by 5%, airlines reconfigure flights to in-
crease load factor by 2%, and inflation rate is expected to remain stagnant
Based on the insight from these one-variable-at-a-time sensitivity analysis, No-
tional Scenario 2 would provide more insight because the interactions between those
noise variables may drive the variability of the result more than any single variable.
However, this insight might not be accurate – to examine its validity, more sensitivity
analyses were conducted based on interactions between variables, which are discussed
in the following section.
4.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis: Interactions
While the previous section explored the impacts of economic noise variables by exam-
ining their individual influences on the variability of the results for the value metrics,
this section focuses on the impacts of their interactions. Furthermore, these sensi-
tivity analyses varied the defaulted values of other economic noise variables in order
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to better characterize the design space. In order to quantify these sensitivities, a
similar approach was adopted as in the previous section. However, since there ex-
ists a large number of interaction terms – there are 21 second-order interactions and
35 third order interactions from the seven economic noise variables – not all of the
possible combinations were examined. Instead, a smaller number of cases were ana-
lyzed because it was expected that their sensitivities could provide insight into other
interactions without the need of analyzing all possible combinations.
The first case that was analyzed involved only average inflation rate being varied,
but including the defaulting of the manufacturer’s learning curve to different values of
either -5% or +5%. This was done in order to see if the value that other economic noise
variables are defaulted to impacts the sensitivity analysis. These results are shown
in Figure 62, where the “new baseline” values around which inflation was varied are
highlighted by an x symbol. In this figure the impacts of the different values for
manufacturing learning curve are easily seen – they shift the range of values to the
left or right of the baseline profit. While less obvious to notice in the figure, the range
of variability when the manufacturing learning curve is defaulted to +5% is slightly
larger than the range when that variable is defaulted to -5%. This trend further
highlights the nonlinear effects that are present when examining variation in OEM’s
learning curve.
Before examining the effects of varying two noise variables simultaneously, there
was a need to further examine the shift caused by defaulting other economic noise
variables. This was done by defaulting OEM’s learning curve to either -5% or +5%
while simultaneously defaulting the average load factor to -10% or +10%. The results
are shown in Figure 63. In this figure, the “new baseline” are marked with an o
symbol. When comparing the results in this figure to the results shown in Figure 62,
the only difference that exists is the vertical shift due to the different values of average
load factor. This comparison further highlights the orthogonality that is present
154
x x 
x – Manufacturing Learning Curve = -5% from BL 
 
x – Manufacturing Learning Curve = +5% from BL 
Figure 62: Sensitivities analysis based on average inflation rate with OEM’s learning
curve defaulted to different values.
between the impacts of load factor and manufacturing learning curve.
While the results shown in Figure 62 are technically showing second-order effects,
there was a need to examine the impacts of varying two economic noise variables
simultaneously. This was done in a similar manner as with Figures 62 and 63 by de-
faulting other economic noise variables to different values in order to further examine
their impacts. Figure 64 shows the results of varying inflation rate and the number
of aircraft manufactured while defaulting manufacturing learning curve to -5% and
+5%. This figure shows two key results: 1) the interaction between inflation rate,
number of vehicles, and defaulted settings of the OEM’s learning curve almost entirely
cover the full range of variability seen in the normalized profit metric, and 2) regions
of overlap exist between these two ellipses, which means that different combinations
of economic noise variables can recreate the same results. The latter point highlights
the non-uniqueness of the design space and highlights the need for clearly defined
scenarios to reduce the impacts of uncertainty – by examining the design space, a
decision-maker may be unable to determine the factors that drive the result. Based




o – Manufacturing Learning Curve = -5% from BL; Load Factor = +10% 
 
o – Manufacturing Learning Curve = +5% from BL; Load Factor = -10% 
Figure 63: Sensitivities analysis based on average inflation rate with OEM’s learning
curve and average load factor defaulted to different values.
examined by also defaulting the load factors to either -10% or +10%. These results
are shown in Figure 65. This figure shows similar results to those presented in Fig-
ure 63, except that there is more variability in the value metrics, which is due to the
interactions between inflation rate and the OEM’s learning curve.
To conclude the interaction sensitivity analysis, a third economic noise variable
was included. Figure 66 shows the results of varying average inflation rate, number
of aircraft manufactured, and fuel costs while defaulting the OEM’s learning curve
to values of -5% and +5%. This figure shows even more of an overlap region than
Figure 64, which is due to the results having more variability in the $/RPM value
metric. These results further highlight the need to have clearly defined scenarios.
When the same three economic noise variables are varied, but average load factor is
defaulted to different values a vertical shift occurs in the ellipses, which was expected
– these results are shown in Figure 67. While this process of varying additional
economic noise variables could continue, the information gained from the results has
a diminishing returns. For this reason, the sensitivity analysis involving interactions
between economic noise variables was not continued.
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x – Manufacturing Learning Curve = -5% from BL 
 
x – Manufacturing Learning Curve = +5% from BL 
Figure 64: Sensitivities analysis based on the interaction of average inflation rate and




o – Manufacturing Learning Curve = -5% from BL; Load Factor = +10% 
 
o – Manufacturing Learning Curve = +5% from BL; Load Factor = -10% 
Figure 65: Sensitivities analysis based on the interaction of average inflation rate
and number of aircraft manufactured with OEM’s learning curve and average load
factor defaulted to different values.
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x x 
x – Manufacturing Learning Curve = -5% from BL 
 
x – Manufacturing Learning Curve = +5% from BL 
Figure 66: Sensitivities analysis based on the third-order interaction of average infla-
tion rate, number of aircraft manufactured, and fuel cost with OEM’s learning curve
defaulted to different values.
o 
o 
o – Manufacturing Learning Curve = -5% from BL; Load Factor = +10% 
 
o – Manufacturing Learning Curve = +5% from BL; Load Factor = -10% 
Figure 67: Sensitivities analysis based on the third-order interaction of average infla-
tion rate, number of aircraft manufactured, and fuel cost with OEM’s learning curve
and load factor defaulted to different values.
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Several key observations were made regarding the results of these sensitivity anal-
yses of interactions between economic noise variables. It was shown that interactions
between several variables were able to recreate almost the entire variability of the
value metrics, especially OEM profit. Another observation was that results of the
value metrics do not necessarily represent a unique combination of variables. This
was highlighted by the overlap regions in Figures 64 and 66. This result suggest that
the design space cannot be linearly decomposed into unique regions that represent
a range of values for different metrics. Before applying the lessons gained from the
single variable and interactions sensitivity analysis, it was necessary to first examine
the sensitivity of the value metrics to probability distributions other than uniform.
4.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis: Probability Density Functions
All of the previous sensitivity analyses have been conducted assuming uniform PDFs
to describe the range of uncertainty in the economic noise variables. While this helps
gain insight into the sensitivities of variables and their interactions, it is not sufficient
to fully characterize this design problem. The reason for this is that a uniform PDF
implies no knowledge about an expected value because all values within the range
are equally probable to occur. This does not adequately characterize the uncertainty
associated with the economic noise variables since past (or other sources) information
may help specify a value that is likely to occur. While the specific distributions
associated with each economic noise variable are discussed in the following section
(§ 4.2.4), this section seeks to characterize the effects of different PDF shapes on the
variability of the value metrics.
While PDFs be specified in a manner to generate an infinite number of uniquely
shaped distributions, three alternative distributions were considered besides uniform
distributions. The three different distributions considered were Beta (β), which allow











Figure 68: Notional graphs to highlight differences between different PDFs used in
this sensitivity analysis.
of the shape. The skew represents a bias towards some values over other values and the
kurtosis is defined as the peakedness of a distribution which relates to the frequency
that a number is selected. A β(3,3) is a symmetric distribution that has no skew. A
β(2,5) has a skew towards lower values in the range of the distribution and a β(5,2) is
skewed towards higher values in the range of the distribution. A comparison between
all four distributions can be seen in Figure 68.
This sensitivity analysis was conducted by varying all of the economic noise vari-
ables to ± 1%, ± 5%, ± 10%, and ± 15% for each of the distributions shown in
Figure 68. By comparing the resulting ellipses that show the variability of the value
metrics, further insight can be gained into the impacts of different PDF shapes. To
compare the results of the β distributions, the results from the uniform distribution
are shown in Figure 69. This figure also highlights the range of variability for the
normalized OEM profit metric at ± 5% uncertainty; the range is approximately 95%
of the Geometric Baseline value and is slightly skewed towards lower values.
The results from the symmetric β(3,3) distribution are shown in Figure 70. When




Figure 69: Sensitivity of results to uniform distributions with different levels of
uncertainty, the range of variability for normalize profit at ± 5% is explicitly shown.
the different probability distributions is rather apparent. The ± 5% uncertainty has a
range of approximately 65%, which is not only smaller than the uniform distribution,
but also more closely centered around the Geometric Baseline value. However, in
general the results for the different levels of uncertainty are still skewed towards
negative profit values. In general, the ranges for both value metrics are not as large
as the ranges for the uniform distribution. This suggest that the interactions between
the values near the minimums and maximums of the economic noise variables cause
large variation in the value metrics.
Figure 71 shows the results from using β(2,5) distributions for all of the economic
noise variables. These distributions on input parameters cause the smallest range
of distributions on the value metrics. When the uncertainty was set to ± 5%, the
variability for normalized profit was 50% of the Geometric Baseline. Furthermore,
these results are almost perfectly symmetrical about the Geometric Baseline; however,
as the uncertainty increases the values are more skewed towards high profit values.
When examining the variation for the normalized $/RPM values, the results show that




Figure 70: Sensitivity of results to symmetric beta distributions (β(3,3)) with dif-
ferent levels of uncertainty, the range of variability for normalize profit at ± 5% is
explicitly shown.
uniform distributions where the variability around $/RPM was more symmetrically
distributed around the Geometric Baseline. This result is somewhat counter-intuitive
because this distribution was biased towards lower values for load factor. Upon further
inspection, the lower values for price, fuel costs, and inflation compensate for this
decrease in load factor.
The final distribution analyzed was the β(5,2) distribution which is biased towards
higher values for the economic noise variables. The results for this sensitivity analysis
are shown in Figure 72 where it can also be seen that the range of profit for ± 5%
uncertainty is approximately 55% of the Geometric Baseline. The similarity between
the ranges for the β(2,5) and β(5,2) distributions was not expected. However, the
range of profit values for the β(5,2) distribution are much lower, with none of the
points achieving the same value as the Geometric Baseline. When the results of this
distribution are compared to the results form the uniform distribution (Figure 69),
it can be seen that the minimum values of profit for the ± 5%, ± 10%, and ± 15%
are lower for the β(5,2). When the results in Figure 72 are compared to the results




Figure 71: Sensitivity of results to beta distributions skewed towards lower values
(β(2,5)) with different levels of uncertainty, the range of variability for normalize
profit at ± 5% is explicitly shown.
skewed in opposite directions. Again, this result occurs because the increase in price,
fuel costs, and inflation cancel the benefits from an increase in average load factor.
While analyzing the distributions separately has provided significant insight into
characterizing the effects of uncertainty from the economic noise variables, more in-
sight might be gained by comparing these effects to the effects of geometric variability.
These results are shown in Figure 73 where the ± 5% values for each of the four dis-
tributions discussed previously is compared to the results of full geometric variability,
which were defined for each variable in Table 8 of § 4.1.1. This figure clearly shows
how uncertainty of economic noise variables dominates the results. Even at ± 5% un-
certainty, the variability in the value metrics from factors that are under the control
of the OEM is dominated by the factors that are uncontrollable.
While it was assumed that the effects from economic noise variables dominated the
problem, these results from Experiment 1 have shown this to be the case. Figure 73
was sufficient to answer Research Question 2 because it shows that uncontrollable
factors exhibit more influence on the value metrics than controllable factors. This




Figure 72: Sensitivity of results to beta distributions skewed towards higher values
(β(5,2)) with different levels of uncertainty, the range of variability for normalize
profit at ± 5% is explicitly shown.
± 5% uncertainty 
Geometric 
Baseline 
Figure 73: Comparing ± 5% uncertainty for different PDFs of economic noise vari-
ables to the effects from the full range of geometric variables.
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have confidence in their decisions, which was the subject of Research Question 3. As
discussed in § 3.7.1, a scenario-based approach was implemented to mitigate these
effects. The following section examines the impacts of scenario-based analysis.
4.2.4 Scenario-based Analysis
Instead of conducting the scenario-based analysis with one of the four probability dis-
tributions previously discussed, there was a need to create a more realistic represen-
tation of the uncertainty associated with this problem. This was done by examining
historical information related to each of the economic noise variables in order to se-
lect an appropriate distribution. A summary of the PDFs selected for each economic
noise variable is provided in Table 11, but a rationale for selecting those distributions
is provided in below:
Manufacturer’s Learning Curve: Manufacturing aircraft has become more ex-
pensive over time due to increased complexity, increased wage rates, etc. → a
β(5,2) distribution would capture this behavior.
Production Facility Costs: As with the manufacturing learning curve, modern
aircraft often require a more expensive factory upgrades or the creation of new
facilities→ a β(5,2) distribution would capture this trend towards higher costs.
Inflation Rate: Since inflation rate is heavily influenced by governmental policy and
the behavior of other markets, it can be difficult to determine an exact trend
→ a uniform distribution was used.
Number of Aircraft Manufactured: Some aircraft designs are very successful caus-
ing a larger number than expected to be purchased, which increases the number
manufactured; however, some designs perform poorly on the market causing a
much lower number than expected to be manufactured→ a uniform distribution
















Figure 74: Changes in average load factor between 1995 and 2015. [49]
Price of Aircraft: This has previously been discussed in § 2.2 – while aircraft OEMs
often have a target price for selling there aircraft, there can be fluctuation above
and below that price→ a β(3,3) distribution was used to capture this variability.
Load Factor: Airlines have spent considerable effort to increase their average load
factors over the years, as seen in Figure 74 from the U.S. Department of Trans-
portation [49]. However, this trend is not always increasing, as seen by slight
down turns between 2000-2001, 2007-2008, and 2010-2011. → a β(5,2) distri-
bution was used to capture skew towards higher values of load factor.
Fuel Price: Historically, fuel price has generally increased, but recent fluctuations
have caused a drastic decrease in the price of jet fuel, as seen by Figure 75 [80].
However, it is doubtful that fuel price will continue to stay at very low values→
a β(5,2) distribution was used to model the tendency for fuel price to increase.
Using the probability distributions preciously described and summarized in Ta-
ble 11, a general analysis was conducted with all the ranges of uncertainty for each
economic noise variable set to ± 10%. The results from this analysis are shown in
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Figure 75: Changes in average price of jet fuel between 1991 and early 2016. [80]
Table 11: Distributions used for the various economic noise values for the scenario-
based analysis portion of Experiment 1.
Economic Noise Variable PDF Selected
Manufacturing Learning Curve β(5,2)
Production Facility Costs β(5,2)
Inflation Rate Uniform
Number of Aircraft Produced Uniform




± 10% uncertainty 
Figure 76: Ellipse showing design space with ± 10% uncertainty on all economic
noise variables using distributions described in Table 11.
Figure 76. In this figure, the ellipse represents 95% of the data points that and shows
the variability of the normalized profit and normalized $/RPM value metrics. When
this ellipse is compared to the ellipses in Figures 69, 70, 71, and 72 from the previous
section, it is interesting to note that the range of values for normalized profit are more
similar to the ± 15% uncertainty ranges, but the ranges for normalized $/RPM are
more similar to ± 10% uncertainty for the uniform distribution (Figure 69). While
this suggests that the interactions between the different shaped PDFs are causing this
behavior, the focus of this section was on the effects of using a scenario-based analy-
sis. To this end, two randomly-generated scenarios were created in order to quantify
their impacts on the design space – these scenarios are described in Table 12. These
scenarios were described by inputting a range of values for each economic noise vari-
able where 0% represents the baseline value. As an example, consider the range of
prices for Scenario 1 – the price would vary between the baseline value and +10% of
the baseline value with a median price occurring at +5% of the baseline value.
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Table 12: Ranges for two randomly defined scenarios in order to quantify impacts of
scenario-based analysis.
Economic Noise Variable Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Manufacturing Learning Curve [0, +10%] [-10%, 0]
Production Facility Costs [0, +10%] [-10%, 0]
Inflation Rate [0, +10%] [-10%, 0]
Number of Aircraft Produced [0, +10%] [-10%, 0]
Price of Aircraft [0, +10%] [-10%, 0]
Load Factor [0, +10%] [-10%, 0]
Fuel Price [0, +10%] [-10%, 0]
While the scenarios used for the conclusion of Experiment 1 are not representative
of any real-world scenarios, they are sufficient to validate whether or not scenario-
based analysis could be used to mitigate the large amounts of variability in the value
metrics shown in Figure 76. Before examining these scenarios overall impact on both
value metrics, the manufacturer’s cumulative cash flow (CCF) curves were examined
using box plots to show the variability for each year. Figure 77 shows the CCF curve
for Scenario 1 and highlights three important traits. Point A shows that the variability
in the breakeven year is rater large, spanning between years 11 & 12 to year 19, with
an outlying point in year 20 being just above the breakeven value. Point B shows
that the final profit has a large range of possible values, with very few points being
above the Geometric Baseline value for profit. Lastly, point C highlights that the
maximum possible sunk cost occurs in year 7 and has a value that is approximately
-163% of the Geometric Baseline profit.
The CCF curve for Scenario 2 is shown in Figure 78. This figure highlights the
difference in results that occur between the two scenarios. Point A shows that the
breakeven year is expected to occur between years 10 and 12, which is much lower
variability than in Scenario 1. Furthermore, point B highlights that the median range
of profit is above the Geometric Baseline value for Scenario 2. Finally, point C shows




























Figure 77: Plot of the normalized OEM’s CCF curves for Scenario 1 with three
specific points highlighted: A) breakeven year, B) range of estimated profit, and C)
maximum possible sunk cost.
and occurs in year 6, which is when initial deliveries of aircraft occurs. While this
information concerning normalized profit for both scenarios is useful, it does not
account for the scenarios’ impacts on normalized $/RPM.
Before examining the ellipses that illustrate the variability of both metrics simul-
taneously, each value metric was examine independently. This was done by examining
their cumulative distribution functions (CDFs), which show the probability of a value
metric being above or below a certain value. For normalized profit, the CDFs were
used to quantify the probability that profit would be greater than the Geometric
Baeline profit with no uncertainty. For normalized $/RPM, the CDFs were used to
quantify whether $/RPM would be below the Geometric Baseline $/RPM. The re-
sulting CDF plots for Scenario 1 are shown in Figure 79. In these plots, it can be
seen that Scenario 1 not only hurts the expected profitability of a design, but also
its desirability by airlines. If this were a real-world scenario, then the aircraft OEM
would probably seek to infuse strategy options that cause their design to perform
better for both of these value metrics. To contrast these results, the CDF plots for




























Figure 78: Plot of the normalized OEM’s CCF curves for Scenario 2 with three
specific points highlighted: A) breakeven year, B) range of estimated profit, and C)
maximum possible sunk cost
reasonably high probabilities for the aircraft to perform well with regards to the two
value metrics.
While the results from the CDF plots in Figures 79 and 80 allow for some in-
sight to be gained, they do not directly aid in decision making. This is because
none of the factors examined in Scenarios 1 or 2 were under control of the decision-
maker. However, the use of these scenarios does provide a much clearer picture for
the decision-maker to further analyze. This can be seen by examining the relative
Normalized Profit



























Figure 79: Plot of the CDFs for Scenario 1, which depicts the probability of profit
and $/RPM having better values than the Geometric Baseline with no uncertainty.
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Normalized Profit


























Figure 80: Plot of the CDFs for Scenario 2, which depicts the probability of profit
and $/RPM having better values than the Geometric Baseline with no uncertainty.
Table 13: Summary of the percentage reduction of the total design space by using
each scenario for each value metric.
Normalized Profit Normalized $/RPM
Scenario 1 ↓ 64% ↓ 69%
Scenario 2 ↓ 74% ↓ 67%
variability of both value metrics for Scenarios 1 and 2 compared to the variability for
the full range (i.e., ± 10%) of uncertainty. This comparison can be seen in Figure 81.
While the figure is sufficient to highlight a significant reduction in variability for each
value metrics, the percentage reductions are quantified in Table 13.
The results from this scenario-based analysis showed that significant reductions
in the design space could occur. This shows that scenario-based analysis can be used
reduce the variability in the design space, which may allow for more insight into the
design problem. These results further suggest that more tightly-defined scenarios
(i.e., with smaller ranges around each economic noise variable) may lead to even
better insight being gained. Regardless, scenario-based analysis is not sufficient to
allow a decision-maker to pick a relevant strategy as it was conducted in Experiment
1. Instead, it was necessary to evaluate the effects of different strategies in these
scenarios in order to quantify their impacts on the value metrics.
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± 10% for all 
economic noise 
variables 
Figure 81: Ellipses showing two scenarios compared to the ellipse of ± 10% uncer-
tainty on all economic noise variables.
After the impacts of strategies are assessed, a technique must then be applied
in order to provide insight about which strategy is preferred. The rationale for a
technique to do this was discussed in § 3.7.1 and shown in Figure 37. One of three
possible techniques that combine Taguchi’s S/N and MCDM techniques should be
used to evaluate strategies. This is the focus of Experiment 3, which is discussed in
§ 4.3.2. But before conducting that experiment it was necessary to first examine a
canonical experiment (Experiment 2) to determine how S/N ratio could be applied
if there are negative value metrics – while the scenario-based analysis presented in
Experiment 1 did not result in any scenarios with negative values for normalized
profit, it is not unreasonable to assume that this may occur given different scenario




This section is comprised of § 4.3.1 and § 4.3.2, which address Experiment 2 and
Experiment 3, respectively. The major aim of both experiments was to examine
the process of comparing proposed designs and strategies to a competitor’s design.
The difficulties associated with this task are detailed in § 3.7.1, but stem from the
probabilistic nature of the resulting value metrics. To mitigate these concerns, a
comparison was suggested that utilizes selection techniques that combine Taguchi’s
S/N and MCDM techniques of OEC and TOPSIS, which were described in § 3.7.5.
However, since OEM’s profit was selected as a value metric, there is a possibility of
having negative values for that value metric, given a specific scenario. Since these
negative values cannot be used in Taguchi’s S/N formulation, a mitigating technique
must be implemented.
The concern with negative value metrics was explored § 4.3.1 by Experiment 2.
This experiment examines a canonical problem in order to determine a preferred mit-
igating strategy. Two transformation strategies were examined in order to determine
if the different approaches lead to different results. Based on the results of this ex-
periment, several heuristics are suggested that are applicable to any problem using
Taguchi’s S/N formulation with negative inputs. By accounting for the possibility
of negative value metrics, Experiment 3 can further examine the hybrid S/N-MCDM
techniques in order to determine a preferred approach.
Instead of using a canonical experiment, as was the case with Experiment 2,
Experiment 3 uses the data from the scenario-based analysis conducted in § 4.2.4,
which occurred as the final step in Experiment 1. The use of this data allows for more
insight to be gained into the nature of this design problem; however, Experiment 3
does not directly compare the possible alternatives to a competitor. This was done in
order to gain clear insight into the three possible techniques for selecting a preferred
strategy. The end of Experiment 3 concludes by describing how these techniques
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would be applied when comparing to competition. Chapter 5 examines three use
cases of the CoDeS Framework where the results of Experiment 3 are directly used
to compare competition. The results of Experiment 2 were needed to successfully
analyze the second use case.
4.3.1 Negative Value Metrics (Experiment 2)
As previously stated, Experiment 2 in this section analyzed a canonical example prob-
lem that focused on mitigating strategies for using negative numbers with Taguchi’s
S/N formulation. This was a concern because values of OEM’s profit can be negative,
positive, or zero. Since profit is a value metric that should be maximized, obvious
problems can occur for negative or zero values based on Taguchi’s larger is better
formulation, which was shown in Equation 22 and restated below. If a value of zero
was analyzed in the equation, then the fraction would become infinity. If a negative
value was used, then it could wrongly bias the results since the term is squared –
for example, consider two values of −5 and 3, obviously 3 should be preferred for
the larger is better metric, but the −5 would have a more favorable value because
−52 = 25 but 32 = 9. A technique should be implemented that addresses both of








One mitigating technique may be to use value metrics that cannot take negative
values – in the case of this aircraft design problem, cost would be an example of a
metric. However, if cost was used, then information regarding price and quantity
sold would not be captured, which would be ignoring two important factors. Another
mitigating technique may be to ignore data points that have non-positive, but this
technique would also wrongly bias the results – in fact data that showed negative
values for profit may be more important to a decision-maker because they could
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represent high risk. Instead of these techniques, transformations were examined.
The transformations analyzed are well-established techniques either within the
general field of mathematics or by practitioners of Taguchi’s S/N formulation, as de-
scribed in § 3.7.6. Two transformation techniques were analyzed: 1) Transform the
data to positive values only (shift-transformation), and 2) Transform the S/N for-
mulation to target is better (target-transformation). The target is better formulation
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The formulation for the first approach is shown in Equation 36 where γ represents
an arbitrary constant that is added to make all the values positive. The formulation

















In order for either of these transformations to be applicable, guidance needs to
be provided for values of γ and/or Γ. To evaluate whether a preferred value for
these constants was obvious, regardless of the data, partial derivatives were taken in
order to determine whether any minima or maxima occur. The partial derivative of
Equation 36 with respect to γ is given by Equation 38, where the summations go from
i = 1 to N . From examination, this equation has no obvious values of a minimum
or maximum and as γ >> yi then
∂S/N
∂γ
→ 0 because the numerator approaches zero
faster than the denominator. The partial derivate of Equation 37 with respect to
Γ is given by Equation 39, where the summations go from i = 1 to N . Similar to
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the other transformation, this equation shows no obvious minimum or maximum and
as Γ >> yi then
∂S/N
∂Γ
→ 0. Since these partial derivatives show that there are no
obvious values for γ or Γ and further analysis showed that the constants cannot just
be set to arbitrarily large values, there was a need to further experimentally determine





















Since the values for γ or Γ need to be experimentally determined, Experiment
2 was slightly modified – besides determining whether one transformation was pre-
ferred, the experiment also sought to determine any rules or heuristics for determining
an appropriate constant value for that preferred transformation. In order to conduct
Experiment 2, data was needed that was representative of the problems previously
discussed, but only a small number of data points with obvious behavior were consid-
ered. This was done in order to ensure generality of the results from this experiment
and to provide clear context for any rules or heuristics that were developed. The data
used for this canonical experiment is shown in Table 14 – each alternative has ten
data points that create a distribution of results and the mean and maximum value
for Alternative 2 are greater than those of Alternative 1, but both have the same
variance. This means that when these alternatives are compared using Taguchi’s S/N
formulation for larger is better, Alternative 2 should be selected.
The first transformation applied to this data was the transformation given in
Equation 36, which introduced a constant of γ to shift the data. The results from
varying 1 ≤ γ ≤ 10 are shown in Table 15. When γ ≥ 4, then the results show
that Alternative 2 was preferred, which was the expected results; however, when
γ = 1, 2, or 3 Alternative 1 had a higher S/N value and was therefore preferred.
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Table 14: Notional data used for Experiment 2 to evaluate transformation techniques
of nonpositive data using Taguchi’s S/N formulation.













Further analysis into this result showed that for values of γ less than the absolute
value of the minimum of the data caused the results to be inaccurate. This finding
was significant because it suggests values of γ and a heuristic that can be applied
to other data sets. Another interesting trend seen in the results of Table 15 is that
as γ increases, the separation between S/N values of Alternative 1 and Alternative 2
decreases. This result was expected from the results of the partial derivative shown
in Equation 38, but has now been confirmed by experiment.
The second transformation applied to the data was the transformation given in
Equation 37, which introduced a constant of Γ to serve as an arbitrary target from
which all the data could be compared. The results from varying −4 ≤ Γ ≤ 5 are
shown in Table 16. When Γ ≥ 2, Alternative 2 had a higher S/N value and was
preferred, which was the expected result. But, when Γ ≤ 1, then Alternative 1 was
the preferred option. The reason for this switch occurring around Γ = 1 was due to
the means of the data set. As long as the target was set to a value higher than the
mean of the data being analyzed, this transformation selected the correct distribution.
178
Table 15: S/N results from transforming the data by introducing a shift of γ.











Another trend that was not as apparent from the data shown in Table 16 was the
verification of Equation 39, which was verified by checking larger values of Γ. When
Γ = 40, there was no difference, to the three significant figures, between the S/N
values of Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 with both equal to -31.8. Interestingly,
when γ = 40 in the shift transformation, the values of Alternative 1 and Alternative
2 are both equal to 32.2.
The results form Experiment 2 did not provide clear guidance about which trans-
formation technique is preferred, but yielded three useful heuristics for these trans-
formations. The results suggest that either technique could be used to mitigate the
effects of negative data values in Taguchi’s S/N formulation. This means that the
preference of one of these transformation techniques is dependent on the user and the
analysis being conducted. While the S/N values from the shift-transformation are
positive and the S/N values from the target-transformation are negative, this might
be indicative of the data set used and may not be the case for all data evaluated.
However, the heuristics suggested below should be universally applicable to any data
set. The first heuristic is applicable to both the shift-transformation and the target-
transformation, but the second and third heuristics are specific to the transformation
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Table 16: S/N results from transforming the data by introducing a target value of
Γ.












Heuristic 1: Regardless of the transformation used, the values of γ or Γ should not
exceed seven-times the maximum value for the data set for all alternatives, but
values of the constant less than two- or three-times the maximum value may be
preferred.
Heuristic 2: If performing a shift-transformation, the value of γ must be greater
than the absolute value of the minimum of the data for all alternatives (i.e.,
γ > |min(Aji)| for j alternatives with i data points in each).
Heuristic 3: If performing a target-transformation, the value of Γ must be greater
than the largest mean of the data for all alternatives (i.e., Γ > max(ȳj) for j
alternatives.
These suggestion of these heuristics conclude Experiment 2. The following sec-
tion discusses Experiment 3, which looks at applying the three hybrid techniques of
Taguchi’s S/N formulation and MCDM to data from the scenarios analyzed at the
end of Experiment 1.
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Table 17: k-factor values of two notional technologies evaluated in Experiment 3.
Technology 1 (T1) Technology 2 (T2)
Benefits kComponentWeights = -5% kDrag = -10%
Costs
kRDT&E = +5% kRDT&E = +5%
kPrice = +5% kPrice = +5%
4.3.2 Non-negative Value Metrics (Experiment 3)
Experiment 3 was conducted using data from the randomly generated scenarios ex-
amined in § 4.2.4. These scenarios were described in Table 12 and their resulting
variability on the value metrics can be seen in Figure 81. However, it is important to
note that the purpose of comparing alternatives is not to select an optimal scenario
because aircraft OEMs have no control over the scenarios. Instead, the objective was
to select optimal strategies in the presence of a given scenario. That is the main
thrust of Experiment 3 – to determine which, if any, combination of Taguchi’s S/N
formulation and MCDM techniques would be best for selecting the preferred strat-
egy(ies). The strategies considered for Experiment 3 were two notional technologies
(T1 and T2) that are described in Table 17 using their k-factors.
T1 and T2 were then evaluated for each scenario in order to see their impacts on
the variability of the value metrics. The results from Scenario 1 are shown in Figure 82
and the results for Scenario 2 are shown in Figure 83. The most obvious results from
both scenarios was that the results of the technologies were not drastically different in
terms of their value metrics; however, the difference of 1% in the normalized $/RPM
metric for one aircraft that flew 1,000 nmi missions during the year could result in a
difference of up to $330,000 in operating costs and when considering billions of dollars
in potential profit for an aircraft a 1% difference could result in a difference of tens
of millions of dollars. While the difference between these technologies may not seem
significant, there are large consequences for making the wrong decision of selecting a
non-optimal technology.
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The inability to clearly distinguish the preferred technology based on the impacts
shown in Figures 82 and 83 highlight the need for an appropriate technique to select
the preferred technology. As previously discussed (§ 3.7.5), three alternative com-
binations of Taguchi’s S/N formulation and MCDM techniques are candidates for
preferred techniques: 1) OEC of S/N values, 2) S/N of OEC values (MRSN), and 3)
TOPSIS of S/N values. Further complicating the issue was that preferences between
value metrics may not be known or may change with time. To mitigate these effects
an approach was adopted to show the relative sensitivities or elasticities of each ap-
proach for unknown weightings. This was accomplished by normalizing the weightings
to a percentage value and then using those percentages to analyze each technology
using the three different approaches. In all three approaches, w1 was the preference
towards normalized $/RPM and w2 was the preference towards normalized profit for
making a decision. For example, if a decision-maker knew that $/RPM was thrice as
important as estimated profit for making their decision – this might be because the
decision-maker would expect a lower $/RPM value to increase the number of aircraft
purchased which would further increase profit – then the weightings would be set to
(w1, w2) = (75%, 25%).
The first approach examined was the OEC of S/N values, which was defined by
Equation 23 of § 3.7.5. The results from this approach are shown in Figure 84. This
figure shows that the OEC values are linearly increasing, which is expected given
the linear nature of the weightings. It can be seen that the weighting values of
approximately (60%, 40%) represent an important point because values to the left
(i.e., where profit is more or equally preferred to $/RPM) show that T1 was preferred,
but values to the right (i.e., where $/RPM is at least 1.5x preferred to profit) result
in T2 as the preferred strategy. It is important to note that a decision-maker would

































































Figure 84: Scenario 1 with T1 and T2 being analyzed by an OEC of Taguchi’s S/N
values for each value metric with variable weightings.
This approach was also applied to the technologies in Scenario 2, which can be seen
in Figure 85. The results from this figure show that T2 was generally preferred for all
weightings to the right of (25%, 75%), which would mean that if profit was considered
less than thrice as important as $/RPM, then T2 should be selected. While this result
was not independent of the weighting values, T2 was shown to dominate for a larger
range of weightings than T1 dominates in Scenario 1. However, this was only the
result from one possible combination of Taguchi’s S/N and MCDM techniques.
The second approach examined multi-response signal to noise ration (MRSN),
which could be described as a S/N formulation of OEC values (i.e., second approach).
This approach is described by Equations 25, 26, and 27 in § 3.7.5. The results from
evaluating T1 and T2 in Scenario 1 are shown in Figure 86, which are drastically
different than the results shown for the OEC of S/N values (Figure 84). One of the
main observations that can be made about this figure was that the values of MRSN
for T1 and T2 approach zero as the weightings shift towards focusing entirely on


















































Figure 85: Scenario 2 with T1 and T2 being analyzed by an OEC of Taguchi’s S/N
values for each value metric with variable weightings.
of weightings (70%, 30%) to (90%, 10%). This result would suggest that for any
weightings-preferences within that range, both technologies are equally preferred. A
similar result is shown in Figure 87, which plots the MRSN values for the technologies
in Scenario 2; however, this figure shows that the MRSN values are very similar for
weightings that are between (30%, 70%) and (60%, 40%). While these results cannot
be verified against real data, they were compared to the other approaches to provide
some guidance. Before comparing these results, it was necessary to examine the
results from the TOPSIS of S/N values (i.e., third approach).
Figure 88 show the results from the TOPSIS of S/N values (i.e., third approach)
for the different technologies in Scenario 1. These results provide some interesting
insight due to the TOPSIS formulation. Firstly, it is clear to see – from the slopes of
the lines – that as the weightings shift towards preferring $/RPM compared to profit,
T2 becomes more favorable and T1 exhibits the opposite behavior. This insight
might be more beneficial to a decision-maker because it provides a clearer indication
































































































































































Figure 88: Scenario 1 with T1 and T2 being analyzed by a TOPSIS of Taguchi’s
S/N values for each value metric with variable weightings.
TOPSIS identifies a positive ideal solution from which to compare the data, and if
an alternative was that positive ideal solution then it would have a TOPSIS score of
unity. This means that for the weightings of (0%, 100%) T1 was the positive ideal
solution, and for weightings of (100%, 0%) T2 was the positive ideal solution. Similar
results are also seen in Figure 89, which shows the evaluations of the technologies in
Scenario 2. The results from Scenario 2 show that T2 would be preferred as long as
w2 ≤ 4w1.
By showing and analyzing the results from the three different approaches of com-
bining Taguchi’s S/N formulation and MCDM techniques, these three techniques can
be evaluated. While all three results show that the preferences of technologies for both
scenarios is dependent on the relative weightings of the value metrics, the results from
the OEC of S/N values and TOPSIS of S/N values show the same relative weightings
for when T2 is preferred over T1 for each scenario. Not only does MRSN not show
the same results, but it also shows lines that both approach zero as the weightings























































Figure 89: Scenario 2 with T1 and T2 being analyzed by a TOPSIS of Taguchi’s
S/N values for each value metric with variable weightings.
due to trying to maximize profit while trying to minimize $/RPM, which makes this
approach not as favorable for the CoDeS Framework. Since none of the approaches
could be verified as being ideal, the CoDeS Framework allows for any of the three
techniques to be applied. However, since the OEC of S/N values and TOPSIS of S/N
values produced the same result for this experiment, they may be preferred over the
MRSN formulation. Furthermore, since TOPSIS is often cited as being a more robust
technique compared to OEC, the TOPSIS of S/N values was selected as a preferred
approach for the use cases analyzed in Chapter 5.
Before concluding Experiment 3, an enterprise solution was considered in order
to examine its effects on the design space. The enterprise solution (E1) examined
was assumed to be a manufacturing initiative that reduced the manufacturer’s learn-
ing curve by 5% (λE1,MLC = −5%). Instead of applying this enterprise solution to
both technologies in each scenario, an optimal technology for each scenario was first
selected. Since no prior information was known about the preferences of weightings,


















Figure 90: Ellipses showing variability in value metrics with infusion of T1 and
implementation of E1 in Scenario 2 compared to both T1 and the baseline with no
strategies.
1 and Figure 89 for Scenario 2 shows that at that weighting value T1 is preferred in
Scenario 1 and T2 is preferred in Scenario 2.
Figure 90 shows the effects of the enterprise solution (E1) and T1 on the variability
of the value metrics in Scenario 1. These effects were directly compared to the baseline
(i.e., no strategies) result and the result of infusing on T1 in this figure. By coupling
E1 and T1, the mean of normalized profit was higher than the geometric baseline.
This is useful information because it means that further enterprise strategies, like
decreasing the price to reduce $/RPM†, could be infused to further improve the
aircraft’s performance in this scenario. The effects of this strategy was analyzed
using the TOPSIS of S/N values approach and compared to the effects of T1 and T2
for variable weightings – these results are shown in Figure 91. The results from this
analysis showed that T1 and E1 were almost always preferred to only T1 and T2,
unless the weightings were heavily skewed towards favoring the $/RPM value metric.
The effects of E1 and T2 in Scenario 2 can be seen in Figure 92. The TOPSIS of
S/N values technique was applied to this data and the results are shown in Figure 93.
























































Figure 91: Scenario 1 with T1 and E1 being analyzed by Taguchi’s S/N and TOPSIS
with variable weightings.
The results were very similar to the results in Scenario 1 – the enterprise solution and
technology combination were preferred to only technologies except for at extreme
values of weighting $/RPM relative to profit. Further analysis of this result in both
scenarios seems to be due to minute differences in $/RPM, which may be due to slight
errors caused by the use of surrogate models. However, this error was not deemed to
be a major concern because the extreme relationships between the weighting values
are shown for theoretical completeness – if the $/RPM metric was weighted that
heavily, there would be no need to consider the profit value metric.
The enterprise and technology combinations were also analyzed using the OEC of
S/N values approach and the MRSN approach. The results from these analyses are
shown in Appendix B. However, all of the approaches showed similar results for both
scenarios. This was not expected based on the MRSN results from the evaluation of
technologies. Regardless, the approach using TOPSIS was adopted as the preferred


















Figure 92: Ellipses showing variability in value metrics with infusion of T2 and
























































Figure 93: Scenario 2 with T2 and E1 being analyzed by Taguchi’s S/N and TOPSIS
with variable weightings.
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While the results of Experiment 3 did not select a definitive approach, the results did
highlight some differences that may influence the user’s selection when applying the
CoDeS Framework.
4.4 Summary of Chapter
This chapter described three experiments that were conducted in order to provide
guidance in the implementation of the CoDeS Framework. Experiment 1 charac-
terized the impacts of uncertainty by examining the impacts of single-variable, in-
teractions, and different probability distributions on the variability of the value met-
rics. Furthermore, this experiment concluded showing the usefulness of scenario-based
analysis. Experiment 2 was a canonical experiment that was conducted in order to
determine a preferred approach for selecting between strategies that may have neg-
ative value metrics. While neither of the two transformations (shift-transformation
and target-transformation) were shown to be superior, the experiment did allow for
the development of three heuristics which should be applicable to any situation of an-
alyzing negative value metrics with Taguchi’s S/N formulation. Experiment 3 further
analyzed the Taguchi’s S/N formulation by examining three hybrid techniques that
combined Taguchi’s S/N and MCDM techniques. These techniques were: 1) OEC of
Taguchi’s S/N values, 2) Taguchi’s S/N of OEC values (i.e., MRSN), and 3) TOPSIS
of Taguchi’s S/N values. While neither technique was shown to be superior, some
differences between the results caused the third technique (TOPSIS of Taguchi’s S/N
values) to be selected for this dissertation; however, the CoDeS Framework could use
either of the three techniques to select a strategy.
None of the experiments presented in this chapter examined the impacts of com-
petition. This was intentionally done in order to increase the probability of gaining
clear insight in to the results from each experiment. However, the main thrust of this
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dissertation was to analyze how accounting for competition may influence the con-
ceptual design of an aircraft, which was the motivation for constructing the CoDeS
Framework. To this end, the following chapter examined three use cases of the CoDeS




“I do not think that there is any other quality so essential
to success of any kind as the quality of perseverance. It
overcomes almost everything, even nature.”
John D. Rockefeller [103]
The information presented in this chapter built on the results from the experiments
discussed in Chapter 4. This chapter explored three example use cases of the CoDeS
Framework. Each of these use cases examines a different aspect of the CoDeS Frame-
work. Before analyzing these use cases, § 5.1 describes the general problem that was
applied to all three use cases by describing the models used for the aircraft. In each
use case, two OEMs are competing for market share. It is important to note that all
three use cases represent notional scenarios, which may be motivated by real mar-
ket data, but are not intended to represent actual behavior of any establish aircraft
OEMs. The following is a brief description of each use case:
§ 5.2: Exploratory Enterprise Forecasting Explores an Ent-IES (§ 3.6.2) for-
mulation to examine the application of the CoDeS Framework in a competitive
duopoly – seeks to determine if a proposed enterprise solution for an entrant
can beat the incumbent’s design.
§ 5.3: Normative Enterprise Forecasting Explores an Ent-IF (§ 3.6.2) formula-
tion to examine what enterprise solution would be necessary in order for an
entant’s design to beat the incumbent’s design.
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§ 5.4: Entering Asian Market Both firms are trying to enter the Asian market
with competing aircraft, one already available in other markets and the other
being developed – one utilizes only technologies, but the other seeks to use
enterprise solutions in order to dominate this new market.
Each of these use cases is elaborated further in their respective sections. But it
was necessary to describe the models that were used in each use case.
5.1 Background Information on Competitors
Some of the background information for each of the use cases was the same. All
three examined examples of short-haul, single-aisle, narrow-body, 150-passenger class
aircraft in the presence of a duopoly. The basic model used for these aircrafts was rep-
resentative of a Boeing B737 [92], which was described in detail in § 4.1.1. While the
Bertrand and Cournot duopoly models (§ 2.1) do often assume that firms are produc-
ing identical goods, this would not be a useful assumption to make for the analyzing
the design of aircraft. While the basic model used was the same, modifications were
made in order to simulate different OEMs and different aircraft. These differences are
further elaborated by discussing the first four steps of the CoDeS Framework, which
are identical for the first two use cases – the third use case mights slight modifications
to the first four steps of the CoDeS Framework.
Step 1 – Establish the Need:
Airlines are looking to purchase a single-aisle, narrow-body, 150-passenger class air-
craft. This aircraft is for domestic routes that average 1,000 nmi. This aircraft should
be of conventional design in order to ensure ease of airport operations, decrease the
difficulty for technicians to perform maintenance, and ensure a degree of commonality
for operating the aircraft when compared to other aircraft.
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Step 2 – Define the Problem:
While the five major areas of concerned were addressed in this section, one of the
key elements – Define Scenarios of Interest – was not defined in this section. Instead,
each use case included a definition for the scenario of interest.
1. Define the Competitive Environment: This market is characterized as a
duopoly. An OEM (the Incumbent) already exist in this market and airlines
are beginning to purchase their aircraft. Seeing an opportunity for growth,
another OEM (the Entrant) begins the early phases of conceptual design to
bring a concept to this market – the Entrant is using the CoDeS Framework so
all analysis is from their perspective.
2. Define the Geometric Variables & Their Ranges: The thirteen geomet-
ric variables and their corresponding ranges are the same as the ones used in
Experiment 1. This data can be seen in Table 8 of § 4.1.1.
3. Define the Competitor’s Geometric Baseline: The Incumbent’s aircraft is
already in production. From reverse-engineering techniques, it was found that
their geometric baseline was given by the third column of Table 19.
4. Define Economic Noise Variables and Their Ranges: Table 18 shows the
economic noise values, their ranges, and the distribution shapes used to model
them. A discussion about the distribution shapes can be found in § 4.2.4 – this
discussion also motivated the particular ranges for some of the economic noise
variables variables.
5. Define Strategy Variables and Their Ranges: The specific technology k-
factors and enterprise λ-factors will be defined for each use case; however, the
names of the technologies considered for both the Entrant and Incumbent are
described below.
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Table 18: Ranges and description of PDF used for Economic Noise Variables.
Economic Noise Variable: Ranges PDF Shape
Manufacturing Learning Curve [-15%, +15%] β(5,2)
Production Facility Costs [0, $1 Billion USD] β(5,2)
Inflation Rate [-25%, 50%] Uniform
Number of Aircraft Produced [-50%, +15%] Uniform
Price of Aircraft [-15%, +15%] β(3,3)
Load Factor [-15%, +30%] β(5,2)
Price of Fuel [-25%, +50%] β(5,2)
• Entrant
– Composite Wing [88]
– Natural Laminar Flow [65]
– Geared Turbofan [95]
• Incumbent
– New Engine Option (NEO) [92]
– Winglets [176]
Step 3 – Establish Value Metrics:
The two value metrics that are used for this dissertation are normalized OEM profit
and normalized $/RPM. The former serves as a surrogate metric for market share,
and the latter as a surrogate metric for airlines’ desire to purchase aircraft. This was
discussed in detail in § 3.4.
Step 4 – Determine Geometric Baseline:
This step determines not only the Entrant’s geometric baseline, but also establishes
the Incumbent’s geometric baseline. Since the Incumbent’s design∗ was already in





















Figure 94: Comparison between the thrust and TSFC values at cruise conditions for
the base engine and the NEO – each point represents a different throttle setting.
production, reverse engineering techniques were used to determine the values for each
geometry variable. This table also shows the entrant’s baseline geometry, which was
the same as the one defined in § 4.2; as a reminder, this geometry was determined by
using the NSGA-II process, which sought to optimize the profit and $/RPM values
for the range of geometries specified in Table 8.
For simplicity, it was assumed that both aircraft use the same propulsion system.
This was done in order to decouple the aircraft manufacturing competition problem
from the aircraft engine competition problem. The propulsion system used has the
same characteristics as the one described in § 4.1.1. The thrust and thrust-specific
fuel consumption were described by Figure 43 at cruising altitude and speed. Each
aircraft has two engines that each weigh 6,781.67 lbm. Each engine has an installed
thrust of 27,293.2 lbf at sea-level. The NEO for the Incumbent produces the same
thrust, but weighs only 6,403.77 lbm. Furthermore, the NEO has a better thrust-
specific fuel consumption, which can be seen in Figure 94.
Results of Model of Incumbent’s Aircraft and Model of Entrant’s Aircraft:
A major difference in the models arose from the fact that one of the OEMs in all of
the use cases already has an established design in market. Therefore, the model for
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Table 19: Comparison between the incumbent’s geometry and the entrant’s geometry
in the three use cases.
Geometric Variable Entrant’s Value Incumbent’s Value
Wing Area (ft2) 1200 1408.48
Thrust to Weight Ratio 0.25 0.275
Aspect Ratio – Wing 10 9.741
Taper Ratio – Wing 0.34 0.284
Thickness to Chord – Wing Root 0.2 0.1693
Thickness to Chord – Wing Tip 0.15 0.0949
Wing Sweep Angle (o) 35 25.72
Aspect Ratio – Horizontal Tail 3 6.266
Taper Ratio – Horizontal Tail 0.155 0.203
Thickness to Chord – Horizontal Tail 0.07 0.109
Aspect Ratio – Vertical Tail 1.2 1.918
Taper Ratio – Vertical Tail 0.4 0.276
Thickness to Chord – Vertical Tail 0.09 0.115
this aircraft would not include the same RDT&E costs nor would it have the same
baseline value of the manufacturer’s learning curve. But this aircraft is still analyzed
over the same twenty year production life cycle in order to ensure an “apples to
apples” comparison between the profit value metrics.
In order to visualize the differences between these models, a deterministic analy-
sis was conducted – this analysis assumed baseline values for all economic noise and
strategy variables, except for the NEO strategy for the incumbent. The results of this
analysis are shown in Figure 95. All of the results were normalized by the Entrant’s
geometric baseline. When comparing the Incumbent’s geometric baseline to the En-
trant’s geometric baseline it is clear to see that the Entrant has a lower $/RPM value.
As stated previously in § 4.3.2, a difference of 0.01 in normalized $/RPM equates to a
difference of approximately $330,000 per aircraft per year. If a relationship between
$/RPM and number of aircraft purchased were known, then it could be implemented
in the model. This change in number of aircraft purchased would cause the Entrant’s























Figure 95: Deterministic comparison between Entrant’s geometric baseline design,
Incumbent’s geometric baseline design, and the Incumbent’s geometric baseline design
with NEO.
(i.e., shift left). However, since it would be näıve to believe than an Incumbent would
not try to oppose the Entrant from entering the market, Figure 95 also shows the
deterministic result os a NEO strategy. Not only is the $/RPM value lower for the
Incumbent’s NEO, but the estimated profit is much higher – this could result in a
situation where the Incumbent could offer price discounts to further incentivize air-
lines to purchase their aircraft. As previously stated in § 3.4 and shown in Figure 23,
this could result in the Incumbent gaining even more market share.
While the deterministic results do provide some insight into the competitive nature
of the problem, they do not fully address the difficulty associated with this problem –
the uncertainty. The possible impacts from uncertainty are shown in Figure 96. From
this figure, it is clear to see that the uncertainty, especially related to the competitor,
is so large that it is almost impossible to have confidence in any decision made.
While Figure 96 serves as a representation from what may happen in the presence of
uncertainty, the use cases in the following sections more thoroughly address concerns
associated with uncertainty.
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Figure 96: Depiction of how uncertainty can reduce the ability to make a decision.
Before examining the results of the use cases it was necessary to examine the
general case of how uncertainty impacts this design from the Entrant’s perspective
only. Using the information from Table 18, the impacts from the economic noise
variables was quantified. The variability of the value metrics from these economic
noise variables are shown in Figure 97. It is important to note that the results in
this figure represent a theoretical twenty-year production life cycle, but in actuality
an OEM would probably cancel an aircraft program that did not reach its breakeven
year after a certain period of time; however, this logic was not the focus of this
dissertation so it was assumed all aircraft designs and strategies are evaluated over a
twenty-year period. Regardless, the large variability shown in Figure 96, it is obvious
that mitigating steps need to be taken in order for the Entrant to have confidence in
their decisions. The results of Research Question 3, which were further examined in
§ 4.2.4, showed that scenarios could be used to mitigate the effects of this uncertainty.
Therefore, each use case examined the implications of different scenarios and how they
impacted the selection of a preferred strategy.
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Figure 97: Effects from the full range of economic noise variables on both value
metrics, which are described in Table 18.
5.2 Use Case 1: Exploratory Forecasting
Use Case 1 examined the use of exploratory forecasting for an enterprise solution.
As discussed in the previous section, the effects from the full range of uncertainty
associated with the economic noise variables causes significant variability in the value
metrics. To mitigate the effects of this uncertainty, it was necessary to introduce a
scenario, which was probabilistically-defined by the data in Table 20. This completes
part of the missing information from Step 2 of the CoDeS Framework, which was
mostly covered in § 5.1. The variability in the value metrics from this scenario are
compared to the variability in the value metrics from the uncertainty in Figure 98 –
Figure 99 shows a zoomed in version of just an ellipse defining the scenario.
There was still one element of information missing from Step 2 of the CoDeS
Framework, and that was the definition of strategy variables and their ranges. The
first strategies to be examined were technologies for infusion into the Geometric Base-
line design. Three technologies were considered: Composite Wing (T1) [88], Natural
Laminar Flow (T2) [65], and Geared Turbofan (T3) [95]. Since the scenario was
probabilistically-defined, these technologies were deterministically-defined by using
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Table 20: Description of probabilistic scenario evaluated in Use Case 1.
Economic Noise Variable Range
Manufacturing Learning Curve [-3%, +5%]
Production Facility Costs [$800 Million, $1 Billion USD]
Inflation Rate [-5%, +3%]
Number of Aircraft Produced [700, 800]
Price of Aircraft [-5%, +5%]
Load Factor [0, +10%]













Figure 98: Variability in the value metrics from the full uncertainty of the problem














Figure 99: Zoomed in look at the probabilistically defined scenario of Use Case 1
described in Table 20.
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Table 21: Description of three deterministic technologies evaluated for the entrant
in Use Case 1.
Technology Composite Natural Geared
k-factor Wing Laminar Flow Turbofan
Value (T1) [88] (T2) [65] (T3) [95]
kRDT&E +0.5% +5% +3%
kO&S +0.5% – +2%
kWingWt -10% – –
kMLC−Wing +2% – –
kD,induced – -10% –
kD,profile – -5% –
kEngWt – – -5%
kTSFC – – -10%
kUtil -0.5% – -0.5%
point-estimates of their impacts – the values of the technology k-factors are shown in
Table 21. While these technologies are not necessarily incompatible, it was assumed
that the Entrant was only willing to invest in one technology.
Step 5 – Evaluate Strategy Alternatives:
These technology strategies were investigated using the M&S environment, which was
composed of surrogate models created from the FLOPS and ALCCA M&S environ-
ments. The effects from each technology are shown in Figure 100 – as a reminder,
profit should be maximized and $/RPM minimized, which is indicated by the di-
rection of improvement (DoI) arrow on the figure. This figure shows that T2 has
lower $/RPM values, on average, but that T1 and T3 may have slightly larger profit
values. However, it is clearly seen that no technology clearly dominates the other
technologies. As stated earlier, Taguchi’s S/N formulation can be used in order to
help discern differences between these technologies and then a MCDM technique, like
TOPSIS, can be used to help select and optimal technology.


















Figure 100: Ellipses that represent the impacts in Use Case 1 from each of the
technologies defined in Table 21.
shown in Figure 101. The results from this figure indicate some interesting trends.
Firstly, T1 seems to be almost completely dominated by the other two technologies,
which suggest that T1 should not be selected, regardless of the weightings on the
value metrics. Another interesting trend is the trade in preferences between T2 and
T3 – at low preferences for $/RPM, T3 is strongly preferred, but as $/RPM has larger
significance, T2 becomes preferred. Since knowledge of preferences were not known,
an equal weighting for each value metric would result in T2 being preferred; this equal
weighting is shown by the vertical black line in Figure 101. However, before finalizing
selection of a preferred technology at this step, the technologies were first compared to
the Incumbent’s design – if one, two, or all of the technology options clearly dominated
the Incumbent’s design, then there would be no need to use TOPSIS.
Step 6 – Compare to Competitor’s Design:
As previously stated, it would be näıve to assume that the Incumbent would not
try to adopt some strategy to prevent the Entrant from entering the market. As
previously stated, the Incumbent and Entrant have different technologies available
























































Figure 101: Results from TOPSIS of S/N values in Use Case 1 with variable weight-
ings to select a preferred technology option for the Entrant. The vertical black line
shows the point of both value metrics being equally weighted.
between the technologies in Table 21, but instead can use a new engine option (NEO)
and winglet. A comparison between the NEO engine and the base engine were shown
in Figure 94 of § 5.1. The winglet was assumed to reduce the induced drag by 5%
(i.e., kD,i=-5%) and increase the weight of the wing by 1% (i.e., kWingWt=+1%). [176]
This combination of strategies was referred to as NEO+ and only available to the
incumbent.
Instead of comparing the Incumbent’s NEO+ design to the Entrant’s technol-
ogy strategy options by showing their effects on the variability of the value metrics,
Figure 102 shows these effects after applying Taguchi’s S/N formulation. From this
figure, it can be clearly seen that the Incumbent’s NEO+ strategy dominates all of the
technology options for the Entrant. There was no need to apply a TOPSIS analysis
to these data because the results would clearly indicate that the Incumbent’s NEO+
option is preferred, regardless of the weightings selected.


























Figure 102: Scatter plot comparison of the S/N values of the value metrics for
the technology options compared to the Incumbent’s design with NEO and winglet
technology strategies (NEO+) – the Incumbent’s alternative dominates all technology
strategies from the Entrant.
when equal weightings were applied to the value metrics. Figure 103 shows a di-
rect comparison between only the Entrant’s T2 strategy option and the Incumbent’s
NEO+ strategy option. This figure allows for clear examination of how each of these
strategies impact the variability of the value metrics. It can be seen that the Incum-
bent’s NEO+ option earns a higher profit on average and has better performance in
$/RPM values with a slightly lower mean and tighter variability.
To further examine the differences between these aircraft designs, a study was
conducted in order to examine the effects of an uncertainty imbalance. Figure 104
shows the results of this study. The top graph in this figure shows the case where no
uncertainty exists in the Entrant’s T3 option compared to the scenario-uncertainty
shown in the Incumbent’s NEO+ option – this was done by collapsing the variability
of the scenario to zero and using the midpoint for each economic noise variable to
deterministically-define the scenario. The bottom graph in this figure shows the

















Figure 103: Ellipses showing variability in the value metrics in Use Case 1 for the
Entrant with natural laminar flow strategy option compared to the Incumbent NEO+
option.
either of these situations would occur, it provides interesting insight into the nature
of this problem. The top graph of Figure 104 shows that the Incumbent’s ellipse
completely dominates the Entrant’s point. Furthermore, the bottom graph shows
that a portion of the Entrant’s ellipse is in the preferred direction compared to the
Incumbent’s point-solution.
Step 7 – Make a Decision:
The final step of the CoDeS Framework has two options: 1) Terminate, or 2) Iterate.
Since the results from Step 6 of the CoDeS Framework showed that the Incumbent’s
design would be preferred, a rationale decision-maker would iterate in order to see if
other strategies would result in a better design option for the Entrant. This should
include the investigation of enterprise options.
Re-Step 5 & 6:
Based on past experience, the Entrant knows that it could implement an in-house


































Figure 104: Comparison between Entrant’s T2 option and Incumbent’s NEO+ op-















Ent, T2 & E1 
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Figure 105: Ellipses showing variability in the value metrics in Use Case 1 for the
Entrant with natural laminar flow technology and manufacturing initiative strategies
compared to the Incumbent NEO+ option.
enterprise solution, which was called E1, was further investigated. The analysis of
the manufacturing initiative was conducted using the M&S environment and the Ent-
IES formulation. E1 was investigated in conjunction with T2 in order to keep the
benefits of the natural laminar flow technology, but decrease the costs associated
with manufacturing. The effects of E1 and T2 can be seen in Figure 105 where their
impacts were also compared to the Incumbent’s NEO+ option. From this figure, it
can be seen that the profit of the Entrant has increased, but E1 did not affect the
variability of the $/RPM value metric.
Even though E1 only improved the expected profit for the Entrant’s design, this
improvement was enough to make the design more preferred to the Incumbent’s
NEO+ option. This result is shown in Figure 106 where a TOPSIS analysis of
Taguchi’s S/N formulation for the value metrics was conducted with variable weight-
ings. This figure shows that the Entrant T2 & E1 strategy options were preferred to























































Figure 106: Results from TOPSIS of S/N values with variable weightings to deter-
mine if inclusion of manufacturing initiative in Use Case 1 causes Entrant’s design to
beat Incumbent’s design.
While E1 did not improve the $/RPM value metric, it did offer significant improve-
ment in the profit value metric. By comparing the strategy options to the Incumbent’s
strategy option, it was shown that the Entrant’s design was more preferable for most
weightings of the value metrics. Furthermore, it has been previously discussed that
having a higher estimated profit could allow for the Entrant to reduce the cost of
their aircraft, which would positively impact the $/RPM value metric – this could be
considered another enterprise solution. While Use Case 1 did not examine any other
enterprise options, Use Case 2 used an Ent-IF formulation in order to normatively
explore the impacts of various enterprise strategies, including reduction of price.
5.3 Use Case 2: Normative Forecasting
Use Case 2 examined the impacts of normative forecasting in order to determine what
enterprise solutions or combination of enterprise solutions would provide the highest
likelihood of the Entrant’s design being preferred over the Incumbent’s design. Use
Case 2 utilized the first four steps of the CoDeS Framework, which were described in
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Table 22: Description of probabilistic and deterministic scenario evaluated in Use
Case 2.
Economic Noise Probabilistic Deterministic
Variable Ranges Value
Manufacturing Learning Curve [+3%, +10%] +6.5%
Production Facility Costs [$100, $350 million USD] $225 million USD
Inflation Rate [0, +10%] +5%
Number of Aircraft Produced [600, 700] 650
Price of Aircraft [-5%, +5%] Baseline
Load Factor [-10%, +10%] Baseline
Fuel Price [0, +15%] +7.5%
§ 5.1. Also similar to Use Case 1, Use Case 2 used scenario-based analysis in order to
mitigate the effects of uncertainty. The probabilistically-defined scenario is described
in the center column of Table 22. The deterministically-defined scenario in the third
column of this table is explained during Step 5 of the CoDeS Framework.
Step 5 – Evaluate Strategy Alternatives:
As opposed to Use Case 1, which evaluated deterministically-defined technologies, Use
Case 2 used probabilistically-defined technologies. While the same three technologies
were evaluated, the k-factor impacts of these technologies are shown in Table 23.
The variability in the k-factors were approximated based on estimates about the time
required to mature technologies – since a literature review described natural laminar
flow (T2) has requiring more time to mature to the point of implementing on an
aircraft, it has the largest variability in k-factor impacts. While a detailed discussion
on the variability of k-factors was outside the scope of this dissertation, both Kirby
[93] and Gaitan [69] provide detailed descriptions about these variabilities.
The impacts of the probabilistically-defined scenario and the probabilistically de-
fined technologies on the design space are shown in Figure 107. While it can be
seen that the probabilistically-defined scenario significantly reduces the variability in
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Table 23: Description of three probabilistic technologies evaluated for the entrant in
Use Case 2.
Technology Composite Natural Laminar Geared
k-factor Wing Laminar Turbofan
Value (T1) Flow (T2) (T3)
kRDT&E [0, +1%] [+3%, +7%] [+2%, +4%]
kO&S [0, +1%] – [+1%, +3%]
kWingWt [-10.5%, -9.5%] – –
kMLC−Wing [+1.5%, 2.5%] – –
kD,i – [-12%, -8%] –
kD,p – [-7%, -3%] –
kEngWt – – [-6%, -4%]
kTSFC – – [-11%, -9%]
kUtil [-1%, 0] – [-1.5%, 2.5%]
each value metric, compared to the effects of full uncertainty, this definition for the
scenario was not used for the remainder of Use Case 2. Instead, the deterministically-
defined scenario and probabilistically-defined technologies were used – a zoomed in
figure of these impacts are shown in Figure 108. From this figure, it can be seen that
this scenario results in the presence of negative values for the normalized profit value
metric. This means that the insight gained from Experiment 2 (§ 4.3.1) was used
in order to allow for accurate Taguchi S/N results for comparing the impacts of the
technologies.
As stated in Experiment 2, either a shift-transformation or a target-transformation
could be used to account for these negative values; however, it should be restated that
either transformation must be applied to all of the data (i.e., each technology ellipse)
in order to retain consistency in the results. While both transformation yielded
the same results, only data from the shift-transformation was presented in order to
maintain positive S/N values for plotting purposes. Using the heuristics suggest in
§ 4.3.1, the minimum of all the data from the technology ellipses was found to be

















Figure 107: Comparing the variability in the value metrics from the full uncertainty
(dotted line) to the probabilistically defined scenario from Table 22 (solid black line) to
the combination of deterministically-defined scenario (Table 22) and probabilistically-

















Figure 108: Evaluating impacts from probabilistically-defined technologies (Ta-
























































Figure 109: Results from TOPSIS of S/N values with variable weightings to select a
preferred technology option for the Entrant. The vertical black line shows the point
of both value metrics being equally weighted.
Baseline was used. After applying the shift-transformation to the data, a TOPSIS
of S/N values was performed with variable weightings for all three technologies. The
results from this evaluation are shown in Figure 109. These results show that T1 is
dominated by both T2 and T3 and should not be selected, regardless of the weightings.
Furthermore, these results show that T3 was preferred for most of the weighting values
– when the weightings for each value metric are equal, which is shown by the black
vertical line in Figure 109, then T3 (Geared Turbofan) was preferred. However, all
three technologies were compared directly to the Incumbent’s NEO+ strategy to see
if any of the technologies would cause the Entrant’s design to be preferred over the
Incumbent’s design.
Step 6 – Compare to Competitor’s Design:
The Entrant’s technologies were compared to the Incumbent’s NEO+ alternative in





















Figure 110: Scatter plot comparison of the S/N values of the value metrics for the
technology options compared to the Incumbent’s NEO+ design – the Incumbent’s
design dominates all strategy alternatives.
Incumbent’s profit values for consistency. The Incumbent’s technology k-factors were
modified to represent uncertainty in their impacts – even though the technology was
mature, the size of the winglet was unknown to the Entrant. Since the impacts of
the winglet are dependent on its size [176], the Incumbent’s technology k-factors were
modified as follows: kD,i = [-7%,-3%] and kWingWt = [+0.5%, +1.5%]. The results
from this comparison are shown in Figure 110. This figure clearly shows that the
Incumbent’s NEO+ alternative dominates all of the Entrant’s technology options.
Since T3 was selected from the TOPSIS analysis conducted in Step 5 of the CoDeS
Framework, this technology’s impact on the variability of the value metrics was di-
rectly compared to the Incumbent’s NEO+’s impact. The resulting ellipses are shown
in Figure 111. These results showed that the Incumbent’s design was not only shifted
in the direction of improvement (DoI), but also seemed to have a more narrow ellipse
in general.

















Figure 111: Ellipses showing variability in the value metrics in Use Case 2 for the
Entrant with the geared turbofan strategy option compared to the Incumbent NEO+
option.
Entrant and Incumbent were reduced to zero. The effects of this study are shown in
Figure 112. In the top graph of this figure, it can be seen that most of the Incumbent’s
ellipse dominates the Entrant’s point-design. This graph most closely represents
reality because it can be interpreted as the Entrant having complete knowledge of their
design, but uncertain knowledge about the Incumbent’s design. The bottom graph
of Figure 112 describes the opposite situation where the Entrant has full knowledge
of the Incumbent’s design, but is uncertain about the impacts of their own design.
From this graph, it can be seen that the Incumbent’s NEO+ point-design dominates
most of the Entrant’s ellipse.
Step 7 – Make a Decision:
The final step of the CoDeS Framework has two options: 1) Terminate, or 2) Iterate.
Since the results from Step 6 of the CoDeS Framework showed that the Incumbent’s
design would be preferred, a rationale decision-maker would iterate in order to see if
other strategies would result in a better design option for the Entrant. This should


































Figure 112: Comparison between Entrant’s T3 option and Incumbent’s NEO+ op-
tion by examining cases of uncertainty imbalance in Use Case 2.
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Table 24: Description of three different normative enterprise manufacturing options’
impacts.
Enterprise Number λMLC Value
Enterprise 1 (E1) -1%
Enterprise 2 (E2) -3%
Enterprise 3 (E3) -5%
Re-Step 5:
Using the Ent-IF formulation, this step examined the impacts of three different enter-
prise solutions in order to determine whether they could help provide a more compet-
itive alternative to the Incumbent’s NEO+ option. All of these enterprise solutions
examined notional manufacturing initiatives and their impacts are described in Ta-
ble 24. This analysis was conducted in order to determine how much manufacturing
would need to decrease in order to ensure that the ellipse was completely positive.
This would allow for the OEM to utilize a fourth enterprise solution that is described
at the end of this step.
Figures 113, 114, and 115 show the results of E1, E2, and E3, respectively. All
of these figures compare the specific enterprise solution to the Entrant’s design with
T3. Figure 113 shows that E1 shifts the Entrant’s ellipse to the right, but not enough
for all of the profit values in the ellipse to be positive. Figure 114 illustrates how E2
causes a larger shift than E1 resulting in all of the profit values to be positive, but
there is too small of a margin between the minimum value and zero. Figure 115 shows
that E3 not only results in all of the profit estimates to be positive, but provides a
margin of approximately 10% of the Geometric Baseline between the minimum value
and zero.
Since E3 was shown to shift the Entrant’s ellipse and provide a sufficient margin,
it was combined with a fourth enterprise strategy (E4) in order to see if that combina-
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Figure 113: Exploring the impacts of including the first normative enterprise strategy














Ent, T3 & E2 
Figure 114: Exploring the impacts of including the second normative enterprise















Ent, T3 & E3 
Figure 115: Exploring the impacts of including the third normative enterprise strat-
egy (E3) in Use Case 2, compared to only the geared turbofan strategy.
that sought to capitalize on the increase in expected profit from utilizing E3. E4 was
specifically defined as a 5% price reduction (i.e., λP = -5%). This price reduction
was expected to decrease the $/RPM value; however, this price reduction would also
decrease the expected profit, but it was desired that the margin from E3 would be
sufficient in order to prevent any negative profit values. The results from combining
E3 and E4 strategies for the Entrant are shown in Figure 116. This resulting combi-
nation was then compared to the Incumbent’s NEO+ option in the sixth step of the
CoDeS Framework.
Re-Step 6:
Figure 117 shows a comparison between the Entrant’s design with strategies of T3,
E3, and E4 and the Incumbent’s NEO+ design; the Entrant’s T3 design was also
shown for comparison. From this figure, it seems that the enterprise solutions have
caused a significant increase in the competitiveness of the Entrant’s design. To further
examine this claim, a TOPSIS analysis of the S/N values was conducted. It should
be noted that the normalized profit metrics were still shifted by 20% of the Geometric















Ent, T3, E3 & E4 
Figure 116: Exploring the impacts of including the third normative enterprise strat-
egy (E3) and a fourth normative enterprise strategy (E4) in Use Case 2, compared
to only the geared turbofan strategy.
the results presented in Use Case 2.
The results from the TOPSIS analysis are shown in Figure 118. This figure shows
that the Entrant’s combination of technology and enterprise strategies results in a
design that was preferred over the Incumbent’s NEO+ option for almost all values
of the weightings. Furthermore, the slope of the Entrant’s design with T3, E3 & E4
was more flat compared to the slope of the Incumbent’s line. This suggest that the
Entrant’s design and strategy options were more robust to different weightings. While
this figure also shows the Entrant’s strategy option of only T3, it has a value of zero
for all weightings, which suggest that this design is always completely dominated by
the other strategy options.
Re-Step 7:
Based on the results of the TOPSIS analysis presented in Figure 118, the Entrant’s
design option should be competitive against the Incumbent’s design option. There-
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Figure 117: Exploring the impacts of including the third normative enterprise solu-
tion (E3) and a fourth normative enterprise solution (E4) in Use Case 2, compared





















































Figure 118: Results from TOPSIS of S/N values with variable weightings in Use Case
2 to determine whether the Entrant’s geared turbofan with E3 and E4 strategies beats
the Incumbent’s NEO+ design.
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should also explore an enterprise strategy that results in a 5% reduction in manufac-
turing costs (E3) and implement a 5% reduction in the price of their aircraft (E4) for
the given scenario.
The analysis of Use Case 2 was missing an important element related to the 5%
reduction in price – how this reduction in price (and $/RPM) propagates to changes
in the number of aircraft desired. As previously stated in § 3.4, this relationship was
not known for this dissertation, but it could be expected that an OEM would know
or could estimate this relationship based on previous interactions with airlines. The
third use case in the following section examines how that data could be used if it
were known.
5.4 Use Case 3: Entering Asian Market
Use Case 3 explored a notional scenario of entering the Asian market; however, this
scenario was motivated by current OEMs’ predictions for strong growth in this market
during the coming years. Both Airbus and Boeing predict significant growth in the
Asian market between 2015 and 2034. [6, 27] Airbus estimates that majority of
these aircraft will need to have passenger capacities between 154-183 seats for flights
occuring within the Asian market (i.e., not between different continents). [6] Boeing
estimates that approximately 11,000 single-aisle aircraft will be servicing the Asian
market by 2034. [27] In fact, Airbus estimates that the Asian market will account for
39% of their deliveries between 2015 and 2034 [6], and Boeing estimates the entire
Asian market has a value of approximately $2.2 Trillion USD†[27].
To examine Use Case 3, some slight modifications were made to the general back-
ground information about the OEMs presented in § 5.1. The main difference was that
neither aircraft is established in the market, but the names “Entrant” and “Incum-
bent” were still used to describe the OEMs in order to remain consistence since each
†Using USD valuation from 2015.
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OEMs use the same Geometric Baselines described in Table 19. However, each OEM
examined a different strategy in place for entering the Asian market. The Incumbent
sought to utilize the NEO+ strategy previously described in Use Cases 1 and 2. But
the Entrant sought to only utilize an enterprise solution to its Geometric Baseline –
this enterprise solution (E1) is a maintenance initiative that seeks to also increase the
OEM’s physical presence in the Asian market.
E1 involved spending $1 billion USD to construct a maintenance facility in Asia
that can service the aircraft. It was assumed that E1 would cause airlines to spend
the same amount of money on the maintenance of aircraft (but they may be able to
save costs by not having the overhead associated with a maintenance program), and
that 10% of the money spent on maintenance would be a net profit to the OEM. The
impacts and implications of this enterprise solution are discussed more in Steps 5 and
6 of the CoDeS Framework.
As with the previous use cases, the effects of uncertainty were mitigated by im-
plementing a scenario-based analysis. Since both Boeing and Airbus have generally
optimistic views about aircraft manufacturing between 2015 and 2034 [6, 27], the
probabilistically-defined scenario used optimistic ranges for the economic noise vari-
ables. The exact ranges are shown in Table 25. In this table, no ranges are provided
for the production facility costs because it was assumed that only the Entrant would
spend money on a new production facility and that the value was deterministic. Also,
it was assumed that both aircraft would be producing 50% of the total market share,
before examining the impacts of enterprise strategies. The impacts of this scenario
compared to the full range of uncertainty are shown in Figure 119.
A comparison of the Geometric Baselines, described in Table 19, is shown in
Figure 120. This figure shows how each design impacts the variability of the value
metrics in the presence of this scenario. It should be noted that this figure does not
represent the infusion of any strategies.
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Table 25: Description of probabilistic scenario evaluated in Use Case 3.
Economic Noise Variable Range
Manufacturing Learning Curve [-7%, +2%]
Production Facility Costs –
Inflation Rate [-15%, -5%]
Number of Aircraft Produced 50% market share
Price of Aircraft [-5%, +5%]
Load Factor [+10%, +15%]













Figure 119: Variability in the value metrics from the full uncertainty of the problem

















Figure 120: Comparison between the Entrant’s baseline and Incumbent’s baseline

















Figure 121: Comparison between the Entrant’s baseline and Incumbent’s NEO+
designs in Use Case 3.
Step 5 & 6:
Initially, Use Case 3 only examines the impacts of the Incumbent’s NEO+ strategy,
which was described in Use Case 1 (§ 5.2) and the Entrant not using any strategies.
The resulting ellipses from this analysis are shown in Figure 123. When this figure
is compared to Figure 120, it can be seen that the use of the NEO+ strategy causes
the Incumbent’s ellipse to move in the direction of improvement. These two ellipses
were evaluated using Taguchi’s S/N formulation in order to determine a preferred
alternative. The result from this evaluation can be seen in Figure 122. The results
in this figure show that the Incumbent’s NEO+ strategy completely dominates the
Entrant’s Geometric Baseline.
Step 7 – Make a Decision:
The final step of the CoDeS Framework has two options: 1) Terminate, or 2) Iterate.
Since the results from Step 6 of the CoDeS Framework showed that the Incumbent’s
design would be preferred, a rationale decision-maker would iterate in order to see























Figure 122: Scatter plot comparison of the S/N values of the value metrics in Use
Case 3 for the Entrant’s baseline design compared to the Incumbent’s NEO+ design
– the Incumbent’s design dominates.
examined in Use Case 3 is the maintenance initiative (E1) previously described.
Re-Step 5 & 6:
E1 is an enterprise strategy that sought to capitalize on making more money for
the OEM throughout the life cycle of the aircraft. To model these effects, the total
maintenance costs for the aircraft (not including the engine) were needed, which is a
capability of the ALCCA code. The M&S environment was modified to incorporate
these calculations into the total income for the aircraft OEM. Therefore, the effects
of E1 were computed, and Figure 123 shows how it impacted the Entrant’s ellipse
relative to the Incumbent’s NEO+ option.
S/N values were then computed for these ellipses in order to see whether the
Entrant’s use of E1 would be preferred to the Incumbent’s NEO+ option. The results
from this analysis are shown in Figure 124. This figure shows how the implementation

















Figure 123: Comparison between the Entrant’s use of a maintenance initiative (E1)
and Incumbent’s NEO+ designs in Use Case 3.
change in the values for $/RPM. This result was expected since the maintenance
initiative did not directly save airlines any money on maintenance costs. It should
be noted that the slight variation in the $/RPM metric is less than 0.02%, and was
assumed to be due to the residuals of the surrogate models.
However, a key benefit of an OEM initiating a maintenance program is that they
can then earn money during the life cycle of the aircraft and not just during the
purchase of an aircraft. To this end, the Entrant then analyzed the impacts of second
enterprise strategy (E2), which reduced the price of the aircraft by 5% (i.e., λP = -5%).
The effects of this price reduction are compared to the Incumbent’s NEO+ strategy in
Figure 125 using ellipses to show the variability in the value metric. When this figure
is compared to Figure 123, it is clear that reducing the price caused the Entrant’s
ellipse to shift down and to the right, which is not in the preferred direction. By
examining a plot of the S/N values, which is shown in Figure 126, it can be seen that
the S/N of profit for the Entrant would lower when implementing E1 and E2 than
for the Geometric Baseline.
While the enterprise strategy of reducing price was examined in Use Case 2, the
























Figure 124: Scatter plot of S/N values of the value metrics showing how E1 shifts
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Figure 125: Comparison between the Entrant’s use of a second enterprise strategy



























Figure 126: Scatter plot of S/N values of the value metrics showing how E2 shifts the
Entrant’s point to the left and up since the decrease in price lowers expected profit
and $/RPM.
that relationship was unknown. Use Case 3 assumes a fixed relationship between
relative $/RPM and percentage market share – a 1% lower $/RPM value equates to a
2% increase in market share between the Entrant and Incumbent. By examining the
median values of the normalized $/RPM metric for the Entrant’s E1 & E2 strategies
compared to the Incumbent’s NEO+ strategy, it was found that there was a 2%
difference. By the assumed relationship between $/RPM and quantity desired, the
Entrant’s market share would increase to 54% and the Incumbent’s would decrease
to 46%. The effect of these change in market share can be seen for the Entrant in
Figure 127 and for the Incumbent in Figure 128. The direct comparison between the
Entrant’s E1 & E2 strategies against the Incumbent’s NEO+ strategy are shown in
Figure 129.
The results from Use Case 3 can be summarized in Figure 130, which shows the
impacts from the different strategies on a plot of S/N of the value metrics. If the en-
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Ent, E1 & E2, Q increase 
Normalized Profit 
Figure 127: The Entrant’s use of E1 and E2 to decrease $/RPM causes more aircraft
















Inc, NEO+, Q decrease 
Figure 128: The Entrant’s use of E1 and E2 causes their aircraft to be preferred
















Ent, E1 & E2 (Final) 
Inc, NEO+ (Final) 
Figure 129: Comparing the variability of the value metrics from the Entrant’s use of
E1 and E2 and the Incumbent’s NEO+ after accounting for changes in market share.
NEO+ strategy; furthermore, since the Incumbent’s NEO+ strategy has a better
S/N value for $/RPM, the Incumbent would have gained more market share. If the
Entrant were to only use the maintenance initiative (E1), then their estimated profits
would increase. As previously stated, this increase in expected profit means that
another enterprise strategy of a price reduction (E2) can be implemented in order
to lower the $/RPM values of an aircraft. Since Use Case 3 assumed a relationship
between changes in $/RPM and quantity demanded, a more accurate representation
of the effects from E2 can be seen. It should be noted that the decrease in $/RPM
seen between “Ent, E1 & E2” and “Ent, Final” in Figure 130 represents a change of
less than 0.03% and was assumed to be due to residuals associated with the surrogate
model used. The opposite effect can be seen between “Inc, NEO+” and “Inc, Final”
in the same graph – a decrease in market share causes a marginal increase in $/RPM.
Re-Step 7:
By implementing enterprise strategies of E1 and E2, the Entrant is able to create a
design option that dominates the Incumbent’s NEO+ design option. Based on the




























Figure 130: Scatter plot of S/N values of the value metrics showing how the Entrants
use of E1 and E2 dominates the Incumbent’s NEO+ strategy.
these strategies would also provide the Entrant with a majority of the market share.
However, one aspect of Use Case 3 that was not accounted for in this analysis was any
effects that result from opening a maintenance facility directly in the Asian market.
Implementing this strategy may have political, economic, or other implications that
were outside the scope of this dissertation.
5.5 Summary of Chapter
This chapter examined three use cases for the CoDeS Framework. While each use
case examined slight variations of duopoly competition using the same geometric air-
craft, the resulting strategies implemented were different. Use Case 1 used exploratory
forecasting to examine the impacts of a known manufacturing initiative. This was
important because this strategy was only considered after it was seen that the pro-
posed design and technology would have not been sufficient to beat the competitor’s
design. Use Case 2 examined the impacts of normative forecasting to evaluate the
amount of cost reduction that would need to occur in a manufacturing initiative so
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that a price reduction initiative could be implemented. This price reduction would
result in a decrease in the $/RPM value, which may cause more airlines to desire that
aircraft. Finally, Use Case 3 examined the notional situation of entering the Asian
market. This use case explored the impacts of a maintenance initiative that would
allow for an OEM to make income throughout the life cycle of an aircraft and not
just during sale of an aircraft.
One important aspect to note about all of the use cases is that significant insights
were gained when comparing a proposed design to a competitor’s design. In Use Case
1, the Entrant’s selection of an optimal technology (Natural Laminar Flow) would
have not been sufficient to compete against the Incumbent’s NEO+ design. In Use
Case 2, only the benefits gained from infusing a Geared Turbofan and two enterprise
strategies allowed for the Entrant’s design to beat the Incumbent’s design. Finally,
Use Case 3 demonstrated how a combination of only enterprise solutions may result
in a better design alternative without the need to infuse technologies. While these
results are specific to the three use cases described in this chapter, the flexibility
of the CoDeS Framework allows for a decision-maker to analyze a large variety of




“The natural function of the wing is to soar upwards and
carry that which is heavy up to the place where dwells the
race of the gods.”
Plato [133]
This chapter concludes this dissertation work. By constructing the CoDeS Frame-
work and evaluating several use cases, the research objective has been sufficiently
addressed. To fully address the research objective, three research questions were
posed and answered either through a literature review or experimentation. The first
of these research questions is restated below:
Research Question 1: How to ensure a decision-maker has confidence
in their decisions in the presence of uncertainty from economic factors and
the competitive market?
In order to address Research Question 1, a deeper understanding of the impacts
from uncertainty was needed. This lead to the development of Research Question
2 and Experiment 1, which sought to characterize the effects of uncertainty from
controllable and uncontrollable factors. Research Question 2 is restated below:
Research Question 2: How can the impacts of uncertainty be deter-
mined with regards to controllable and uncontrollable factors?
This second research question was addressed through Experiment 1, which con-
ducted sensitivity analyses of the individual noise variables, interactions between
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noise variables, and the effects of different probability distribution shapes. The in-
sight gained from this experiment lead to the development of Research Question 3:
Research Question 3: What technique is most appropriate to mitigate
the impacts of uncertainty?
An in-depth literature review resulted in the adoption of scenarios to address Re-
search Question 3. The effects of these scenarios were further shown at the end of
Experiment 1 by quantifying the reduction in variability of the value metrics that
occurs by adopting scenarios. These scenarios were probabilistically-defined in Ex-
periment 1, but the use cases of Chapter 5 examined both probabilistically- and
deterministically-defined scenarios.
By addressing Research Questions 2 and 3, Research Question 1 could be fully
answered. Due to the effects of uncertainty, a modified Taguchi’s signal-to-noise ra-
tio was adopted and coupled with a multi-criteria decision making technique. To
fully understand how this approach should be implemented, Experiment 2 examined
a canonical example involving nonpositive value metrics. From these results, Ex-
periment 3 explored the results associated with implementing different multi-criteria
decision making techniques with the modified Taguchi’s signal-to-noise ratio.
Based on the results from these experiments, the CoDeS Framework was formal-
ized. It was evaluated against three use cases in order to examine its capabilities.
By addressing these use cases, it was shown that the Research Objective (which was
formulated in detail in § 2.4, but is also restated below), was accomplished.
Research Objective: Develop a framework to aid in the conceptual
design of aircraft by parametrically accounting for uncertainty from the
economic market and competitive environment through an integrated and
interactive design approach. This approach should allow for analysis of
various strategies (e.g., technology and enterprise-based) that can be used
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by the designer or the competitor. Furthermore, this framework should
allow for a direct comparison between proposed solution(s) and possible
competitors solution(s).
The CoDeS Framework addressed all of the elements described in the Research
Objective. The CoDeS Framework provides an approach to parametrically vary fac-
tors related to both the competitive environment and the economic market. These
factors are addressed through the direct comparison to a competitor and the economic
noise variables. This was accomplished using an integrated M&S environment that
not only accounted for the physics associated with the physical design of aircraft, but
also the economics associated with this design and external factors throughout the life
cycle of the aircraft. Furthermore, the CoDeS Framework was constructed in a man-
ner that allows for interactions to occur throughout the process – a decision-maker
and/or SMEs can easily assess different strategies, whether technologies or enterprise
solutions and rapidly compare the results from these strategies to a competitor.
Besides the development of the specific steps in the CoDeS Framework, this disser-
tation addressed several other key aspects of competition-influenced aircraft design.
These aspects were addressed through synthesizing elements from the literature, ex-
perimentation, and the specific application of the CoDeS Framework. These specific
contributions are described in further detail in § 6.1.
Finally, this chapter concludes with suggestions for future work. While most
of these suggestions focus on further refinement of the CoDeS Framework, other
competition-related aspects are also addressed. Specifically, these recommendations
focus on incorporating a more refined model for the customers’ preferences and steps
towards developing an approach that accounts for market segmentation.
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6.1 Contributions
The main contribution of this dissertation work was the development of the CoDeS
Framework, which can be used to analyze the influences of competition during the
early phases of conceptual design. The use of this framework can provide more de-
tailed knowledge to a decision-maker earlier in the design process. Furthermore, it
was shown through the three use cases in Chapter 5 that inclusion of a competitor
during the evaluation of a potential design can result in different strategies being se-
lected. In the first two use cases, the Entrant may not have investigated any enterprise
solutions without the realization that their optimal technology would be dominated
by the Incumbent’s use of their own technologies. This problem represented the main
motivation of the construction of the CoDeS Framework – a design that is optimal
against nature may not be preferred compared to a competitor. However, the CoDeS
Framework would not be effective, without several other specific contributions that
were made during its development.
One of the key contributions made from a literature review was a detailed analysis
of the ways in which aircraft OEMs compete. The identification of these competitive
strategies drove the framing and underlying analysis of the CoDeS Framework. Two
of the key aspects of competition were the use of technologies and enterprise solutions
that are incorporated into a design in order to make it more appealing to customers.
While the general assessment of these strategies could be qualitatively performed,
there was a need to quantify their impacts especially during the early parts of the
conceptual design phase. The use of a well-established k-factor approach for modeling
the impacts of technologies was used and also modified to account for enterprise
strategies. This adaptation used λ-factors in order to account for the impacts of
enterprise strategies. While both of these techniques are useful, a difficulty arises in
trying to quantify the values of k-factors and λ-factors, which means that input from
SMEs might be solicited.
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If SMEs were only used to help quantify values for k-factors and λ-factors, then
established techniques could be used to adapt an M&S environment; however, the
use of SMEs may not be limited to strategy assessment. SMEs could also be used to
quantify metrics that cannot be captured through an M&S environment. Some exam-
ples of these metrics include, but are not limited to: desirability, manufacturability,
ease of certification, potential for furture growth, etc. To include these assessments,
a technique needed to be identified that could identify optimal alternatives based on
the values of inputs and outputs without the knowledge of an underlying equation.
A technique, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), from the fields of economics and
operations research was cross-fertilized to address these concerns. The use of DEA
allowed for SMEs to be easily incorporated in the assessment of potential designs.
This increased the flexibility of the CoDeS Framework because it allowed for more
problems/designs to be analyzed. While this dissertation did not utilize SMEs, a no-
tional example was presented in § 3.5.2 that described how to solicit and incorporate
data from SMEs into the CoDeS Framework.
While the use of strategies and SMEs helps capture the effects of factors that
are under the control of the OEM, they are not as useful for factors that are not
under the control of the OEM. A significant contribution from this dissertation was
the characterization of how these factors can affect the value metrics and limit the
ability to make decisions. These effects were mitigated by using a two-step approach.
The first step involved the use of scenario-based analysis, which was highlighted by
the literature as a preferred approach for mitigating uncertainty. The second step
required the use of Taguchi’s S/N formulation with MCDM techniques. Three of
these hybrid techniques were identified – the OEC of S/N values, the MRSN, and
the TOPSIS of S/N values techniques were identified from literature. Experiment
3 (§ 4.3.2) showed that all of these techniques produced similar results, but could
not identify which technique was most appropriate. Instead, the CoDeS Framework
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allowed for any of the three techniques to be used, depending on the preferences
of the decision-maker. Regardless of which technique is selected, the possibility of
nonpositive value metrics can impact the accuracy of the results.
Experiment 2 (§ 4.3.1) examined a canonical example in order to determine an
approach for mitigating the effects of negative value metrics used in Taguchi’s S/N
formulation. Two transformation techniques were identified from the literature: 1) a
shift-transformation which added a constant to data in order to make all of the data
positive, or 2) a target-transformation which introduced a notional target from which
all the data would be evaluated. The results of this experiment showed that both
techniques can be applied, but that certain heuristics must be used when applying
either technique. The first heuristic is applicable to both technique and seeks to limit
the size of the constant or target relative to the data. The second and third heuristics
are related to the specific approach taken – a shift-transformation requires a shift
that is slightly larger than the minimum of the data, whereas a target-transformation
requires a target that is slightly larger than the mean of the data. While either trans-
formation can be used, the heuristics must be followed in order to ensure accuracy in
the results.
While most aircraft design approaches implicitly assume a monopoly (by not di-
rectly accounting for a competitor), the CoDeS Framework uses a direct comparison
with the competitor’s design. This allows for significant insight to be gained during
the early parts of the conceptual design of the aircraft. These insights were shown in
the use cases. Use Case 1 highlighted the ability of the CoDeS Framework to perform
exploratory forecasting using known technologies and enterprise strategies. Use Case
2 explored the CoDeS Framework’s ability to perform normative forecasting in order
to identify the minimum requirements of a strategy in order to make a design more
competitive. Finally, Use Case 3 examined a situation where two OEMs are simulta-
neously trying to enter a new market – one OEM used technologies to increase the
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competitiveness of their derivative design, but the other OEM used enterprise solu-
tions in order to compete. The results of Use Case 3 highlight how a “real-world”
game could be interactively analyzed using the CoDeS Framework.
In summary, the CoDeS Framework represents a necessary step that was required
to gain detailed insight into the design of aircraft in the presence of competition. The
following section offers suggestions for future work.
6.2 Suggestions for Future Work
Several use cases were presented in Chapter 5 that sufficiently demonstrated the ca-
pabilities of the CoDeS Framework. However, there are a large number of other use
cases that can be evaluated in order to further test and refine the CoDeS Framework.
This could include the incorporation of other technologies and enterprise solutions in
order to quantify their impacts. Alternatively, analysis could be conducted into differ-
ent passenger-classes of aircraft, which may cause changes in the type of competitive
environment being analyzed. However, with the recent announcement of Delta pur-
chasing seventy-five CS100 aircraft from Bombardier [131], the competitive market
of manufacturers creating 150-passenger class aircraft has changed. While this third
OEM means this market is still regarded as a duopoly, the responses from Boeing
and Airbus should offer significant insight into the future of large aircraft OEMs. By
evaluating more use cases, new insight can be gained into the development of util-
ity functions that accurately represent OEMs’ preferences. These utility functions
could then be used to analyze competition in a specific market using a game theoretic
approach.
Besides analyzing different use cases, the CoDeS framework could be expanded to
include a robust model for the customer. Use Case 3 showed the powerful insights that
could be gained if a direct relationship between $/RPM and market share was known
– by incorporating an accurate representation of the market, more detailed insight
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can be gained. For this to occur, the value metrics need to be accurately linked to
the customers’ preferences in order to estimate demand functions. By incorporating
this insight, demand-based analysis could be performed on possible aircraft designs
and different strategies. By incorporating this analysis into the existing supply-based
analysis of the CoDeS Framework, an accurate representation of a market for a specific
type of aircraft can be generated.
While the CoDeS Framework can assess competition between two OEMs compet-
ing in the same market, it is currently unable to assess general OEM competition
across multiple markets. For this to occur, a robust representation of both utility
functions and customer demand curves would need to be incorporated for different
classes of aircraft and different markets. This would allow for a global assessment of
the OEM to occur from a bottom-up perspective that truly captures the competitive
nature of each market. This would allow for higher-level games to occur because
OEMs could then examine consequences from leaving a particular market to more
heavily invest in a different market.
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APPENDIX A
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF
COMPETITION
This example is a notional example intended to provide insight into the difference
between monopoly, duopoly (Cournot), duopoly (Bertrand), and perfect competi-
tion. The equations used in this example are notional and not particular to aircraft
manufacturers. A list of notation specific to this example is first provided:
• p – Price
• Q – Quantity
• Π – Profit
• ρ – Revenue
• Co – Cost
• MC – Marginal Cost
• MR – Marginal Revenue
• R – Reaction Function
• Ma – Market
• M – Monopoly
• PC – Perfect Competition
• C – Cournot Duopoly
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• B – Bertrand Duopoly
Cournot Duopoly:
Begin by assuming an inverse demand curve:
p(Q) = 100−Q
Assume that y = y1 + y2, which means the market quantity is equal to the sum of
the quantity produced by firm 1 and firm 2.
p(Q1, Q2) = 100−Q1 −Q2









∴ MC1 = MC2 = 10
Find Q1 that maximizes Π1(Q1, Q2), assuming Q2 is constant:
Π1 = PQ− C1
Π1(Q1, Q2) = (100−Q1 −Q2)Q1 − 10Q1
∂Π1
∂Q1
= 100− 2Q1 −Q2 − 10 = 0
∴ y1 = R1(Q2) = 45− Q22
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Find Q2 that maximizes Π2(Q1, Q2), assuming Q1 is constant:
Π2(Q1, Q2) = PQ− C2
Π2(Q1, Q2) = (100−Q1 − y2)Q2 − 10Q2
∂Π1
∂Q2
= 100− 2Q2 −Q1 − 10 = 0
∴ Q2 = R2(Q1) = 45− Q12
Solve the system of equations, based on the reaction functions:
Q1 = 45− Q22
Q2 = 45− Q12
The resulting solution is the Cournot equilibrium, (Q1,C , Q2,C) = 30. When these
values are plugged into the inverse demand function initially assumed:
p(Q1,C , Q2,C) = 100− 30− 30
pMa = 40








Figure 131: Cournot’s model of a duopoly – reaction functions result in identification
of the equilibrium quantities of Q1,C and Q2,C
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Perfect Competion:
Firms in perfect competition are price takers. The “invisible hand” of the market
also drives the price of the goods to be equal to marginal costs of the firm, in the long
run. If it were assumed that the firms had the same marginal cost function and the
market had the same inverse demand function as described in the Cournot example:
pPC = MC = 10
p = 100−Q → QPC = 90
ΠPC = 0
Monopoly Competion:
Monopolies act as price setters. This is done by determining where MC = MR
to find QM and then finding pM based on that quantity. This problem assumed a
simplified version of monopoly competition where the cost function is the same for
the monopoly as for either firm in the Cournot duopoly. If the monopoly had the
same inverse demand function as previously described:
Π = ρ− Co
Π = (100−Q)Q− 10Q
∴ ρ = 100Q−Q2
MR = dρ
dQ
MR = 100− 2Q
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By setting MC = MR:
MC = MR
10 = 100− 2Q
∴ QM = 45
PM = 100−QM
PM = 55
∴ ΠM = 2, 025
The monopoly profit is greater than the total profit earned in the Cournot Duopoly










Figure 132: Graph of monopolistic competition as described in the above example.
Bertrand Duopoly:
Assume that the same cost functions for Cournot Duopoly also apply to this example.
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Further assume that each firm has a demand function:
Q1(p1, p2) = 50− p1 + p22
Q2(p1, p2) = 50− p2 + p12
Firm 1 wants to choose p1 that maximizes their profit, given that p2 is fixed:






= 60− 2p1 + p22
∴ R1(p2) = 30 +
p2
4






= 60− 2p2 + p12
∴ R2(p1) = 30 +
p1
4
By solving the system of equations (R1(p2),R2(p1)), p1,B = p2,B = 40.







Figure 133: Bertrand’s model of a duopoly – reaction functions result in identification
of the equilibrium quantities of p1,B and p2,B
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The results from the Bertand model of a duopoly and the Cournot model of
a duopoly yield the same equilibrium quantity, prices, and profit. This was due
to the assumed demand function used for the examples. One of the most difficult
problems associated with these analysis is accurately estimating the demand functions




FIGURES OF RESULTS FROM DIFFERENT S/N AND
MCDM APPROACHES
These figures pertain to the analysis conducted in § 4.3.2. The figures shown are
for the other methods of combining Taguchi’s S/N formulation and MCDM – OEC
of S/N values and S/N of OEC values (i.e., MRSN). The results are presented for
the enterprise strategy options from both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. Figures 134
and 135 show the OEC of S/N values for Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. Similarly,
Figures 136 and 137 show the results of the MRSN approach. These figures show
that for most of the weighting values, the enterprise solution had a higher score. The
results from these figures are similar when compared to the TOPSIS results, which
are shown in Figure 91 for Scenario 1 and Figure 93 for Scenario 2 of § 4.3.2.
While the results are similar, the adoption of the MRSN approach still yields
results that may be harder to interpret. The difficulty arises because the scores tends
to zero as w1 >> w2. This was most likely due to the combination of trying to
minimize one value metric while trying to simultaneously maximize the other value
metric. Regardless, the general trend between the MRSN and the OEC of S/N
values show that the enterprise solution would be preferred for almost all different
values of the weightings. It should also be noted that the graphs in Figures 134,
135, 136, and 137 should not be compared to each other – the relative values of the
weightings between graphs are not useful for two reasons: 1) they are evaluating
different scenarios that a decision-maker cannot control, and 2) the scores between
MRSN and the OEC of S/N values are not the same formulation which would result




















































Figure 134: Scenario 1 with T1 and E1 being analyzed by an OEC of Taguchi’s S/N


















































Figure 135: Scenario 2 with T2 and E1 being analyzed by an OEC of Taguchi’s S/N
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